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C h a p i t r e    
E D I T O R I A L
S E X U A L  P R A C T I C E S  A N D  T R A N S M I S S I O N  
O F  H A V  A N D  H C V  
Elisabeth Bouvet
Hôpital Bichat Claude Bernard, Paris, France
In the current issue of Eurosurveillance, two articles report 
outbreaks of hepatitis A (Copenhagen) [1] and hepatitis C (Paris) 
[2] in the male gay community, and it seems likely that specific 
sexual practices of this community may have been the mode of 
transmission.
For decades, it has been accepted that the hepatitis A virus 
(HAV) is transmitted through direct contact from person to person 
either through the oro-faecal route or by contaminated food that 
is unprepared or contaminated during preparation, whereas the 
hepatitis C virus (HCV) is transmitted through a parenteral mode 
(through blood and its components). As far as hepatitis A is 
concerned, several outbreaks have already been reported in gay 
men, leading to recommendations for vaccination against hepatitis 
A by the health authorities in several countries [3,4].
In her article, A Mazick from Copenhagen [1] shows that in very 
low endemic countries, where the population has low 
immunity against HVA, the introduction of this virus 
in the gay male population can lead to very efficient 
transmission through multiple sexual relations within 
a very short period of time. Saunas offer the ideal 
opportunity for transmission of HAV, epidemically 
and endemically. Some sexual practices, such as 
oro-anal (rimming) or digito-anal (fingering or fisting) 
intercourse facilitate this type of infecting contact.
This risk is likely to increase in the years to 
come, because of: 1) increase in susceptibility of 
young people in Northern Europe because of lower 
incidence, 2) increasing contacts with people coming 
from HAV-endemic areas, 3) increasing popularity of 
new sexual practices that have occurred following 
improved knowledge of HIV transmission risk, but that increase 
oro-faecal transmission. The epidemiological situation of HAV in 
Europe is likely to facilitate this type of transmission because the 
population’s receptivity to this virus in low endemic countries is 
increased, while in neighbouring countries the virus circulation 
remains high. HAV is often introduced in those countries linked 
to the presence of contaminated food (imported or not) or to 
oro-faecal transmission, which can easily lead to large epidemics 
within populations whose immunity for HAV is low.
The acute hepatitis C cases described in Paris [2] in HIV-infected 
gay men are a different and completely new scenario reported by 
InVS and several hospital doctors. There is no assumption that 
receptivity of the concerned population has changed. Hepatitis 
C, just like hepatitis A, is not usually considered to be a sexually 
transmitted infection (STI). Prevalence of anti-HVC antibodies in 
patients visiting health centres for STIs is low, with the exception 
of injecting drug users. Moreover, the incidence of hepatitis C is 
low in sexual partners of individuals who are carriers of hepatitis 
C, despite the presence of HCV in sperm [5]. Several points need 
to be underlined in this epidemic. Firstly, the fact that patients 
were infected by HIV raises several questions. Does this epidemic 
affect only HIV-infected people? If so, why? Is there an increase of 
specific sexual practices with an increased risk of bleeding in this 
population? Is this population more receptive or more contagious? 
Should studies be carried out in gay men who are not infected 
with HIV, to look for a ‘silent’ transmission that could have been 
overlooked, as usually happens with HCV cases? Furthermore, several 
viruses are involved, thus eliminating a unique transmission route. 
Sexual practices reported by patients frequently involve unprotected 
and traumatic anal intercourse that causes bleeding. The most 
frequent transmission modes of HCV (injecting drug 
use, hospital exposure, piercing and tattooing) were 
eliminated in those patients. We are faced here with 
an unquestionable fact, and its cause is still not 
well understood, although it certainly deserves to be 
studied in depth in order to identify the practices 
responsible. It is fundamentally important to look 
for the exact transmission mechanism so that we 
can formulate precise and pertinent targeted public 
information and prevent new cases. One answer may 
be the proposal to screen HIV-infected gay men for 
hepatitis C, especially in Paris, and to disseminate 
information on the transmission risk of HCV during 
traumatic sexual intercourse where bleeding may 
occur.
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O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E S
S u r v e i l l a n c e  r e p o r t
Concerns about healthcare-associated infections and the global 
crisis in antimicrobial resistance has combined to accentuate the 
fears around so-called ‘superbugs’. In Ireland there is no single 
agreed indicator regarded as a true measure of the level of methicillin 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in hospitals. The objective 
of this study was to compare two crude measures of MRSA – the 
percentage of bacteraemia caused by MRSA and the incidence 
rate (per 1000 bed days used) of MRSA bacteraemia in six acute 
hospitals. We examined all blood cultures positive for S. aureus 
(methicillin sensitive and resistant) from 2002 to 2004 in the Health 
Service Executive (HSE) Mid-Western Area of Ireland. Hospital 
In-Patient Enquiry (HIPE) data was used to determine monthly 
in-patient bed days used. Of 245 patient episodes of bacteraemia, 
119 were MRSA. The trends in the percentage of isolates that 
were MRSA and the incidence rate calculated were compared. The 
incidence rate appears to be a more reliable and robust indicator of 
MRSA in hospitals than the percentage. Despite many difficulties in 
interpreting indicators of MRSA they should not preclude the regular 
publication of data at least at regional level in Ireland.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(5): 75-7 Published online May 2005
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Introduction
Healthcare associated infections represent an enormous challenge 
to patient care in the Irish hospital and healthcare system. This issue 
is further compounded by the increase in antimicrobial resistance in 
Ireland and around the world. There is rising concern in Ireland about 
what are commonly perceived as ‘superbugs’. Methicillin resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a topic that has dominated headlines 
in medical journals for three decades. The public have genuine concerns 
about the ‘level’ of MRSA in the institutions that deliver healthcare and 
the consequences of the organism for patients. Infections with MRSA 
may require treatment with parenteral second-line antimicrobials, 
possibly more expensive and toxic, necessitating prolonged hospital 
stay [1]. Bacteraemia is an important indicator of bloodstream 
infection. In many cases these infections are healthcare-associated or 
hospital-acquired infections [2]. There is a lack of consensus as to how 
to define hospital-acquired infections and how to measure MRSA in 
Irish hospitals. Two measures often quoted include the percentage of 
S. aureus isolates that are MRSA and the incidence rate of S. aureus (and 
MRSA) expressed per 1000 bed days used. In contrast to the United 
Kingdom, in Ireland there is little data published and readily available 
on S. aureus bacteraemia and specifically MRSA bacteraemia. The results 
of surveillance of bacteraemia due to S. aureus are seen as indicators of the 
extent of MRSA in hospitals [3]. This study examines how representative 
two measures for MRSA bacteraemia are in the Mid-Western Area - 
the percentage of isolates MRSA and the incidence rate of MRSA 
bacteraemia expressed per 1000 hospital bed days.
Methods and Materials
Cases of S. aureus bacteraemia were identified from blood 
cultures investigated at the Microbiology Laboratory at the 
Mid-Western Regional Hospital, Limerick. This laboratory 
provided the blood culture service for all acute hospitals in the 
region in 2002-2004 (St. John’s Hospital, since July 2002). Cases 
were exclusively blood cultures (including those taken through 
intravascular devices) and did not include any fluids (e.g., knee 
aspirates) that may have been cultured in the same manner. 
No duplicates were included, first isolates were taken but this did 
not exclude cases where MRSA bacteraemia followed an MSSA 
bacteraemia. Non-residents of the HSE Mid-Western Area were not 
excluded from analyses. All patient episodes were assigned to the 
hospital referring the sample to the laboratory. The incidence rate of 
bacteraemia is the number of new bacteraemia episodes expressed per 
in-patient bed days used over a period. These data were extracted from 
the Laboratory Information System at the Mid-Western Regional 
Hospital.
Data on inpatient bed days used were kindly provided by the 
HIPE Department of the Mid-Western Regional Hospital and 
St. John’s Hospital, Limerick, Ireland.
Abbreviations:
Hospital 1  Mid-Western Regional Hospital Ennis, Co. Clare
Hospital 2  Mid-Western Regional Hospital, Limerick City
Hospital 3  Mid-Western Regional Hospital Nenagh, Co. 
Tipperary
Hospital 4  Mid-Western Regional Maternity Hospital, Limerick 
City
Hospital 5  Mid-Western Regional Orthopaedic Hospital, Co. 
Limerick
Hospital 6 St John’s Hospital, Limerick City
MSSA  Methicillin sensitive S. aureus
MRSA Methicillin resistant S. aureus
Results
Data on 245 episodes of S. aureus bacteraemia were collected for 
the three years January 2002 to December 2004. Table 1 shows the 
number of MSSA and MRSA bacteraemia in each year by hospital and 
the average percentage of MRSA in each centre over the three years. 
Overall in the region, the percentage of bacteraemia caused by MRSA 
was 44% in 2002, 56% in 2003 and 48% in 2004. Table 2 shows the 
relative size and activity in each of the hospitals in the area. Hospital 
2, the largest hospital, recorded the highest number of patients with S. 
aureus bacteraemia in the area and the incidence rate has fallen each 
year unlike the percentage which rose from 42% in 2002 to 54% in 
2003. In isolation, the percentage MRSA in Hospital 3 and Hospital 
5 appear similar but the incidence rate for both hospitals [TABLE 2] 
shows the level of MRSA to be very different. The annual incidence 
rate in Hospital 3 is rising from 2002 to 2004.
1. Department of Public Health, Health Service Executive Mid-Western Area, Ireland.
2.  Department of Medical Microbiology, Mid-Western Regional Hospital, Limerick, 
Ireland.
3. Infection Control, Mid-Western Regional Hospital, Limerick, Ireland.
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T A B L E  1
Number of patients with S. aureus bacteraemia (MRSA and MSSA) by year and hospital and % MRSA in HSE Mid-Western 
Area, Ireland, 2002-2004
Patient episodes of bacteraemia (MRSA/MSSA)
Hospital 2002
Total
2003
Total
2004
Total
2002-4
Total  %MRSAMRSA MSSA MRSA MSSA MRSA MSSA MRSA MSSA
1 4 5 9 4 3 7 4 2 6 12 10 22 54.5
2 31 43 74 25 21 46 20 30 50 76 94 170 44.7
3 5 3 8 6 0 6 9 4 13 20 7 27 74.1
4 0 0 0 0 4 4 1 0 1 1 4 5 20
5 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 4 75
6 0 2 2* 4 3 7 3 5 8 7 10 17 41.2
All 42 54 96 39 31 70 38 41 79 119 126 245 48.6
* Data for 2002 incomplete.
T A B L E  2
Incidence rate (per 1000 bed days used - BDU) and percentage bacteraemia due to MRSA by hospital, Ireland, 2002-2004 
Hospital 2002 2003 2004
Beds BDU Incidence %MRSA BDU Incidence %MRSA BDU Incidence %MRSA
1 88 28 661 0.140 44 29 888 0.134 57 32 422 0.123 67
2 426 113 134 0.274 42 121 629 0.206 54 125 074 0.160 40
3 75 25 117 0.199 62 25 468 0.236 100 26 653 0.338 69
4 80 29 919 0.000 0 28653 0.000 0 26 201 0.038 100
5 68 12 886 0.155 67 12 348 0.000 0 12 510 0.080 100
6 95 28 710 0.000* 0* 26 852 0.149 57 26 784 0.112 38
All (95% CI)**
882 23 8427 0.176 
(0.12-0.23)
44
(33-55)
24 4838 0.159
(0.11-0.21)
56
(43-68)
249 644 0.152 
(0.10-0.20)
48
(37-60)
* Data for 2002 incomplete.
** 95% confi dence intervals (95% CI) for aggregate data.
The annual trend in % MRSA in hospitals from 2002 to 2004 
are opposite to the trend shown by the incidence rate. In the largest 
hospital in the area the crude annual incidence rate of MRSA 
bacteraemia has fallen 40% over the three years. Year on year for the 
region there is no significant difference between annual incidence 
rates or percentage MRSA at the 5% level.
Figure 1 compares the percentage of patients with S. aureus 
bacteraemia that were MRSA and the incidence rate (per 1000 bed 
days used) of patients with bacteraemia due to MRSA and all S. aureus 
in the Mid-Western Area from 2002 to 2004 by quarter. Aggregate data 
merges opposite trends in MRSA from hospitals. While there is little 
change in the incidence rate of MRSA bacteraemia in the area, the 
rate of all S. aureus bacteraemia (including MSSA) fell slightly in 2003 
before rising again in late 2004. Up to early 2003 the two measures 
appear very similar but then the percentage of patients that yield 
MRSA isolates from bacteraemia fluctuates in the area from quarter 
to quarter. In one nine-month period the percentage of bacteraemia 
caused by MRSA rose from 39% to 71% and fell again to 40%. 
The difference between the two measures is not as obvious at regional 
level and is probably not statistically significant.
F I G U R E
Percentage of patients with S. aureus bacteraemia that were 
methicillin resistant and incidence rate (per 1000 bed days used) 
of patients with S. aureus bacteraemia (MRSA and all 
S. aureus), in HSE Mid-Western Area, Ireland, 2002-2004
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Discussion
In Ireland, bacteraemia caused by S. aureus became a statutorily 
notifiable disease from January 2004. In the United Kingdom, the 
publication of the incidence of S. aureus bacteraemia (including 
MRSA) has been mandatory since April 2001. The publication of 
incidence rates for Trusts and hospitals in England, Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland has proved informative.
Interventions designed to reduce antibiotic resistance and control 
MRSA in hospitals are vital to minimise morbidity and mortality 
due to infections caused by resistant organisms. Prudent antibiotic 
usage, handwashing/hand disinfection, active screening, contact 
precautions and environmental hygiene are key aspects to minimising 
MRSA in hospitals. Consistent and comparative measures will be 
required to evaluate such interventions. The strategy for control of 
antimicrobial resistance in Ireland (SARI) outlines considerable data 
on the surveillance, infrastructure and burden of disease in Ireland 
as well as proposals for the implementation of future strategies to 
control antimicrobial resistance [1]. It is suggested that studies that 
link information on interventions to control and prevent MRSA with 
resistance rates at the level of the hospital, region or both, may increase 
our understanding of the nature of the MRSA epidemic [4].
Data on S. aureus and MRSA bacteraemia are important indicators 
of healthcare associated infections because they estimate true 
infections (in the majority of cases) rather than colonisation. The 
number of cases of MRSA bacteraemia is a small proportion of all 
MRSA infections but this indicator is less likely to be influenced by 
bias due to sampling variations between centres (e.g. differential 
screening policies or sites tested) [5]. Regional variations can occur 
if there are outbreaks of MRSA. Different types of MRSA may be 
present in the regions but in Ireland there are no regional data on 
S. aureus bacteraemia published regularly.
An appropriate and consistent measure of the ‘level’ of MRSA 
in a hospital is difficult to establish. Measures vary considerably 
by time and place. It is claimed that MRSA has been endemic in a 
number of large hospitals in Dublin since the 1980s [1]. Large tertiary 
healthcare facilities may have higher rates of MRSA given that they 
provide more specialist services (e.g., dialysis, oncology and intensive 
care) for patients with complex medical needs. Laboratory methods 
of antimicrobial susceptibility testing can vary between regions in 
Ireland and standardisation may minimise this as a cause of variability. 
Admission and discharge data are often not readily available through 
laboratory information and communication technology, placing 
the burden of surveillance on infection control staff. Complete 
case ascertainment is a crucial aspect of surveillance and electronic 
data extraction of all cases highlighted issues for surveillance in one 
hospital.
The percentage of isolates that are MRSA varies widely between 
different time periods and depends on the type of hospital. 
The percentage alone does not indicate the number of MRSA 
bacteraemias.
The incidence rate of MRSA does not show as much variability 
in time and is better as a measure between hospitals of different size 
and casemix compared to the percentage of bacteraemia that are 
MRSA. Peaks in the incidence rate reflect increases in MRSA and not 
MSSA changes.
The situation is always more complex when percentages and rates 
are applied to small numbers, such data must not be over-interpreted. 
Confidence intervals are wide in such circumstances.
Percentage MRSA bacteraemia may be useful at a national 
‘ecological’ level. Data on 477 cases from over 20 Irish hospitals 
participating in European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
System (EARSS) showed the percentage of bacteraemia that are MRSA 
in Ireland was 42% in 2003. This was much lower than the percentage 
in the Mid-Western Area (56%). However, the incidence rate of MRSA 
bacteraemia in the Mid-Western Area in 2003 is the same as the rate 
nationally (0.16). Objectively, we cannot say that one measure is 
superior to the other and we may be biased to a measure that shows 
a less negative aspect. This incidence rate appears reliable and useful 
for comparative purposes because it takes into account the difference 
in the relative size of hospitals. However, services and casemix are not 
equivalent, so unqualified comparisons between hospitals are not as 
helpful. Indeed the attribution of a case of MRSA bacteraemia to a 
particular healthcare facility is fraught with problems – carriage of 
MRSA may have preceded admission or infection may already be 
advanced on admission to one hospital from another facility. Certain 
agreed time limits, consistently applied, may make surveillance data 
more useful and some risk adjustment of crude rates may facilitate 
comparisons in future. At the very least high quality data on S. aureus 
bacteraemia (including MRSA) should be published regularly by 
region if not by hospital. It would be useful to determine the trends 
in the percentage of S. aureus bacteraemia due to MRSA compared to 
trends in the incidence rate per 1000 bed days used in other European 
countries at national and hospital level as well.
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We investigated the characteristics of 20 community acquired MRSA 
strains isolated in a paediatric hospital in Athens. Eighteen of these, all 
isolated from skin and soft tissue infections, carried the Panton-Valentine 
leukocidin (PVL) determinants, were found resistant to fusidic acid, 
tetracycline and kanamycin, and displayed a PFGE pattern identical to 
that of the well-described ST80 CA-MRSA clone circulating in various 
European countries.
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Introduction
Community acquired (CA) methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) infections caused by hypervirulent strains producing the Panton 
Valentine Leukocidin (PVL) are an emerging public health issue worldwide 
[1]. Outbreaks of CA-MRSA infections have recently been described in 
Australia, Europe and the United States [1-6], mainly in otherwise/ healthy 
schoolchildren and young adults. Molecular studies have suggested that 
these infections are the result of the spread of a limited number of PVL-
producing MRSA clones that are genetically distinct from nosocomial 
strains [1,2,6]. PVL producing MRSA strains are associated with severe 
deep skin infections and necrotising pneumonia and usually show an 
unusual antibiotic susceptibility profile, being resistant only to kanamycin, 
fusidic acid and occasionally tetracycline.
In this study we report the emergence of PVL positive CA-MRSA 
infections in a paediatric population in Greece.
Materials and Methods
All S. aureus strains isolated from community acquired skin and 
soft tissue infections in Penteli Children’s Hospital, a paediatric 
hospital in the north of Athens with a catchment population of one 
million inhabitants, from June to November 2004 were retrospectively 
analysed.
It should be noted that it is the hospital’s policy to systematically 
culture specimens from all skin and soft tissue infections.
Antibiotic susceptibility profiles were determined by the standard 
disk diffusion method, according to the instructions of the National 
Committee of Clinical Laboratory Standards [7]. Detection of the 
mecA gene and the lukF-PV and lukS-PV genes was performed 
by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) as previously described [8]. 
SmaI digests of chromosomal DNA were objected to pulsed-field 
electrophoresis (PFGE), as described previously [9].
Results and Discussion
During the study period a total of 129 patients were presented in 
the outpatient department of the hospital suffering from skin and 
soft tissue infections, and S. aureus was isolated from 99 of them. 
On sensitivity testing, 22 of them (22.2%) were found to be MRSA, 
an alarmingly high rate that must be further confirmed by carefully 
designed prospective studies. MRSA accounted for 47% of all CA 
S. aureus infections in a recent study from Taiwan, [10].
Eighteen MRSA strains recovered from 18 patients were available 
for further study. Seven were recovered from abscesses, seven from 
cases of cellulitis, three from boils, and one from a wound infection. 
Two more MRSA strains isolated from outpatients during the same 
time period, from pus and from synovial fluid, were also included 
in the analysis.
The genes lukF-PV and lukS-PV were detected in all 18 skin 
and soft tissue isolates but not in the two isolates from pus and 
synovial fluid. All PVL-positive strains were resistant to fusidic acid, 
kanamycin and tetracycline, but sensitive to gentamicin, erythromycin 
and ciprofloxacin. PFGE analysis revealed high similarity among all 
PVL+ strains grouping them into one type (type C) divided into three 
subtypes (C1 displayed by 12 isolates, C2, by 4 and C3 by 2 isolates, 
respectively). The two PVL - strains showed different PFGE patterns 
(Pattern A and B respectively, data not shown).
 T A B L E  5
Vaccine coverage (%) by vaccine and year of birth among 
young adults over 14 years of age, Northern Health Region 
of Portugal
Vaccine / 
Dose No.
Year of birth
1987 1988 1989 1990
Td 95.5 96.4 96.7 96.7
HBV 3 92.5 91.6 92.6 95.6
MMR 2 * 93.4 94.5 94.2 96.0
* Second dose of MMR.
Interestingly, Pattern C was found similar to the PFGE pattern of 
the well-described MLST80 strain that seems to be spreading through 
Europe [FIGURE] [5,11]. Moreover, PFGE pattern C is similar to the 
PFGE pattern of the PVL+ clone C, established and causing hospital 
acquired MRSA infections in one hospital in Patras, a city in southwest 
Greece [12]. Although Greece has one of the highest rates of MRSA 
infections in Europe [13], this PFGE type is not among the types 
circulating in the Greek hospitals [12], indicating that community 
acquired MRSA infections are possibly not the result of the spread 
of hospital MRSA strains in the community.
In that respect, and similarly to other areas in the world, PVL 
producing CA MRSA seems to be a new emerging infection in 
Greece.
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We introduce Bulgarian Surveillance Tracking Antimicrobial 
Resistance (BulSTAR) and make the first report on surveillance data 
for 2003. This longitudinal surveillance programme monitors the 
isolation and antimicrobial susceptibility of all clinically significant 
microorganisms isolated from blood cultures, cerebrospinal fluid, 
upper and lower respiratory tract, urine and wound samples in 
the participating microbiology laboratories. Twenty eight public, 
45 hospital and 6 private laboratories from all 28 counties of the 
Republic of Bulgaria participated in BulSTAR 2003. The total number 
of isolates from marked sources during the surveillance period was 
98 929. Seven microorganisms represented 72% of all isolated 
bacteria in BulSTAR 2003: Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus 
aureus, Proteus-Providencia-Morganella group, Klebsiella spp., 
Pseudomonas spp, Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus 
pyogenes. Generally the resistance of clinically significant Gram 
positive and Gram negative bacteria in Bulgaria was estimated to 
be at a medium level when compared with many other surveillance 
sources worldwide. A unique 32-year experiment on the population 
by treating all severe infections with an ampicillin/gentamicin 
combination resulted in twofold higher levels of resistance to 
amynoglycosides compared with other countries worldwide. This is 
due to the extremely conservative treatment schemes used in the 
former socialist countries, based on national directives and cheap 
domestic production of gentamicin and ampicillin. The forthcoming 
introduction of a computer network and improvements in detecting 
mistakes are expected to increase the sensitivity and the significance 
of BulSTAR surveillance system – an indispensable tool in the 
combat against increasing worldwide antibiotic resistance.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(6): 79-82 Published online June 2005
Key words: antimicrobial resistance, Bulgaria, BulSTAR, micro-
biology, surveillance
Introduction
Bulgaria is a small country situated in the north part of the 
Balkan Peninsula, near the geographical border between Europe and 
Asia. With a population of 7.9 million inhabitants, the Republic of 
Bulgaria is divided into 28 counties that are served by approximately 
100 public microbiology laboratories of the national healthcare 
system. An increasing number of private microbiology laboratories 
are being established and are becoming part of the national healthcare 
surveillance system. The aims of this study are to introduce Bulgarian 
Surveillance Tracking Antimicrobial Resistance (BulSTAR), to make a 
synopsis on the surveillance data and to point out particular aspects of 
the resistance trends of some major pathogens in Bulgaria for 2003.
Methods
We introduce the Bulgarian Surveillance Tracking Antimicrobial 
Resistance (BulSTAR) and report summarised national data for 
year 2003. The surveillance programme was initiated in 1997 by the 
Department of Microbiology in the National Center of Infectious and 
Parasitic Diseases (NCIPD) in Sofia as a voluntary system for annual 
reporting of the isolation and antimicrobial susceptibility of all clinically 
significant microorganisms in 45 public microbiology laboratories from 
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blood cultures, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), upper and lower respiratory 
tract, urine and wound samples. In the years that followed, the 
programme evolved into a national system for longitudinal surveillance 
of antimicrobial resistance, BulSTAR, organised and conducted under 
the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Ministry of Health and coordinated 
by the Bulgarian Association of Microbiologists (BAM) [1]. Data 
from previous years are available on the Internet (www.bam-bg.net). 
BulSTAR monitors all clinically significant microorganisms, isolated 
in the collaborating centres and their susceptibility to more than 
30 antimicrobial agents, tested routinely in the laboratories, using 
nationally recognised standardised method and an element of rule-based 
result checking, applied before the data are accepted. At present, the 
surveillance system covers almost the entire population in all 28 regions 
of Bulgaria. Data are collected separately for in-and outpatients, and for 
urine samples are also divided by sex. Additional information concerning 
patients’ clinical data, samples assessment, laboratory methods and total 
number of materials and positive cultures in the laboratories is also 
included in a separate, supplementary part of the reports. We present 
here the first report on cumulative data, collected during the BulSTAR 
surveillance period from 1 January to 31 December 2003. Seventy nine 
microbiology laboratories from all regions of the country including 
28 public, 45 hospital and 6 private laboratories sent their annual reports 
for this year. All organisms were assessed according nationally recognised 
guidelines [2,3,4]. Participating laboratories used the disk diffusion 
method of the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards 
[5] or different commercial broth microdilution systems. Extended 
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) production among Gram negative 
bacteria was assessed according to the National Committee for Clinical 
Laboratory Standards [5]. Standard (with Group A and B agents) and 
extended (with Group C agents) antibiograms are consistent with the 
National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards [6]. A National 
External Quality Assessment Programme (EQA) was implemented in 
1998 to support the surveillance system. All microbiology laboratories 
participating in BulSTAR also participated in the EQA.
Results
General information - Supplementary data
Cumulated results from the supplementary part of the reports 
show that in 2003 the total number of clinical samples received in all 
participating microbiology laboratories was 1 208 234. Their numbers 
by sample type were as follows: 400 668 stool samples; –241 960 urines; 
–90 107 throat; –52 283 nasal; –62 176 sputum; –42 214 genital; 7167 
punctures; 64 274 blood; 25 773 wound; 1636 CSF; 165 615 serological 
tests; and 54 361 others. The distribution reveals that stool samples 
make up a large part of the overall structure of specimens collected in 
the microbiology laboratories (34%), followed by urine samples (20%) 
and respiratory tract specimens (16%). The relatively high proportion 
of stool specimens observed is due to the inclusion in the supplementary 
part of the reports of great number of screening faecal samples 
received by the Hygiene Epidemiology Inspectorates for prophylactic 
examinations of food industry workers, military personnel and children 
under 3 years of age. Bacteria isolated from stool specimens and their 
susceptibility to antibacterial agents are monitored and analysed in a 
separate survey carried out by Enter-net [7].
BulSTAR 2003 analysed 485 926 samples collected from the six 
aforementioned sources. As explained above, stool samples are not 
the subject of BulSTAR. The total number of isolates from monitored 
sources is 98 929. This means that 20.4% of all clinical samples were 
positive (22.1% among community-acquired and 19.7% among 
nosocomial samples). According to the national guidelines based on 
NCCLS [6], a standard antibiogram is sensibility testing to 5-7 first line 
agents. The total number of antibiograms is 151 437, or approximately 
1.5 antibiogram per isolate, which shows that approximately 50% of 
the isolates required an extended antibiogram with second and third 
line agents.
Aetiological structure
Figure 1 represents the relative proportion of all bacteria by 
species, isolated from six monitored sources, during the BulSTAR 
one year surveillance period. The most frequently isolated bacteria 
are: Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus aureus, Proteus-Providencia-
Morganella group, Klebsiella species, Pseudomonas species, 
Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus pyogenes. These seven 
microorganisms represent 72% of all bacteria, isolated in participating 
laboratories in BulSTAR 2003. Candida species and coagulase-negative 
Staphylococci (CNS) increased to 9% each. The proportion is high, 
but can be explained by the lack of a strict definition of contamination, 
colonisation and infection.
However, despite this shortcoming, the overall structure of 
infections, based on the relative percent of isolated microorganisms 
monitored in BulSTAR 2003 is generally similar to that in most 
European countries [8,9].
F I G U R E  1
Most common bacterial species isolated in microbiology 
laboratories – BulSTAR 2003
Seratia spp. 0.2% (211)
H. influenzae 1.1% (1123)
Enterobacter spp. 1.8% (1829)
Enterococcus spp. 2.9% (2852)
S. pyogenes 5.1% (5073)
S. pneumoniae 5.2% (5163)
Klebsiella 
spp. 6.6% (6541)
P. aeruginosa 6.9%
(6853)
PPM
7.3% (7227)
Candida spp.
8.9% (8833)
Coagulase-negative
staphylococci
9.0% (8869)
S. aureus
11.8% (11 682) E. coli
28.9% (28 592)
Others 4.1% (4081)
Resistance
Another aim of this study is to point out some aspects in the 
prevalence of resistance among the seven leading pathogens isolated in 
Bulgaria during the surveillance period to some indicator antibiotics. 
Figure 2 presents resistance rates among selected Gram positive 
bacteria.
F I G U R E  2
Prevalence of resistance among Gram-positive bacteria – 
BulSTAR 2003
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Among Gram negative bacteria in BulSTAR 2003 standard levels 
of resistance were monitored, compared with many other surveillance 
sources worldwide [10-15]. Just as a typical example, resistance of 
E. coli, the most frequent isolate, to ampicillin in Bulgaria was 53.2% 
[1]. According to other sources this resistance varies from 37.1% 
among outpatients in Russia [13,14] to 64.3% among invasive 
isolates in the population covered by EARSS participating Romanian 
laboratories in Romania [11]. Ciprofloxacin resistance was found 
in 13.5% of E.coli in Bulgaria: this proportion varied from 4.5% in 
Russia to 23% in Portugal [11]. According to SENTRY, the prevalence 
of resistance among Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates was 9% to 
imipenem but only 16.8% to ciprofloxacin.
ESBL-producing Gram negative bacteria are of particular interest 
and are monitored worldwide.
ESBL production in Gram negative bacteria in Bulgaria is presented 
in Table 1.
ESBL production among E.coli isolates was 11.5% in Russia, 21.4% 
among Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates in Europe and 37.3% in Latin 
America and 21% among Enterobacter species. [14].
T A B L E  1
Extended spectrum beta-lactamase production among Gram-
negative bacteria – BulSTAR 2003
Bacterial species ESBL production (percentage)
E.coli 8.0
Proteus spp. 17.8
Klebsiella spp. 23.7
Enterobacter spp. 23.3
Antibiotic consumption
In response to the Council Recommendation on the prudent use 
of antimicrobial agents in human medicine, [16] the Department of 
Microbiology in the NCIPD started to collect data for antimicrobial 
consumption in Bulgaria at the national level as part of BulSTAR in 
2002. We introduced sales data on hospital antibiotic consumption 
for 2002 as the number of Defined Daily Doses (DDDs) per 
100 bed-days, according to the World Health Organization’s ATC/
DDD methodology.
T A B L E  2  
Hospital antibiotic consumption in Bulgaria for 2002 
Antibiotics 
Number DDD 
per 100 
bed-days
J01 - Antibacterials for systemic use (overall) 47.4
J01A - Tetracyclines 0.0
J01B - Amphenicols 0.0
J01C - Penicillins 9.6
J01D - Other beta-lactam antibacterials 16.8
J01E - Sulfonamides and trimethoprim 0.0
J01F - Macrolides, lincosamides and streptogramins 0.3
J01G - Aminoglycoside antibacterials 12.3
J01M - Quinolone antibacterials 7.6
J01X - Other antibacterials 0.7
Aminoglycosides
In Table 3 we present more detailed data concerning the resistance 
to agents in the aminoglycosides group, emphasising the striking 
difference between resistance levels in Bulgaria and those in the rest 
of the world.
T A B L E  3
Prevalence of resistance among selected bacteria against 
aminoglycosides, Bulgaria
Microorganism
Gentamicin
resistance 
(percentage)
Amikacin
resistance 
(percentage)
S.aureus 13.8 10.0
E.coli 15.7 6.2
Klebsiella spp. 26.2 15.9
Enterobacter spp. 28.5 16.2
Pseudomonas spp. 38.7 24.9
Acinetobacter spp. 59.8 38.4
In the examples above, the levels of resistance are twofold higher 
than levels usually detected in European and other countries 
worldwide [11, 13-15]. Other sources quote resistance to gentamicin 
among E.coli –3.4% and among K. pneumoniae –6% (SENTRY). 
In Russia, E.coli resistance to gentamicin was 20.9%, but the resistance 
to amikacin was unexpectedly low: 2.2% among nosocomial 
isolates.
Discussion
General information – Supplementary data
The relatively high proportion of stool specimens is due to the 
inclusion in the Supplementary part of the reports of screening faecal 
samples received by Hygiene Epidemiology Inspectorates. Although they 
are not the subject of BulSTAR’s analysis they give an overall picture of the 
total workload and all clinical samples received in participating Bulgarian 
microbiology laboratories in 2003.
Aetiological structure
Seven microorganisms represent 72% of all bacteria, isolated in 
participating laboratories in BulSTAR 2003 [FIGURE 1]. The relatively 
high proportion of Candida species and CNS (9% each) is explained by 
the lack of strict definition for contamination, colonisation and infection. 
In general the overall structure of infections, based on the relative percent 
of isolated microorganisms monitored in BulSTAR 2003 is similar to that 
in most European countries.
Resistance and antibiotic consumption
Resistance rates among Gram positive bacteria [FIGURE 2] in Bulgaria 
in 2003 were estimated to be at a medium level when compared with 
the levels observed in the last few years in other countries in central 
Europe [10,11], eastern Europe [12], Russia [13,14] and worldwide 
[15]. Fortunately there were no vancomycin-resistant or intermediate 
Staphylococcus species.
Levels of resistance in Gram negative bacteria [FIGURE 3] in BulSTAR 
2003 were similar to those monitored worldwide. The ESBL production 
[TABLE 1] demonstrates one typical picture of resistance to the most 
commonly used group antibiotics in Bulgaria in the past 10 years. Table 
2 demonstrates antibiotic use of major antibiotic classes as proportion of 
the total consumption of antimicrobials in Bulgarian hospitals, which is 
47.4 DDD per 100 bed-days in Bulgarian hospitals as a proportion 
of a total of 47.4 DDD per 100 bed-days. Nevertheless, while it is not 
surprisingly that beta-lactams have the highest consumption, the 
significant consumption of aminoglycosides is definitely noteworthy.
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F I G U R E  3  
Prevalence of resistance among Gram-negative bacteria – 
BulSTAR 2003
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Aminoglycosides
The prevalence of resistance to the two chosen agents in the 
aminoglycosides group [TABLE 3] is of particular interest, because 
Bulgaria has a unique experience in the treatment of severe infections 
with an ampicillin/gentamicin combination, lasting for over 32 years. 
This is because of the extremely conservative treatment schemes used 
in the former socialist countries, based on national directives and cheap 
domestic production of gentamicin and ampicillin.
Conclusions
Some trends in the prevalence of antimicrobial resistance are universal, 
while others are unique for different countries, regions and even hospitals. 
In Bulgaria the prevalence of resistance may be generally characterised 
as relatively standard for Eastern Europe, taking into account the lack 
of reliable methods for excluding duplicate isolates. The participating 
laboratories do not have strict guidelines for multiple isolate exclusion, 
nor do they have adequate computerisation. They also have bias results 
towards artificially high rates of resistance. This situation must be 
remedied.
The advantages of this large scale longitudinal surveillance system 
are the significant number of isolates, great number of microorganisms 
monitored, and annual data on susceptibility to more than 
32 antimicrobials. Data collected and summarised in annual reports are 
a good basis for elaboration of local hospital strategies for containment of 
antimicrobial resistance. In Bulgaria, only the university hospitals currently 
have any experience with restrictive antibiotic policies [17,18].
The shortcomings of the system include old nationally recognised 
guidelines for organism assessment and lack of strict definitions for 
contamination, colonisation and infection. Additional disadvantages 
include the inclusion of multiple isolates, lack of comprehensive national 
strategy for combatting antimicrobial resistance and insufficient budget 
resources for the healthcare system in Bulgaria.
The recently introduced upgraded computer network, including the 
ongoing improvements in detecting mistakes, are expected to increase the 
sensitivity and the specificity of the surveillance of antibiotic resistance 
and communicable diseases in Bulgaria.
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Lyme borreliosis is a potentially serious infection common in 
Germany, but little data about its incidence, distribution, and 
clinical manifestations are available. Lyme borreliosis is not a 
notifiable disease in Germany, but six of Germany’s 16 states – 
Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, 
Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen, have enhanced notification 
systems, which do include Lyme borreliosis. The efforts made 
in these states to monitor confirmed cases through notification 
are therefore an important contribution to understanding the 
epidemiology of Lyme borreliosis in Germany.
This report summarises the analysis of Lyme borreliosis cases 
submitted to the Robert Koch-Institut during 2002-2003.
The average incidence of Lyme borreliosis of the six East German 
states was 17.8 cases per 100 000 population in 2002 and 
increased by 31% to 23.3 cases in 2003, respectively. Patient 
ages were bimodally distributed, with incidence peaks among 
children aged 5-9 and elderly patients, aged 60-64 in 2002, and 
65-69 in 2003. For both years, 55% of patients were female. 
Around 86% of notified cases occurred from May to October. 
Erythema migrans affected 2697 patients (89.3%) in 2002 and 
3442 (86.7%) in 2003.
For a vector-borne disease, like Lyme borreliosis, the risk of 
infection depends on the degree and duration of contact between 
humans and ticks harbouring Borrelia burgdorferi. As infectious 
ticks probably occur throughout Germany, it is likely that the 
situation in the remaining 10 German states is similar to that of 
the states in this study.
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Introduction
Lyme borreliosis (LB) is caused by the spirochete Borrelia 
burgdorferi and is transmitted through bite(s) of Ixodes spp ticks. 
Like syphilis, LB is a multi-system infection, which occurs in stages 
and mimics other infections. The characteristic bull’s eye rash 
now known as erythema migrans was first reported in Sweden in 
1909 [2]. LB was recognized as a distinct disease in 1975-1976 in 
people living around Old Lyme, Connecticut, United States (US). 
Over the past two decades, incidence of LB has increased and now 
constitutes an important health problem in US and many parts of 
Europe. In Europe, very few countries have made LB a mandatory 
notifiable disease and therefore, case rates give only an approximate 
estimation of European LB incidence [3] [TABLE 1].
T A B L E  1
Estimated Lyme borreliosis annual incidence in selected 
European countries* 
Country Incidence per 100 000 population
United Kingdom* 0.3
Ireland 0.6
France 16.0
Germany** 25.0
Switzerland** 30.4
Czech Republic* 39.0
Bulgaria 55.0
Sweden (south) 69.0
Slovenia 120.0
Austria 130.0
*  Based on Report of WHO workshop on Lyme Borreliosis Diagnosis and Surveillance, 
Warsaw, Poland, 20–22 June 1995, WHO/CDS/VPH/95. (1996) 141-1. 
** No published fi gures available. 
Across Europe the incidence of LB generally increases from west 
to east. For Germany, precise incidence data of LB do not exist. 
It is estimated that there are around 60 000 new cases a year in 
Germany [4].
Materials and Methods
LB is not a notifiable disease in Germany, but six of Germany’s 
16 states have extended notification systems. The six East German 
states – Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, 
Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen, – have a more comprehensive list of 
notifiable infections, which include LB [5]. Physicians in these states 
have to notify LB cases to the local health authorities. The local health 
authorities send the data to the federal (Bundesland) state authorities, 
who then forward these to the Robert Koch-Institut (RKI).
In 2002, the RKI published case definitions for LB surveillance [5]. 
The case definitions used by local health authorities include clinical, 
laboratory and case-exclusion criteria. Since 2002, data on cases of LB 
submitted to RKI have been confined to cases with erythema migrans 
and/or early neuroborreliosis. The LB cases are checked for missing 
data on essential criteria for clinical and laboratory evidence at RKI. 
When requested by RKI, missing data are subsequently collected by 
the local health authorities [TABLE 2].
S U R V E I L L A N C E  O F  L Y M E  B O R R E L I O S I S  I N  G E R M A N Y ,  
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T A B L E  2
Case definitions of Lyme borreliosis - essential criteria for 
clinical and laboratory evidence of erythema migrans (EM) 
and early neuroborreliosis (NB)
Disease Clinical inclusion criteria Essential laboratory 
evidence criteria 
Erythema 
migrans 
(EM)
Expanding reddish or 
bluish-red patch, often with 
advancing edge, 
typically distinct
None
Early 
neurobor-
reliosis 
(NB) 
At least one 
of the following findings:
either acute painful 
radiculoneuritis 
or acute paralysis 
of cranial nerves 
or meningitis
lymphocytic pleocytosis in 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) 
and at least one of the 
following findings:
either detection of intra-
thecally produced specific 
antibodies 
or of B. burgdorferi by 
culture 
or of nucleic acids 
(e.g. PCR) from CSF
Results
In 2002, 3029 cases of LB were submitted to the RKI. In 2003, 
the number of submitted cases increased by 32% to 3986 cases. 
Of these, only cases declared by the local health authorities as satisfying 
the inclusion criteria were included in this analysis. A total of 3019 
cases (99.7%) in 2002, and 3968 (99.5%) in 2003 fullfilled the criteria 
and were included.
The incidence of LB of the six East German states was 17.8 cases 
per 100 000 population in 2002. This increased by 31% to 23.3 cases 
in 2003. During 2002-2003, LB case reports increased in all of the 
six East German states with the highest relative increase in Thüringen 
[FIGURE 1]. Two states (Brandenburg, Sachsen) accounted for 81% 
of the cases submitted by all six states.
F I G U R E  1
Incidence of Lyme borreliosis, 6 East German states, 
Germany, 2002 and 2003 (2002 n=3 019 cases,
2003 n=3 968 cases)
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Patient ages were bimodally distributed, with incidence peaks 
among children aged 5-9 years (18.3 cases per 100 000 population 
per year in 2002, 28.9 in 2003 respectively) and elderly patients, aged 
60-64 in 2002 (39.2 cases per 100 000 population per year), and 65-69 
in 2003 (48.6 cases per 100 000 population per year) [FIGURE 2].
F I G U R E  2  
Age-specific incidence of Lyme borreliosis, 6 East German 
states, 2002 and 2003 (cases with information about age 
provided in 2002 n=3 009; in 2003 n=3 966)
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One explanation for the age distribution in adults may be the 
obvious higher likelihood of exposure to tick-bites and the leisure 
behaviour of individuals, aged between 25 and 64, which may 
influence the likelihood of their exposure (more outdoor activities, 
sport, camping and others). Relatively few cases occurred in people 
aged over 65 in 2002 and over 70 in 2003, possibly because their 
activities are less likely to expose them to ticks. The observed shift of 
the age peak to the right in 2003 and the incidence peak in children 
aged 5-9 cannot be explained and needs further monitoring in the 
future.
During 2002-2003, incidence increased in both sexes, in females 
(20.9 cases per 100 000 population per year in 2002, 27.6 in 2003); 
in males (18.0 cases per 100 000 population per year in 2002, 23.6 
in 2003). In both years, 55% of patients were female.
A total of 97% of reports for 2002 and 2003 had a date of onset 
of illness provided. Around 86% of submitted cases occurred from 
May to October. The peak (70% of submitted cases between June and 
September) coincides with periods of maximum tick activity and 
summer-related leisure behaviour. Fewer than 5% were submitted to 
have the onset of illness from December to March.
F I G U R E  3  
Date of illness onset of Lyme borreliosis – 6 East German states, 
(2002 n=3 019 cases, 2003 n=3 968 cases)
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Erythema migrans affected 2697 patients (89.3%) in 2002, and 
3442 (86.7%) in 2003. Early neuroborreliosis affected 97 patients 
(3.2%) in 2002 and 97 (2.4%) in 2003 respectively. Table 3 shows the 
number of cases of early neuroborreliosis with paralysis of the facial 
nerve, radiculoneuritis and meningitis in 2002 and 2003.
T A B L E  3
Number of cases of NB with paralysis of the facial nerve, 
radiculoneuritis and meningitis in 2002 and 2003 - 
6 East German states
Year 2002 2003
Early neuroborreliosis with n n
paralysis of 
the facial nerve
34 36
radiculoneuritis 36 39
meningitis 20 16
During 2002-2003 no deaths due to LB were submitted. In this 
period, the diagnosis of LB was supported in a high percentage of 
cases by the detection of specific immunoglobulins: IgM > 85%, IgG 
> 35%. Other submitted diagnostic criteria (e.g. direct pathogen 
detection by culture or molecular diagnostic methods [PCR] and 
investigation of cerebrospinal fluid) were almost negligible (~ 1%).
Conclusions
LB is a potentially serious infection and common in Germany, but 
few data about its incidence, distribution, and clinical manifestation 
are available. The efforts made in some federal states to monitor 
confirmed cases through notification are therefore an important 
contribution to the understanding of the LB epidemiology in 
Germany.
The incidence of LB has increased markedly over the past two 
decades in various European countries. Changes in the natural 
dynamics of European tickborne zoonoses appear to have occurred 
towards the end of the 20th century, largely brought about by human 
impact on the habitat and wildlife hosts of ticks. Purely climatic factors 
may have played some part. At the same time, raised awareness of ticks 
as vectors, and the intense interest in LB have undoubtedly stimulated 
surveillance and protective measures [6].
For a vector-borne disease like LB, the risk of infection depends 
on the degree of contact between humans and infected vectors, as 
well as the time span the tick is attached to the skin of the human. 
As infectious ticks are likely to occur throughout Germany [7], it 
is likely that the incidence in the remaining ten western German 
states has also increased.
Special advice and information is needed for individuals at 
risk - in particular with respect to avoiding exposure, (e.g. areas or 
environments with tick populations, garden places near to forests, 
grass, bushes, red deer, mice, squirrels etc.), to inspect skin for ticks 
after possible exposure, to remove the tick as soon as it is detected or 
as fast as possible, and to seek medical advice if symptoms develop 
after a tick bite [8], [9]. In addition, removal of grass or other 
vegetation as well as eliminating host animals, such as deer have 
been used as methods to control the spread of LB.
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A European football tournament (EURO 2004) took place in 
Portugal, from the 12 June to the 4 July 2004. Portugal’s Northern 
Regional Health Authority serves a population of 3.2 million people. 
This region hosted 12 matches, more than any other region. We 
describe the communicable disease surveillance activities in the 
region, during EURO 2004. Ten foodborne outbreaks, seven cases 
of meningococcal disease and one case of legionnaires’ disease, 
were detected. Visitors were not affected, furthermore, cases among 
residents seemed not to be influenced by the presence of thousands 
of visitors. A similar pattern has been observed at other mass 
gatherings where special surveillance activities were implemented. 
This does not reduce the importance of public health surveillance 
during such mass gatherings. Furthermore, evaluation of this special 
activities should be an opportunity to put, issues of communicable 
disease surveillance resources, priorities, organisation and training 
back on the agenda.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(4): 86-9 Published online Apr 2005
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Introduction
There is a potentially increased risk of transmission of infectious 
diseases at mass gatherings [1,2], including large sporting events. 
To deal with this increased risk, special surveillance activities have been 
prepared and implemented during previous Olympic Games (OG) 
[3-8] and big football tournaments [2,9-11]. Those surveillance 
activities have included the reinforcement of existing routine 
surveillance systems [4,5,7,9].
The routine surveillance of infectious diseases in Portugal is 
based on a statutory reportable disease (SRD) system. From a list of 
reportable diseases [12], physicians report individual cases to the local 
health authorities (LHA) who send anonymous copies to the district 
and national authorities. Data generated by this system are published 
regularly [13]. There is also an alert and response system known as 
SARA: certain representatives of all local, district and regional health 
authorities have mobile phones and most have access to the Health 
Ministry computer network. This system is intended to enable fast 
alert and appropriate response to some health events (like meningitis). 
For all diseases and syndromes, included in statutory reportable 
disease system and SARA, there are written case definitions. Official 
written guidelines on investigation and intervention exist for some 
specific diseases and syndromes.
During the European football tournament, thirty one games took 
place in eight Portuguese towns. Sixteen national football teams took 
part in the tournament and supporters came from all over Europe. 
The Northern Health Region (NHR) of Portugal, with 3.2 million 
people, was the region hosting the most games (twelve) extending 
over a wide period of time. The precise number of visitors to Portugal 
on this occasion is not known, but there were 2500 flights exclusively 
associated with the event, corresponding to 170 000 passengers [14]. 
Furthermore, 443 940 additional nights (113 867 in the north) were 
spent in Portuguese hotels by non-residents during in June 2004 [14]. 
Those additional numbers represented an increase of 20% in relation 
to the previous three years (47% in the north) [14]. Furthermore, 
32 662 visitors (12 320 in the north), mainly from Spain, stayed less 
than one day [14].
As part of the EURO 2004 health strategy, in September 2003, the 
General Directorate of Health appointed a field epidemiology team 
(FET) coordinator to the Northern Health Region (NHR). The task 
of the coordinator was to develop an action plan for communicable 
disease outbreaks and incidents. The task of the FET, which was 
based at the regional coordinating centre (Centro Regional de Saúde 
Pública do Norte), was to support regional, district and local health 
authorities in implementing the plan.. In March 2004, four members 
of the FET in the Northern Region were appointed full time to manage 
communicable disease risk at Euro 2004. We describe here the FET 
preparatory activities and the implementation of surveillance during 
the football tournament.
Methods
Preparatory activities
The role of the FET was secondary prevention, not primary 
prevention [15], although the FET were informed about actions 
that were being taken in that area; the task was clearly within the 
scope of the definition of secondary prevention: ‘measures…for early 
detection and prompt and effective intervention to correct departures 
from good health’ [15]. The intervention of the FET could also cover 
some aspects of tertiary prevention if they could contribute to 
‘minimizing the effects of the heath problem among those already ill’ 
[16]. Furthermore, nosocomial infection surveillance and control 
was not within the FET’s scope. In order to prepare and implement 
the reinforcement of infectious disease surveillance activities, the FET 
devised an action plan defining the aim, specific objectives, strategies, 
time frame, criteria for choosing the target diseases, activities and 
procedures. This process was developed with input from colleagues 
from other health regions.
The aim: to act in response to the occurrence of specific adverse 
health events (AHE), in order to control them or minimise negative 
effects.
Specific objectives: to detect the adverse health events within 
24 hours of onset and to initiate an appropriate response within 
24 hours.
Strategies
• To identify and select target adverse health events.
• To reinforce existing surveillance programmes.
•  To reinforce the role of hospitals in the detection and notification 
of adverse health events.
•  To appoint specific health authorities to be direct contacts (HA-DC) 
of the hospitals.
•  To standardize the procedures in all steps, from receiving the 
information to the responses.
•  To support the LHA technically in the municipalities where AHE 
could happen.
1. Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência, Portugal.
2. Centro Regional de Saúde Pública do Norte, Portugal.
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Time frame: 18 May to 11 July 2004 (covering the period of the 
EURO 2004 tournament).
Criteria for choosing the target diseases:
•  Potential danger for public health.
•  Potential to originate outbreaks.
•  Increased risk due to the mass gatherings (EURO 2004).
•  Risk of importation of diseases eliminated from Portugal.
•  Short incubation period.
•  Having been identified has a target for surveillance activities at 
previous mass gatherings, like the Olympic Games and big soccer 
tournaments.
•  Feasibility (activities should be based on the previous experience of 
Portuguese public health services and resource limitations [17]).
The target adverse health events (AHE) for increased public health 
surveillance during the EURO 2004, in the NHR, were:
•  Foodborne outbreaks.
•  Legionnaires’ disease.
•  Meningococcal disease.
•  Acute flaccid paralysis, diphtheria and measles (vaccine preventable 
diseases eliminated from Portugal, for which there was a risk of 
importation; surveillance of acute flaccid paralysis an essential 
surveillance tool in the activities leading to the poliomyelitis 
eradication [18,19].
•  Unexpected adverse health events.
The inclusion of the ill defined group of ‘unexpected events’ 
intended to increase the sensitivity of the surveillance system. As 
part of the unexpected adverse health events, we included the 
case definitions of anthrax, plague, smallpox, tularaemia and 
haemorrhagic fevers.
We prepared and distributed written guidelines for each of the five 
groups of target adverse health events to all health authorities and 
hospitals. Case definitions were made clear as well as the procedures 
to transmit an alert and respond to each situation. For each AHE, 
the case definition included the classical categories of suspected, 
probable and confirmed, and also procedures to investigate isolated 
cases or outbreaks, and control the AHE. We tried to avoid conflict or 
ambiguity with already existing official written guidelines with case 
definitions and procedures.
We organised meetings with the 12 health authority direct contacts 
(HA-DC), the local health authority of each of the 5 districts and 
the hospitals. These meetings were used to discuss the objectives, the 
case definitions, the procedures, and to introduce all people involved 
before the EURO 2004. It was considered especially important to 
introduce hospital contacts to public health professionals with 
whom there would be telephone contact during the EURO 2004. 
Each hospital was given the mobile phone number of a HA-DC. As 
well as hospital physicians, we considered other potential sources 
of notifications: the normal statutory reportable disease system, 
a public health laboratory for cases of foodborne outbreaks, the 
general public or any other source, provided we could validate the 
information. Though we were expecting that most notifications 
would be transmitted from the hospitals to the HA-DC, the 
notification of an AHE could come from different sources to any 
of the three elements of public health services (HA-DC, local health 
authority and field epidemiology team (FET)) who would in turn 
share information. This was done taking into account the recognised 
need for flexible surveillance activities [7,20].
The members of the FET and all health authorities were public 
health physicians working within the Portuguese National Health 
Service (NHS).
Procedures
Communication procedures were as follows [FIGURE 1]: 
if a hospital identified a situation in the list of target events (case 
definitions), the HA-DC should be contacted as soon as possible, 
within 24 hours. The HA-DC should then contact the local health 
authority (corresponding to the geographic location of the event 
and/or residence of the person with the disease) and the FET; within 
12 hours, and the HA-DC should make sure that response was initiated 
locally, within 24 hours, following the guidelines, which included a 
preliminary assessment and standard procedures to investigate and 
respond to each specific situation. Even if the information source was 
not the hospital, the HA-DC, the local health authority and the FET, 
were to inform each other within 12 hours. We referred to the whole 
described process of communication as an ‘alert’.
F I G U R E  1
Data flow for the 29 notifications (mentioned in the table) 
from the sources to the public health services and 
information forwarded between these
HOSPITALS 2 notifications
    22 notifications
HEALTH AUTHORITIES
DIRECT CONTACTS FOR
THE HOSPITALS (HA-DC)
27 forwarded 
notifications (FN)
2 FN
REGIONAL FIELD 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 
TEAM (FET)
24 FN 5 FN 0 notifications
LOCAL HEALTH AUTHORITIES (LHA) PUBLIC HEALTH 
LABORATORY
2 notifications 1 notification 2 notifications
STATUTORY 
REPORTABLE
DISEASES
PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE 
CENTRE
CITIZENS
Sources of Notifi cations (bold and italic)  notifi cations
Public Health Services (blue)  forwarded notifi cations (FN)
The investigation and response after each type of adverse event 
notified were described in the written guidelines. Once the alert 
had been given, one member of the FET was in charge of following 
up the local health authority response, until it was considered to 
be concluded. The local health authority could request technical 
assistance from the FET at any time, but even if he/she did not do 
this, the follow up was always done.
On the days when no alert was received by the HA-DC, he/she was 
to send ‘zero reports’ to the FET, by telephone or email. The last zero 
report was to be sent on 12 July (Monday). Zero reports were not to be 
sent on weekends and holidays. Thus, at least on 38 of the surveillance 
period days, the HA-DC was to contact the FET. Since there were 
12 HA-DCs, there were 456 possible contacts during these 38 days.
Every day the FET produced a standardised daily report, sent at 
the end of the afternoon to the twelve HA-DCs, the regional health 
authority, the hospitals providing an email address, and the General 
Directorate of Health in Lisbon. The daily report had a standard 
format, developed during the testing period, including a table for 
the situation in that day and another one with cumulative data; 
a specific format was given to additional information concerning 
each type of AHE.
All local health authorities, HA-DCs and the FET were on call every 
day, but the zero reports and the daily reports were not produced on 
weekends or holidays.
From 26 April to 14 May all procedures were tested as if the EURO 
2004 was already taking place. The procedures and events described 
here implemented between 18 May and 11 July 2004.
Results
From 18 May till 11 July, the FET of the NHR received 29 notifications 
of suspected AHE under surveillance [TABLE, FIGURE1]. Eleven 
alerts were discarded because they did not fulfil the case definition 
criteria. The two ‘unexpected’ AHEs that originated an alert 
corresponded to two situations where foreign citizens sought care 
in emergency units of two hospitals, due to coronary heart disease 
and nephrolithiasis, respectively. A foodborne outbreak and a case 
of meningococcal disease occurred during the period considered but 
8 8  E U R OS U R V E I L L A N C E  V O L . 10  I s s u e s  4 - 6  A p r - J u n  2 0 0 5
S u r v e i l l a n c e  r e p o r t    
were only reported some days after 11 July. The alert situations were 
transmitted by mobile phone, except for the two unexpected AHE 
that were notified to the FET by email.
T A B L E  
Notifications received by the field epidemiology team of the 
Northern Health Region of Portugal during the EURO 2004 
tournament (18 May - 11 June)
Adverse Health Event (AHE) No. of notifications
No. of 
confirmed 
situations
No. of 
expected 
situations (*)
Foodborne outbreaks (FO) 11 10 5 to 11
Legionnaires’ disease (LD) 2 1 4 to 6
Meningococcal disease (MD) 14 7 3 to 21
Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) 0 0 0 to 2
Diphtheria (DIPH) 0 0 0
Measles (MSL) 0 0 0
Unexpected (UNEXP) 2 0 0
TOTAL 29 18 8 to 38
(*)  Historical limits for the time period considered based in data from 
homologous periods from 2001 to 2003.
Zero reports were sent either by mobile phone or by email. During 
the 38 days, the twelve HA-DCs made 335 contacts with the FET, with 
a daily minimum of 4 on the 18 May [FIGURE 2]. These contacts 
represent 73.5% of the total 456 possible contacts (notifications and 
zero reports). Only one of the twelve HA-DCs never contacted the 
FET. The other eleven HA-DCs established, on average, 30.5 contacts 
with the FET. Whenever a daily contact was skipped, a telephone 
debriefing on the situation was done the following day.
F I G U R E  2
Number of contacts performed by the twelve health 
authorities with the field epidemiology team, including 
notifications and zero reports, during the EURO 2004, 
North of Portugal
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After any notification was received, the local health authority 
initiated a response, within 24 hours, following the guidelines. In all 
alert situations, the FET followed the response activities, with close 
email and telephone contact with the local health authority, discussing 
the situation and giving technical support whenever necessary. In 
some instances, the FET built and analysed databases, to support the 
outbreak research. A member of the FET was sent to the municipality 
were the AHE occurred, only once, during a big foodborne outbreak 
after a large lunch, in a restaurant.
In the 38 days specified in Figure 2, the FET produced a daily 
report that was sent by email to all HA-DCs, hospitals, the regional 
health authority and the general directorate of health in Lisbon 
(the national health authority).
No AHEs were detected in visitors. In all AHEs that were detected 
and followed, no relationship was found with venues, events, or people 
directly related to the football tournament.
Foodborne outbreaks
Five of the confirmed 10 foodborne outbreaks were notified by 
the hospitals. The health authority knew of two outbreaks from the 
statutory reportable diseases system and one situation was reported by 
the primary health care centre. A patient and the owner of a restaurant 
reported the other two situations directly. The time lag between the 
day of onset in the first case and the notification varied between less 
than 24 hours and 11 days [FIGURE 3]. In all occasions the FET knew 
about the alert on the same day as the health authority. After the 
preliminary assessment, the foodborne outbreaks were investigated. 
Four case-control studies and one cohort study was done; in three 
foodborne outbreaks only patients were interviewed and in one 
of them it was not even possible to interview the affected people: 
information was given by the hospital doctors. Laboratory studies 
were performed in eight of the outbreaks: in patients, food items and 
food handlers for two outbreaks, in patients and food items for two 
outbreaks, in patients only in two outbreaks and in food handlers 
only in two other situations.
F I G U R E  3
Time lag between onset and the notification of foodborne 
outbreaks during the EURO 2004, North of Portugal 
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No visitors were affected in the 10 outbreaks: neither football fans 
nor other tourists. Only Portuguese nationals, resident in the country, 
were affected, and there was no link with any venue or event related 
with the EURO 2004. At least 278 people became ill and 29 had to 
admitted to hospital, but no deaths were observed. Since we were not 
able to know the total number exposed and ill in the biggest outbreak, 
it is likely that the number of cases was much larger.
The outbreak cause was laboratory confirmed for 5 outbreaks, 
all due to Salmonella enterica. The cause was not determined for 
3 outbreaks and was presumed from clinical and epidemiological 
data in 2 other outbreaks: one due to the Staphylococcus aureus 
enterotoxin and another to S. enterica. Meals had been prepared in 
private households (4 outbreaks), restaurants (3 outbreaks), a canteen 
(1 outbreak) and a situation where food items had been prepared 
both in a private household and in a take-away restaurant. Several risk 
factors were identified, such as contaminated raw food, inadequate 
storage and transport, poor premises hygiene; bad hygiene practiced 
preparing the meals and long time lags between preparation and 
consumption.
The local health authority interventions included inspecting 
restaurants and imposing corrections, educating food handlers and 
treating two food handlers who tested positive for Staphylococcus 
aureus.
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Legionnaires’ disease
The only reported case of legionnaires’ disease occurred in 
a woman aged 38 who had been admitted to hospital, with two 
important risk factors: she was a smoker, and had an HIV infection. 
In the epidemiological investigation performed, no source of infection 
was identified and no related cases of legionnaires’ disease were 
detected.
Meningococcal disease
Seven of the fourteen alerts were discarded because meningitis 
was not caused by N. meningitidis. Only three alerts were sent within 
24 hours of onset [FIGURE 4].
F I G U R E  4
Time lag between onset and the notification of suspected 
meningococcal disease episodes during the EURO 2004, 
North of Portugal
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
 <1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
° 
of
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n
s
Time lag in days
Other adverse health events
No notification of any other AHE included in our list was detected. 
We did not know either of other AHE that, though not included in 
the case definitions in our written documents, might fill the criteria 
(above described) that we used to choose the health events under 
surveillance.
Discussion
The adverse health events (AHE) notified during the period of 
the EURO 2004 football tournament in the north of Portugal were 
within the range of values previously observed in similar periods of 
time, in the years 2001 to 2003 [TABLE]. Visitors were not affected; 
furthermore, cases among residents seemed not to be influenced by 
the presence of thousands of visitors.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a consensus in the 
literature about the rational for implementing special surveillance 
activities during ‘mass gatherings’: there is a potentially increased risk 
of transmission of infectious diseases [1,2]. But, on the other hand, 
no serious infectious diseases outbreaks occurred, and the numbers 
of cases observed seem not to be different from past experience; 
this was the case in Portugal 2004, as had been observed elsewhere 
[4,21,22]. How useful was it to undertake this special surveillance? 
We should consider what might have happened if no activities had 
been implemented. Furthermore, we should ask ourselves what could 
have happened, if an unexpected AHE had occurred.
Is this similar to the aerospace industry? If there are no adverse 
events, it is tempting to conclude that implementing redundant systems 
is a waste of money. But if no redundant system is implemented and 
there is any possibility of something going wrong, it will go wrong!
The performance of our operational procedures seems to be 
encouraging. But external evaluation [13,23] of public health 
surveillance of infectious diseases during mass gatherings should 
be an opportunity to put issues of resources, priorities, organisation 
and training back on the agenda. Evaluation is an important tool to 
support appropriate reinforcement of public health surveillance of 
infectious diseases [23,25].
Acknowledgements
The activities described would not have been possible without the work 
and commitment of the hospitals from the Northern health region of 
Portugal and all local health authorities. Special responsibilities were 
taken by Miguel Galaghar, the regional health authority, and the district 
and local health authorities who established the links between the 
hospitals and the regional field epidemiology team: Agostinho Castro-
Freitas, Alcindo Maciel-Barbosa, Ana Cardoso, Arnaldo Araújo, Beatriz 
Lamas, Carlos Pinto, Jaime Batista, João Cruz, Manuel Dias, Manuel 
Pinheiro, Maria Lamas, Maria Paz, Rui Costa and Rui Marques.
The authors are also grateful to Cristina Paulo, Eugénio Cordeiro, 
Manuela Sousa and Mariano Ayala, for the valuable comments on a 
previous version of this manuscript.
References
1.  Coulombier D. Surveillance for the world Cup, France, 1998. Eurosurveillance 
Weekly 1998; 2(24): 11/06/1998. http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/1998/980611.
asp
2.  Ronveaux O, Quolin S, Van Loock S. Infectious diseases surveillance in 
Belgium during the EURO 2000 football tournament. Eurosurveillance Weekly 
2000; 4: 22/6/2000. http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/2000/000622.asp
3.  Weiss BP, Mascola L, Fannin SL. Public Health at the 1984 Summer Olympics: 
The Los Angeles County Experience. Am J Public Health. 1988 Jun; 78(6):686-8.
4.  Pañella H, Plasencia A, et al. Evaluación del sistema de vigilancia epi-
demiológica de enfermedades infecciosas en los juegos olímpicos de 
Barcelona 1992. Gac Sanit 1995; 9: 84-90.
5.  Meehan P, Toomey KE, Drinnon J, et al. Public Health response for the 1996 
Olympic Games. JAMA 1998; 279: 1469-85.
6.  Thackway SV, Delpech VC, Jorm LR, McAnulty JM, Visotina M. Monitoring acute 
diseases during the Sydney 2000 Olimpic and Paralympic Games. Med J Aust. 
2000 Sep 18; 173(6):318-21.
7.  Jorm LR, Thackway SV, Churches TR, Hills MW. Watching the Games: pu-
blic health surveillance for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. J Epidemiol 
Community Health 2003; 57: 102-108.
8.  Dafni U, Golfinopoulou K, Tsiodras S, et al. Planning Syndromic Surveilance 
for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games [Abstract]. J Urban Health 2003; 80(S1): 
i125.
9.  Coulombier D, Malfait O, Ballereau M. Dispositif de veille sanitaire pour la 
coupe du monde de football, 1998. Bulletin Épidemiologique Hebdomadaire 
1998 (nº22).
10.  Cho JP, Kim JS, Yoo IS, et al. Syndromic Surveilance on the Emergency 
Department in Korea [Abstract]. J Urban Health 2003; 80(S1): i124-i125.
11.  Suzuki S, Ohyama T, Taniguchi K, et al. Web-Based Japanese Syndromic 
Surveilance for the FIFA World Cup 2002 [Abstract]. J Urban Health 2003; 
80(S1): i123.
12.  Portugal. Ministry of Health. Lista de doenças de declaração obrigatória a 
partir de Janeiro de 1999. Portaria nº 1071/98, de 31 de Dezembro, Diário da 
República 1998; I Série-B, Nº301.
13.  Portugal. Doenças de Declaração Obrigatória, 1996-2000: região, sub-
região, sexo e grupo etário, mês / Direcção-Geral da Saúde. Direcção de 
Serviços de Informação e Análise. Divisão de Epidemiologia. – Lisboa: 
DGS, 2001.
14.  Martins MV (Editor). Avaliação do Impacto Económico do EURO 2004. Relatório 
Final. Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão. Universidade Técnica de 
Lisboa. Novembro de 2004.
15.  Last JM (Editor). A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 2nd edition. Oxford University 
Press. New York, Oxford, 1988.
16.  Teutsch SM, Churchill RE (Editors). Principles and Practices of Public Health 
Surveillance. Oxford University Press. New York, Oxford, 1994.
17.  Green GB, Burnham G. Health Care at Mass Gatherings. JAMA 1998; 279: 1485-
6.
18.  Birmingham ME, Linkins RW, Hull BP, Hull HF. Poliomyelitis Surveillance: The 
Compass for Eradication. J Infect Dis 1997; 175(Suppl 1): S146-S150.
19.  Gonçalves G, Santos LA, Sarmento A, Rocha G, Valente P. Portugal e a Europa 
Livres da Poliomielite. Acta Médica Portuguesa 2003; 16: 33-42.
20.  Garcia J, Guillén J. Public Health early warning system: Andalusia, Spain. 
Eurosurveillance Weekly 1999. http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/1999/990304.
asp
21.  Hanslik T, et al. Sentinel monitoring of general community health during the 
1998 World Football Cup. Rev Epidém Santé Publ 2001; 49: 135-44.
22.  Rossi PG, Sangalli M, et al. Infectious diseases in Rome during the Millennium 
Year. Euro Surveill2003; 8:181-5.
23.  Valenciano M, Bergeri I, Jankovic D, Milic N, Parlic M, Coulombier D. 
Strengthening early warning function of surveillance in the Republic of 
Serbia: lessons learned after a year of implementation. Euro Surveill. 2004; 
9(5):1-2.
24.  Bednarczyk M, Lu S, Tan CG, Bresnitz EA. Communicable-disease surveillance 
in New Jersey. N J Med. 2004; 101(9 Suppl): 45-50.
25.  Miller M, Roche P, Spencer J, Deeble M. Evaluation of Australia’s National 
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System. Commun Dis Intell. 2004; 28(3): 
311-23.
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E S
S u r v e i l l a n c e  r e p o r t
9 0  E U R OS U R V E I L L A N C E  V O L . 10  I s s u e s  4 - 6  A p r - J u n  2 0 0 5
H I G H  S E N S I T I V I T Y  F O R  T U B E R C U L O S I S  I N  A  N A T I O N A L  
I N T E G R A T E D  S U R V E I L L A N C E  S Y S T E M  I N  F I N L A N D
M Kokki, P Holmström, P Ruutu
Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, National Public Health Institute, Helsinki, Finland
Material and methods
Integrated national surveillance system
Since 1994, the clinical microbiology laboratories in Finland have 
a mandatory duty to notify diagnostic findings for approximately 
70 specified microbes or microbe groups, including M. tuberculosis 
[FIGURE 1], as well as all microbiological findings from blood and 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). In addition, the laboratory reminds in its 
report to the treating physician about the obligation to notify 32 diseases, 
which are mandatorily notifiable also by physicians. The data for NIDR 
are collected using one integrated laboratory notification form and one 
integrated physician notification form for all infections [TABLE].
F I G U R E  1  
Flow of information in the surveillance system for infectious 
diseases in Finland, 1995-1996
Physician
Notifi cation
(on paper form)
Regional
Infectious Disease
Register
National
Infectious Disease
Register (NIDR)
Clinical
microbiology
laboratory
Test result
with reminder
to notify
On paper form via
regional register
 or
electronically
directly to
the NIDR
Notifi cations
(one copy of the 
paper forms)
Notifi cation
Notifications are sent to the NIDR via regional registers located 
in 22 hospital districts. During the study period 1995 to 1996, 20% 
of the laboratory notifications were sent electronically in encrypted 
format through the internet from the laboratories to the NIDR, and 
the remaining 80% on paper forms. Paper notifications are checked 
manually in regional registers and at the NIDR for missing or 
inconsistent information, and corrections are requested before data 
are entered into the NIDR database. For the infections notifiable by 
both laboratory and physician, notifications on an individual case 
are received and entered at different times. These notifications are 
linked automatically in the NIDR database using the national personal 
identity code or, in case this is missing, using date of birth, name, sex, 
and the municipality in which the case is treated. Country of birth, 
most recent nationality, and the place of residence are automatically 
extracted from the population information system using the 
national personal identity code. The earliest date of a diagnostic 
laboratory sample among the notifications of a case is recorded as 
the epidemiological date for a case.
Little is known about the sensitivity of surveillance for tuberculosis 
after integration of formerly dedicated tuberculosis surveillance and 
control into the general health care system, an integration which 
took place in Finland in 1987. We compared routine laboratory 
notifications to the National Infectious Disease Register (NIDR) 
for Mycobacterium tuberculosis from January 1, 1995, to 
December 31, 1996, with data collected independently from all 
laboratories offering M. tuberculosis culture, and with data from 
patient records. 1059 culture-positive cases were found. The overall 
sensitivity of the NIDR was 93% (984/1059). The positive predictive 
value of a culture-positive case in the NIDR to be a true culture-
confirmed case was 99%. For the culture-confirmed cases in the 
NIDR, one or more physician notification forms had been submitted 
for 89%. A highly sensitive notification system for culture-positive 
tuberculosis can be achieved in an integrated national infectious 
disease surveillance system based on laboratory notification.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(6): 90-3 Published online June 2005
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Introduction
Each year eight million people worldwide develop tuberculosis and at 
least three million die from the disease [1]. Tuberculosis has re-emerged 
in countries from Eastern Europe to the United States [2,3]. Emergence 
of multidrug resistance [4,5] poses a threat even for those developed 
countries in which the incidence of tuberculosis has been constantly 
declining. Consequently, high quality surveillance with good sensitivity 
is needed also in countries with low incidence.
In countries endemic for tuberculosis, tuberculosis case finding, 
treatment, and outcome monitoring are commonly implemented by 
a vertical organisation dedicated to tuberculosis. The surveillance data 
thus collected are considered to be of high coverage, in contrast to low 
sensitivities reported from passive systems for the surveillance of other 
infectious diseases based on notification by physicians [6,7]. Little 
information is available on the sensitivity for tuberculosis in national 
systems where surveillance for tuberculosis has been integrated with 
surveillance for a wide range of infectious diseases.
In Finland, a dedicated, vertical national tuberculosis surveillance 
and control organisation was dissolved in 1986, and the surveillance 
for tuberculosis was incorporated into an integrated national system 
for infectious diseases. This system was revised in 1994 to incorporate 
a mandatory, laboratory based notification system for a wide range of 
microbes, including Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and complementing 
mandatory physician notification for a limited number of diseases 
(National Infectious Diseases Register, NIDR).
We investigated the sensitivity of the surveillance system in a two-
year national cohort of culture-positive tuberculosis cases. We compared 
notifications to the NIDR with a reference dataset collected independently 
from all laboratories performing culture for Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis. 
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T A B L E  
Data from laboratory and physician notifications of 
tuberculosis cases to the NIDR, and data retrieved from 
the population information system, Finland
Variable
Notifications to NIDR from Retrieved from 
the population 
information 
systemLaboratory Physician
Name X X
National Personal 
Identity Code X X X
Date of birth1 X X X
Gender X X X
Place of residence X X
Current nationality X X
Country of birth X
Date of death X
Clinical unit treating 
patient X X
International 
Classification of 
Diseases (ICD)
X
Method of confirming 
diagnosis (clinical, 
microbiological, 
histological)
X
Date of diagnostic 
sample X
Classification of TB 
(new, relapse, failure) X
Sputum smear result 
for AFB2 X
Full TB treatment to be 
given X
Code for microbial 
species X
Laboratory method 
(culture, DNA/RNA) X
Sample type X
Resistance to INH or 
rifampicin X
1. Incorporated in the national personal identity code.
2. Acid fast bacilli.
Tuberculosis surveillance data collection and processing
A clinically suspected case of tuberculosis with a decision to 
give full treatment is notifiable by a physician. Tuberculosis is the 
only infection in the NIDR for which a case does not have to be 
microbiologically confirmed to be notifiable. The algorithm for the 
fully computerised categorisation of TB cases, as well as the criteria for 
inclusion or rejection of a provisional case, automatically reassessed 
if a new notification on a pre-existing case is entered, are depicted 
in Figure 2. Cases included in the statistics, i.e. the case definition 
for a registered case, consist of (a) culture-confirmed cases notified 
by laboratories, (b) cases notified only by a physician and for which 
histological confirmation is reported, (c) cases of clinically suspected 
pulmonary tuberculosis for which the physician reports a sputum stain 
positive for acid fast bacilli. Because of the dynamic process where 
notifications on an individual case may accumulate over a period of 
several months, the categorisation of a case may change over time. 
Tuberculosis cases for which sample dates in further notifications are 
later than six months from the first date are assessed separately for 
their case status as a possible failure or relapse.
F I G U R E  2  
Automated computer algorithm for processing notifications 
of tuberculosis cases in the NIDR, Finland
Provisional case
(notifi cations with 
matching identity)
ICD-code for pulmonary
tuberculosis?
NO
Is there confi rmation 
by culture?
Is there histological 
proof?
YES
Is the case sputum 
smear positive?
Is the laboratory 
method culture?
Case of
tuberculosis in
the NIDR
Case rejected from 
NIDR statistics
Laboratory notifi cation on 
a fi nding from a sputum 
or bronchoscopy sample?
Classifi cation:
NON-PULMONARY
Classifi cation:
PULMONARY NOYES
NO
NO NO
NO
YES
YES
Is there histological 
proof?
YES
YES YES
NO
All the physician notifications on tuberculosis without a link to a 
laboratory notification of M. tuberculosis are checked electronically 
for linkage to laboratory notifications on culture findings of non-
tuberculous mycobacteria. All provisional cases under 15 years of age are 
checked in detail. Cases not fulfilling the case definition for registering 
remain in the database, but are not used for statistical purposes. During 
the study period no requests were sent for missing notifications in 
cases where either a laboratory notification, or a physician notification 
reporting microbiological confirmation, was registered without a 
corresponding notification from the other source.
Study population
For the evaluation of the coverage of the NIDR, a comparison 
was made between all cases notified by laboratories as positive for 
M. tuberculosis by culture and a reference dataset. The NIDR -derived 
set of cases included all the tuberculosis cases with a laboratory 
notification on a first specimen positive for M. tuberculosis by culture 
collected between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 1996.
For collection of the reference dataset, all the laboratories that 
had ever sent M. tuberculosis notifications to the NIDR or licensed 
to perform clinical microbiology testing for M. tuberculosis were 
contacted. Eighteen laboratories were found to have performed 
M. tuberculosis cultures during 1995-1996. One of the laboratories was 
private and the remaining ones, associated with university hospitals 
or other specialised care, were in publicly funded hospitals. A request 
was sent to the identified laboratories to provide a list of all samples 
culture-positive for M. tuberculosis between 1 October 1994, and 
31 December 1996, with personal identifying information.
For the reference dataset the laboratories provided data as: (a) 
a print-out of laboratory computer files on culture-positive results 
of M. tuberculosis (five laboratories), (b) a manually-generated list 
from the laboratory database (six laboratories), (c) a photocopy of 
each confirmed identification and susceptibility test result returned 
from the national reference laboratory (three laboratories) and 
(d) a mixture of (b) and (c) (four laboratories). The laboratories 
were discouraged from using the previously sent notifications on 
M. tuberculosis findings as a base for the reference data. The data from 
the lists sent by the laboratories were entered as a reference dataset. 
Each case in this dataset was linked with cases in the NIDR database 
using the national personal identity code. Cases in either dataset 
without an electronic linkage initially to a case in the other dataset 
were carefully checked manually for spelling or digit mistakes in the 
name, date of birth, and national personal identity code for a final 
culture-confirmed cohort. For all the cases in this cohort, a chart 
review was performed for collecting further detailed microbiological, 
clinical, treatment and outcome data.
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Statistical analysis
To estimate the sensitivity of the laboratory notifications to the 
NIDR as a proportion of all culture-confirmed cases, the number of 
laboratory-notified culture-positive cases in the NIDR was divided 
by the total number of culture-confirmed in the study cohort. To 
estimate the sensitivity of physician notifications of culture-positive 
tuberculosis cases in the NIDR, the number of physician notifications 
on culture-positive cases found in the NIDR was divided by the 
number of culture-positive cases notified by a laboratory to the NIDR. 
Positive predictive value was calculated by standard method.
Results
During the 24 month study period in 1995-1996, 991 cases were 
notified as culture-confirmed to the national surveillance system 
NIDR. The retrospective, separate collection of culture findings for 
the reference dataset from each laboratory licensed to implement 
mycobacterial cultures yielded 1054 culture-confirmed cases. Linking 
these two datasets with the national personal identity code identified 
a total of 1088 culture-confirmed cases present in both or either of 
the datasets. Patient records were available and reviewed for 1057 of 
these 1088 cases.
Chart review revealed that a total of 29 of the 1088 cases had not 
actually fulfilled the case definition of the NIDR: in 14 the diagnosis 
was based only on PCR, three cases were caused by non-tuberculous 
mycobacteria, and a further five were excluded for varying reasons. 
A further seven cases had been registered in the wrong calendar year. 
After the exclusion of these 29 cases, a total of 1059 cases remained 
in the study cohort; 984 having been notified to NIDR as culture-
verified, and 1029 present in the reference dataset [FIGURE 3].
F I G U R E  3  
Culture confirmed tuberculosis cases in the NIDR and 
reference dataset between 1 January 1995-31 December 1996, 
Finland
Culture positive
cases in NIDR
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NIDR and the 
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dataset
n=954
Cases in reference dataset
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Cases in the NIDR 
without culture 
confi rmation
n=27
Cases excluded 
from the NIDR
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the reference 
dataset only 
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the NIDR
n=75
Cases in the 
NIDR only
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The sensitivity of the NIDR for culture-positive cases of tuberculosis 
was 93% (984/1059). The positive predictive value of a case recorded 
in the NIDR as culture-positive to be a verified culture-positive case 
was 99% (984/991).
Twenty (2%) of the 1029 culture-positive cases in the reference 
dataset, and also verified in the chart review process, did not have 
any notification to the NIDR [FIGURE 3]. Another 55 cases had 
one or more notifications in the NIDR, which did not, with the data 
included in the original notification(s), meet the NIDR definition for 
a culture-positive case. Twenty seven of these had been included in the 
NIDR statistics based solely on a physician notification fulfilling the 
case criteria, another twenty eight provisional cases had not fulfilled 
the case definition for registration as a case.
Thirty cases not found in the reference dataset were found in the 
NIDR as laboratory notified, culture-positive cases. Patient records 
or additional checks in the clinical microbiology laboratories verified 
that these cases had been positive for M. tuberculosis by culture, but 
had been omitted from the laboratory list for reference dataset, half 
of them from a single laboratory.
For the culture-confirmed cases in the NIDR (N=984), which 
were verified by the checking procedure, one or more physician 
notification forms were found for 876, for a sensitivity of 89% for 
physician notifications.
Discussion
We assessed the sensitivity for culture-confirmed tuberculosis 
of a recently introduced national integrated infectious diseases 
surveillance system based on mandatory laboratory and physician 
notification. By comparing data from the national surveillance system 
with a reference dataset collected separately from all laboratories 
performing M. tuberculosis culture, we found a sensitivity exceeding 
90% for culture-confirmed cases of tuberculosis.
The sensitivity of the surveillance system was assessed using 
a nation wide population-based cohort of all cases positive for 
M. tuberculosis in culture over a two-year period. The laboratories 
performing M. tuberculosis culture were identified from two different 
sources. Subsequently, the reference dataset from each laboratory 
was collected by a mechanism unrelated to previous laboratory 
notifications to NIDR, confirmed by in-depth interview of procedures 
used in collecting the data at each laboratory. The overall high-degree 
match of the cases in the reference data with those in the NIDR and 
the additional validation procedure using patient records ensure 
that the cohort obtained by merging cases from these two sources 
is valid for assessing the sensitivity of the NIDR for culture-positive 
M. tuberculosis infection. A limitation of the study design is that it does 
not allow estimations on the sensitivity of the surveillance systems for 
tuberculosis cases, which have not been confirmed by culture.
Laboratory notification has been proposed to improve the sensitivity 
of passive surveillance systems based on physician notification [8,9]. 
We are not aware of previous reports on evaluating national large-scale 
laboratory-based surveillance of infectious diseases. The sensitivity of 
the NIDR for culture-positive M. tuberculosis cases observed in this 
study is considerably higher than those published previously in high 
or low incidence countries for tuberculosis. Using a combination of 
data sources such as hospital discharge registers, pharmacy listings of 
patients receiving antituberculosis medications, laboratory registries 
and special clinics treating tuberculosis patients for identifying cases 
a study from the United States [6] estimated in the 1970s that the 
reporting rate for tuberculosis was 63%. In Scotland, 60% of cases 
with a combined clinical and pathological diagnosis were notified 
[10]. In a five-year survey in London, 27% of tuberculosis cases were 
notified [11].
The new surveillance system, introduced in Finland in 1994, 
with mandatory laboratory-based notification, has some distinct 
advantages. To save manpower resources, automated computer 
algorithms are used in the NIDR without preceding manual synthesis 
of multiple notifications from a case. In a state wide pilot study in 
a limited geographic area in the United States, electronic laboratory 
reporting more than doubled the total number of reports as compared 
with reporting based on form [12]. In Finland, currently over 85% 
of all laboratory notifications are made electronically to NIDR with 
data automatically extracted from laboratory databases, in contrast 
to 20 percent at the time of the studied cohort. The data, including 
nominal identifiers, are transmitted in an encrypted format using 
public lines and internet technology. Using the national personal 
identity code, all the notifications for one person, sometimes 
exceeding 10 for one episode from several sources, distributed over 
a wide geographic spread due to referrals, can be linked. The system 
also supports easy electronic linkage of provisional tuberculosis 
cases to laboratory notifications of non-tuberculous mycobacteria 
as a checking procedure, as well as linkage between notifications of 
tuberculosis and HIV infection.
In the Finnish notification system the laboratory should 
also remind the physician to send a notification to the NIDR when 
a positive result of a pathogen causing disease also notifiable by a 
physician is reported to the clinic from the laboratory. With limited 
resources for surveillance of a large number of infectious diseases, 
physicians were not sent requests during the study period from the 
surveillance system to supply a notification on a patient for whom a 
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The tuberculosis (TB) situation in the Russian penitentiary 
system has received much attention. We performed a descriptive 
epidemiological study of TB in two St Petersburg remand 
prisons (SIZOs). The medical databases of the TB divisions in 
these prisons were searched for all diagnosed cases of TB from 
1 January 2000 to 31 December 2002. The main diagnostic method 
was chest x ray.
The total number of reported TB cases in these two remand prisons 
during this three-year period was 876. Out of these, 432 were 
diagnosed at entry to prison, and 444 developed the disease during 
incarceration, with the proportion diagnosed during incarceration 
increasing over time. The majority of cases were aged under 
30 years.
TB incidence in Russian remand prisons is still very high and needs 
to be monitored closely.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(6): 93-6 Published online June 2005
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Introduction
Reliable data on tuberculosis (TB) incidence in the Soviet 
Union are lacking. There is, however, strong reason to believe that 
the incidence has increased considerably since 1991. According 
to official national figures, the incidence was 34/100 000 in 
1991 and 90/100 000 in 2000 [1]. The TB problem has received 
much attention both in Russia and western countries [2,3]. The 
high incidence of TB in Russian prisons is of particular concern 
[4-6]: a search of the databases MEDLINE and CAplus yielded 
45 publications since 1980 on TB in Russian prisons. However, 25 of 
these were published in Russian only. There have been several initiatives 
from international organisations to assist national authorities in their 
control efforts among prisoners [7]. TB in prison is not an isolated 
problem – especially not in a remand prison – since incompletely 
treated patients may well spread the disease in the general population 
after release [8-10].
1.  Department of Medical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Karolinska Institute, 
Stockholm, Sweden.
2.  Department of the Penal System of Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation 
in St Petersburg and Leningrad region (GUIN), St Petersburg, Russia.
laboratory notification without a linking physician notification has 
been received. On this background, 89% sensitivity for physician 
notification, providing complementary clinical-epidemiologic data, 
in culture-positive cases seems high compared with previous reports on 
the evaluation of notification systems based on physician notification 
only. The sensitivity and efficiency of the surveillance system can 
still be improved with limited resources by combining computerised 
flagging systems for missing information in an individual case with 
the recently introduced remote access from all the regional registers 
to the NIDR database using encrypted internet technology.
In conclusion, high sensitivity for culture-confirmed tuberculosis 
cases can be achieved in an integrated system for infectious disease 
surveillance by incorporating mandatory laboratory notification. This 
will strengthen the understanding on the burden of disease caused 
by tuberculosis, as well as facilitate the detection of clusters of recent 
transmission when submission of strains for molecular typing is 
associated with laboratory notification.
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All suspected criminals are held in remand prisons (SIZOs) while 
awaiting trial. According to Russian legislation, prisoners on remand 
should be held in a SIZO for no more than 12 months. In 2002 this 
time period was cut to 6 months. However, before 2002, delays in 
bringing cases to trial led to overcrowding of SIZOs [1] with suspects 
being held for several years. If convicted, prisoners are transferred to 
regular prisons in the countryside known as ‘colonies’.
St Petersburg is one of the largest cities in Russia, with a population 
of approximately 5 million. According to official data, TB incidence 
in the city was 44/100 000 in 2002 and 40/100 000 in 2003 [11], about 
half the average national incidence. These figures include all TB cases 
registered in St Petersburg: city residents, homeless people, prisoners 
and migrants.
The ‘incidence’ of TB in a Russian prison is defined as the number 
of diagnosed cases during a year, divided by the average number of 
prisoners during the year (sum of the monthly average, divided by 
12), expressed as cases per 100 000 prisoners per year. It should be 
noted that these figures include cases diagnosed at entry into prison, 
as well as those diagnosed during incarceration.
Several articles about the TB situation in the Russian prison system 
only present data from the prison colonies [12,13], although it is 
acknowledged that the SIZO is the first place where prisoners are at 
high risk for contamination [8]. We have found only a few published 
articles that try to analyse the TB situation in pre-trial SIZO facilities 
in detail [14,15]. This study aims to describe the epidemiology of 
pulmonary TB in two SIZOs in St Petersburg.
Material and Methods
The city has six SIZOs - four in the city and two in the district 
(Leningrad oblast). One of them houses female prisoners and 
one teenager in addition to adults. At entry into a SIZO each 
detainee undergoes a health examination including blood tests and 
fluorographic screening. This method helps to rapidly separate people 
with pulmonary changes from those without. For the latter, chest x ray 
is repeated every 6 months during their stay in the SIZO. Patients with 
pulmonary changes and clinical symptoms indicative of pneumonia 
are given a test therapy of about two weeks with broad-spectrum 
antibiotics. If positive changes in x ray and symptoms persist, then the 
case is diagnosed as TB. Diagnosis is not based only on radiographic 
examination and absence of response to broad spectrum antibiotics 
but also, if possible, on microbiological confirmation by smear sputum 
microscopy and culture of sputum. Laboratory results, including 
susceptibility testing, assist the diagnosis and choice of proper 
treatment. Both previously treated and previously untreated patients 
receive therapy with four antituberculosis drugs in the SIZO.
We analysed TB rates for two SIZOs in St Petersburg: SIZO-1, 
which is the largest and well-known remand prison in St Petersburg, 
commonly known as ‘Kresty’ because of its two cross-shaped 
buildings, and SIZO-4. This choice was made because SIZO-1 has 
the largest medical division for prisoners with TB, and SIZO-4 admits 
prisoners aged under 18 years. Both SIZOs take only male prisoners. 
Before summer 2002, SIZO-1 and SIZO-4 held three to four times 
their official capacity. The number of people in the SIZOs declined 
considerably after this, because of a general amnesty and the change 
of legislation for remand prisoners in mid-2002.
We searched the registers of the TB divisions of the two SIZOs for 
all cases (876) diagnosed during the three-year period from 1 January 
2000 to 31 December 2002 and ascertained all TB cases who were 
considered free from TB on admission, but who were later diagnosed 
with TB (444). Of the 735 cases in SIZO-1, 360 were diagnosed at 
entry into prison, and 375 during their prison stay (for 109 of these 
latter cases we have only limited information, since the prison ledger 
was destroyed in May 2000). Among the 141 cases in SIZO-4, 72 came 
into prison with TB and 69 developed TB during incarceration. Each 
TB case was diagnosed and classified as described above. This was 
in accordance with standard diagnostic procedures accepted in the 
Russian Federation.
The data collected for each TB case were: date of entry into the SIZO, 
date of birth, dates of initial and subsequent chest x rays, date of confirmed 
TB diagnosis, and TB type. The type was defined from the x ray picture 
as focal, infiltrative, disseminated, lympho-nodal, or pleural.
Results
The officially reported rate of TB in SIZO-4 remained almost 
constant for the three years (P value > 0.10). For SIZO-1 the incidence 
dropped significantly (P < 0.006) from 2000 to 2001, but then rose 
significantly (P<0.006) again in 2002 [TABLE 1].
T A B L E  1
Annual tuberculosis rates in two SIZOs in St. Petersburg, 
2000-2002
Year
Reported ‘incidence’ at 
entry and during 
incarceration 
(per 100 000)
Reported incidence 
during incarceration only 
(per 100 000)
SIZO-1 2000 4088 2369
2001 2106 869
2002 3190 1507
SIZO-4 2000 1651 600
2001 1583 900
2002 1598 913
Among those who were deemed free from TB at entry but later 
developed TB, only 6 out of 266 (2%) in SIZO-1 and 2 out of 69 (3%) 
in SIZO-4 were diagnosed during their first 2 months in prison. The 
peak time for being diagnosed was at the end of the first year and the 
beginning of the second year of imprisonment. Almost half of these 
cases were diagnosed within one year of arrival in the SIZOs, and two 
thirds within 18 months [FIGURE]. However, these figures do not 
represent the true risk for prisoners over time, since the denominator 
of still-detained prisoners is decreasing all the time. The proportion 
of people who developed tuberculosis during their stay in both SIZOs 
is almost 50% of all registered cases.
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1. TB cases diagnosed at entry were excluded.
The majority of TB patients were under 30 years old (SIZO-1: 
62-68% and SIZO-4: 70-83%). SIZO-4 holds more young people, but 
during the study period there was not a single case of TB in a prisoner 
under 18 years of age.
Among prisoners who were diagnosed during incarceration in 
SIZO-1, infiltrative TB was most common in 2000, but in 2001 focal 
TB accounted for 50% of cases. Disseminated TB, which requires more 
intense and prolonged therapy, remained common accounting for 
11%-22% of cases. In SIZO-4 about 60% of all the cases that developed 
during imprisonment were infiltrative tuberculosis [TABLE 2].
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T A B L E  2
Types of tuberculosis developed during incarceration in two SIZOs in St. Petersburg, 2000-2002 
Year Focal (%) Infiltrative (%) Disseminated (%) Lymph nodes (%) Pleuritis (%)
SIZO-1 2000 21 59 20 - -
2001 51 36 11 1 1
2002 40 36 22 1 -
SIZO-4 2000 40 60 - - -
2001 32 61 3 3 -
2002 28 61 11 - -
prevent violence and conflicts within the SIZO, prisoners are also 
frequently moved between cells, which will further increase the mixing 
of susceptible and infectious prisoners.
Co-infection with HIV may well be another problem. The number 
of HIV-infected people in the prison system has increased. In 1995 
the first patient with HIV was registered in St Petersburg. At the end 
of 2002 in the prison system of the city, 113 patients were registered 
with HIV and TB [16].
WHO guidelines recommend sputum smear microscopy as the 
standard method for TB diagnosis [18]. For economical and practical 
reasons, these guidelines are not yet implemented in the Russian 
penitentiary system. At present, fluorographic screening at entry to 
the SIZO, repeated at six-month intervals and combined with a short-
course test treatment with antibiotics is the main method for early 
tuberculosis detection in this setting, especially as the prison system 
in St Petersburg does not have its own TB laboratory. Combining 
smear sputum microscopy with x ray would probably be the optimal 
diagnostic method for screening in SIZOs. The absence of information 
on previous treatment, as well as the low number of sputum cultures 
with resistance testing performed, increases the risk for development 
of multi-drug resistant TB during the prison stay. Of all TB cases 
registered in the penitentiary system of the Russian Federation, 
16-19% have positive sputum smear, and 23% of them were multi-
drug resistant in 2001 [1].
Even if tuberculosis in remand prisons in Russia constitutes a 
big problem, one should realize that these institutions are often the 
first to offer socially maladapted people good diagnostic facilities 
and adequate treatment with antituberculosis drugs. One of us has 
compared the prison system to a sieve, in which socially disadvantaged 
persons at high risk for TB are found and diagnosed [Victor Sazhin, 
personal communication, 2002].
This study was approved by the Department of the Penal System 
of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in St Petersburg 
and Leningrad region. It was supported by the Swedish Committee 
for Eastern Europe (ÖEK), grant N 2204.
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Discussion
The present situation with TB in prison in St Petersburg city and 
region is still serious, and the annual rate for 2000 (3199/100 000) 
was higher than the average for the entire Russian penal system 
(2828/100 000) [1].
As shown in Table 1, overall TB incidence in SIZO-1 and SIZO-4 
remains high. The highest reported TB rate in the period was seen in 
2000; the apparent increase in 2002 was probably due to the amnesty 
in the middle of this year, which will have affected the denominators 
used for calculation of the statistics.
Official Russian calculation of TB incidence in SIZOs includes 
cases diagnosed at entry as well as during incarceration. When 
evaluating prevention, it might be advantageous to differentiate 
between these two, since with the present way of reporting incidence 
figures would be high whether or not a single case of TB developed 
during incarceration.
 One could argue that some of the patients in our study probably 
spent a large part of their life in prison, with only short periods of 
freedom in between, and that it would thus make little difference if 
they happened to be diagnosed at entry or later. However, all prisoners 
have a final x-ray before release from pre-trial detentions. For re-
apprehended persons with TB, the result of that x-ray test is used 
to determine whether the case is developed in SIZO or is brought 
from outside.
Successful case finding, rapid isolation and adequate treatment 
of TB cases in remand prison will reduce TB transmission within 
prison. This in turn will decrease occurrence of disease in recidivist 
prisoners and reduce in some way prevalence of disease at entry to 
prison. Persons re-apprehended in the remand prison several times 
during the one-year period must be counted only once. Furthermore, 
incidence figures would be considerably more reliable if person-years 
in prison could be used as the denominator instead of the average 
number of prisoners during a year. This would probably require a 
more automated system of record-keeping, since the present manual 
ledger system would make such calculations difficult.
Another problem for descriptive epidemiology is double registration 
of cases. In the SIZO there is usually only a weak attempt to retrieve 
information from the civil tuberculosis dispensary on previously 
diagnosed TB. A number of cases are thus probably registered both 
in the SIZO and in the city due to the lack of a shared public health 
surveillance system.
The proportion of the number of TB cases in St Petersburg SIZOs 
that developed during incarceration increased [14], for example, in 
SIZO-1 it increased from 30% to 44% for the period 1998-1999, and 
for SIZO-4 - from 29% to 42% for the same time period. In both 
SIZOs the proportion of cases that developed during incarceration 
was close to half of the total reported cases by the end of the study 
period. In comparison, this percentage in the Voronezh region of 
Russia was estimated to be between 6% and 10% in 1995-1999 [15]. 
The proportion of newly detected cases during the stay in a SIZO is 
rarely presented in the literature: for example, 26% of all TB cases in 
the penitentiary system of Arkhangelsk region of Russia were detected 
in one of the SIZOs in 1996-1997, but the percentage of people who 
developed TB while detained in these SIZOs was not stated [17].
Undoubtedly, the situation with many prisoners awaiting trial in 
overcrowded cells will contribute to spread of infection. In order to 
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A  M E D I C A L  L O C U M  S E R V I C E  A S  A  S I T E  F O R  S E N T I N E L  
I N F L U E N Z A  S U R V E I L L A N C E
J Turner 1, H Kelly 2
Surveillance of influenza in the countries of the European Union 
includes a sentinel network of general practitioners reporting 
cases of influenza-like illness (ILI), the collection of specimens for 
virological testing, and laboratory reporting of influenza diagnoses. 
In Victoria, Australia we have a similar sentinel surveillance system, 
with ILI defined by fever, cough and fatigue, and influenza seasons 
described by thresholds. The coordination of sentinel general 
practices can, however, be time consuming and expensive. For 
the last two influenza seasons we have used a deputising medical 
locum service as a sentinel site for influenza surveillance. We are 
not aware of such a service being used as a sentinel site elsewhere 
in the world. In both retrospective and prospective comparisons, 
we have shown that ILI surveillance patterns from sentinel general 
practices are very similar to those from the locum service. Because 
of its timeliness, flexibility, patient mix and geographic spread, locum 
service surveillance is able to supplement sentinel ILI surveillance 
and may also have a role in the recognition of emerging disease 
patterns. This is likely to be true not only in Australia but also in 
countries of the European Union.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(4): 96-8 Published online Apr 2005
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Introduction
Surveillance of influenza in Europe includes a wide range 
of activities, but most countries use at least three approaches: 
a sentinel network of general practitioners (GPs) who report cases of 
influenza-like illness (ILI); the collection of specimens for virological 
testing; and laboratory reporting of influenza diagnoses [1]. Most 
surveillance networks use case definitions to identify ILI [1] and 
threshold indicators to describe the intensity of influenza activity. 
Data are delivered on a weekly basis [2], with the ILI rate reported 
per 100 000 population [3]. This provides an integrated clinical and 
virological system under the auspices of the European Influenza 
Surveillance Scheme (EISS) [4]. In addition, routine influenza 
surveillance plays a central role in the European influenza pandemic 
preparedness plan [5].
In Victoria, Australia we use a similar system, including general 
practice sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI) with 
laboratory support [6]. We use a case definition for ILI [7] and 
describe thresholds for influenza seasons [8]. The coordination of 
sentinel surveillance in general practice can, however, be expensive, 
time consuming and demanding for busy practices. Over the past two 
influenza seasons we have used a deputising medical locum service as 
a sentinel site for ILI surveillance. This report aims to introduce the 
concept of a locum service as a potential sentinel surveillance site and 
to compare ILI surveillance from the locum service with that from 
sentinel general practices.
Methods
The influenza season usually occurs from late autumn (May) 
to early spring (September) in temperate regions of the southern 
whemisphere (weeks 18 to 39 inclusive). During this period the 
Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory (VIDRL) 
coordinates sentinel surveillance, conducted through selected general 
practices in Melbourne and regional Victoria [6]. A national case 
definition for ILI, of fever (or history of feverishness), cough and 
fatigue/malaise, has been used in routine sentinel surveillance since 
2003 [7]. In 2003 and 2004 the average number of metropolitan GPs 
contributing to surveillance was 41 from 16 practices. There is at least 
one general practice per 200 000 population in the metropolitan area, 
as recommended in Australia’s influenza pandemic plan [9].
Sentinel GPs are required to complete a weekly tally sheet indicating 
the total number of consultations and the number of consultations 
for ILI. This is faxed to VIDRL and entered onto a database for each 
sentinel site. At their discretion, GPs are also able to collect a combined 
nose and throat swab for selected patients with an ILI. The swab is 
sent to VIDRL for testing by a multiplex PCR identifying influenza A 
(H1N1), influenza A (H3N2), influenza B, parainfluenza, respiratory 
syncytial virus, adenovirus and picornaviruses (enteroviruses and 
rhinovirus) [10]. In 2004, oligonucleotide primers to detect all known 
influenza viruses replaced primers aimed specifically at currently 
circulating H1 and H3 sub-types. Aliquots of all specimens positive 
for influenza are forwarded to the World Health Organization 
Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza in 
Melbourne for virus strain typing.
As a supplement to traditional general practice surveillance, we have 
explored the use of a medical locum service as a sentinel surveillance 
site. Ethics approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of 
the Department of Human Services in Victoria for extension of 
surveillance to the Melbourne Medical Locum Service (MMLS). 
MMLS provides a deputising medical service to patients in their 
homes, within an approximate 35 km radius of central Melbourne, 
a city of 3.7 million people. This radius covers the same area as the 
sentinel general practice locations in Melbourne [FIGURE 1].1.  Infl uenza Surveillance Coordinator, Epidemiology Unit, Victorian Infectious 
Diseases Reference Laboratory, Melbourne, Australia.
2.  Head, Epidemiology Unit, Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, 
Melbourne, Australia.
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F I G U R E  1  
Sentinel general practice sites compared with 
the 35 kilometer radius from central Melbourne serviced 
by the Melbourne Medical Locum Service
MMLS was established in 1980 and is the largest deputising 
medical locum service in Australia. It has a workforce of 65 GPs. 
Consultations occur after normal working hours, with peak periods 
between 6pm and 2am during the week and throughout weekends 
and on public holidays, when approximately 15 doctors are rostered 
to work. Calls, with patient details, are sent to the doctor’s pager. Most 
patients present to the service with an acute medical problem. Those 
assessed as needing emergency care are referred directly to hospital; 
all other patients are referred to their regular GP for ongoing care the 
following day. The attending locum doctor provides a complete record 
of the consultation, including presenting complaint, history, clinical 
findings, final diagnosis and management. All records are routinely 
entered into a database, which is part of a larger, purpose-designed, 
fully-integrated software system. Access to the database on the MMLS 
server is through a password-protected website. Clinical records are 
downloaded to the clinical software at 620 general practices before 
the first patient is seen the following morning. Summary data can be 
extracted from the database.
We undertook a retrospective analysis of data routinely collected 
by the locum service in order to develop criteria for defining ILI from 
this data set. Extracting data that included any mention of respiratory 
symptoms and/or viral illness resulted in non-specific disease episodes 
being recorded. Optimal data extraction was accomplished using a 
final diagnosis reference to ‘flu’ or ‘influenza’. Using these criteria for 
ILI from the locum service data, we made a retrospective comparison 
with ILI surveillance data from sentinel surveillance between 1998 and 
2002. For routine sentinel surveillance, ILI consultation rates were 
reported as ILI cases per 1000 patients seen. MMLS ILI rates were 
calculated per 1000 call-outs. The locum service has functioned as 
a prospective sentinel site since 2003.
Results
Although different in magnitude, the pattern of ILI among patients 
seen by the locum service was similar to the pattern from sentinel 
general practice surveillance between 1998-2002 [FIGURE 2]. This 
retrospective review compared locum service data referring to ‘flu’ 
or ‘influenza’ with sentinel general practice ILI surveillance using the 
case definition of fever, cough and fatigue. Prospective surveillance 
during the 2003 and 2004 influenza seasons confirmed similar ILI 
surveillance patterns. In 2003 an increase in ILI was evident by week 
31 with a peak at week 34 for both surveillance systems [FIGURE 3a] 
and both systems demonstrated a similar picture in 2004, despite a 
season of low activity and no clearly defined peak [FIGURE 3b].
F I G U R E  2  
Retrospective comparison of locum service data and sentinel 
surveillance data, 1998-2002
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The proportion of patients with ILI seen by the locum service 
continued to be higher than in sentinel general practice surveillance, 
2.6% (661/25 630) compared to 1.0% (764/75 455) in 2003 and 1.0% 
(216/23 470) compared to 0.6% (465/80 712) in 2004. Laboratory 
confirmed influenza, or another respiratory virus, was identified in 
50% of the patients with ILI from general practice sentinel surveillance 
in 2003 [6] and 47% in 2004 [11]. No virological testing was done for 
patients seen by GPs from the locum service.
F I G U R E  3 A  
Comparison of general practice surveillance and MMLS 
surveillance for influenza-like illness, 2003
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F I G U R E  3 B
Comparison of general practice surveillance and MMLS 
surveillance for influenza-like illness, 2004
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Discussion
In general, the locum service and general practice ILI surveillance 
patterns were similar both retrospectively from 1998 to 2002 and 
prospectively during 2003 and 2004. When comparing the two 
systems, we had anticipated there would be a higher proportion of 
patients with an ILI from the locum service, having assumed that 
doctors from the locum service would see a higher proportion of 
acutely unwell patients. This was the case each year but may also have 
been due to the different case definition of ILI used in the two systems. 
While there has been no validation of the locum GPs’ diagnosis of 
influenza, we have shown that, even when using the case definition 
for influenza, influenza infection is confirmed by laboratory testing in 
only 35%-50% of patients with ILI seen in sentinel general practices. 
However this increases with the GP’s confidence in the diagnosis of 
influenza [12]. We believe it is unlikely that the diagnostic approach 
of the 65 locum service GPs would be substantially different to that 
of the 41 metropolitan sentinel GPs.
Coordination of sentinel influenza surveillance in Victoria is 
relatively costly and time consuming. In contrast, the marginal cost 
of the locum service surveillance is negligible, since routinely collected 
data is analysed and forwarded to VIDRL by the locum service. 
This process does not require any additional effort from the locum 
doctors, since they routinely record consultation information and a 
working diagnosis for each patient. Compared to sentinel surveillance, 
locum service surveillance can be managed in a more timely fashion, 
with data accessible at any time from a password protected website. 
For the successful inclusion of locum service data, however, the service 
needs a sophisticated information technology environment and a 
commitment to issues related to population health.
Virological confirmation of a selection of specimens from sentinel 
GPs is an important part of understanding the causes of ILI [10,12]. 
Logistic problems related to the collection of swabs from patients seen 
by doctors from the locum service include maintaining specimens at 
4°C and transporting specimens to the laboratory. These problems 
have not yet been resolved. We have shown, however, that the locum 
service can supplement ILI surveillance data from sentinel general 
practices, albeit without virological testing. Nonetheless, because of 
its timeliness, flexibility, patient mix and geographic spread, locum 
service surveillance may have a role in the recognition of emerging 
disease patterns. This is likely to be true not only in Australia but also 
in countries of the European Union.
In the Northern Health Region of Portugal, vaccine coverage is 
measured by checking and studying individual vaccination records 
in health centres. Each year from 2001-2004, birth cohorts who 
were over 2, 6 and 14 years of age were selected for assessment. 
Data collection occurred on January the following year and meetings 
with district immunisation coordinators took place every March. 
For all vaccines and birth cohorts considered, vaccine coverage 
values observed in the north of Portugal were excellent. In this 
paper, we make comparisons with published international data on 
vaccine coverage and discuss validity issues; we believe that no 
serious biases have affected the validity of our vaccine coverage 
data but comparisons with international data must be addressed 
with caution; the methods we used have been useful in increasing 
vaccination coverage.
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Introduction
In Portugal, vaccines are given free of charge in health centres 
of the National Health Service (NHS), following the schedule 
and technical guidelines of the Portuguese National Vaccination 
Programme (PNVP) [1]. Some NHS hospitals give BCG and vaccine 
against hepatitis B (HBV) to newborns. Vaccination outside the 
NHS is extremely rare. In some special circumstances covered by 
Portuguese law, immunisation against tetanus and diphtheria might 
be compulsory, but globally, the PNVP is recommended, but not 
mandatory. There are no financial or non-monetary incentives for 
health workers or PNVP coordinators.
Vaccine coverage was estimated using routine data on the number 
of doses given by age group, as numerators, and the numbers of 
newborns (discounting infant deaths) as denominators. Data on 
vaccine coverage has been published [2-5] and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the estimation method were discussed [6]. Meanwhile, 
in order to get more valid and precise data on vaccine coverage, 
an alternative method was used in some local surveys, checking 
individual vaccination records [7,8].
At health centres, vaccination files are organised by year of birth. 
Each person has an individual paper record, in which information 
on the vaccine manufacturer, batch and date of administration 
is recorded, for each vaccine dose given. Recently, some health 
centres have computerised their vaccination databases as part 
of a national computerised vaccine registration initiative. To be 
registered in a health centre vaccination file, a citizen must be born 
in the geographic area served by the health centre or have moved 
into it; citizens have the legal right to be vaccinated at the location 
that is most convenient for them (for example: in the area where 
the child’s mother works). In this case, the health centre creates a 
new record and later informs the health centre in the person’s area 
of residence. Records are removed from the active file whenever 
a patient dies, moves to another area or is vaccinated at another 
health centre; these records are not destroyed but do not count for 
statistical purposes. Immigrants, including illegal immigrants, have 
free access to vaccination inside the PNVP.
The Northern Health Region (NHR) of Portugal includes five 
districts and 3 021 511 residents; the proportion of those below 
15 years of age is 22.8% (20.0% in Portugal as a whole – 2001 Census) 
[9]. In the NHR, vaccines included in the schedule of the PNVP are 
given in 425 health units belonging to the Portuguese NHS. The 
Northern Health Region authority is responsible for coordinating 
the vaccination programme in the area, and so we designed and 
implemented a strategy to measure and improve vaccine coverage. 
This paper briefly describes that approach.
Methods
For each year (2001-2004) coverage targets were set, specific to each 
vaccine and birth cohort. Vaccine coverage assessment was carried out 
in early January the following year, and a meeting took place every 
March with the 5 district coordinators to discuss performance in the 
previous year and to set the targets for the current year. As resources 
were limited, we decided to concentrate on some cohorts each year 
and moving on to the next cohorts in the following year [TABLE 1]. 
We decided to measure vaccine coverage by birth cohort at a certain 
moment in time, instead of coverage at x years of age, which would 
have meant studying more cohorts.
T A B L E  1  
Chronology of activities of vaccine coverage assessment by birth cohort, North of Portugal, 2001-2006
Birth
Cohort
Evaluation in Month / Year
May 2001 January 2002 January 2003 January 2004 January 2005 January 2006
2004 Preliminary
2003 Preliminary Final
2002 Preliminary Final
2001 Preliminary Final
2000 Preliminary Final
1999 Preliminary Final Final
1998 Final
1997 Final
1996 Preliminary Final
1995 Preliminary Final
1994 and 1993
1992 Preliminary
1991 Preliminary Final
1990 Preliminary Final
1989 Preliminary Final
1988 Preliminary Final
1987 Preliminary Final
Birth cohorts chosen were children who were 2, 6 and 14 years 
of age in the year of the target. In January that year each cohort was 
subjected to a preliminary assessment, and a final evaluation was 
performed the following January [TABLE 1]; we thought that this 
method of assessing vaccine coverage could induce local activities 
(catch-up) to improve the situation, since health professionals were 
motivated to meet targets. Due to local staff complaints, we had to 
negotiate skipping preliminary counts of some cohorts in the year 
they were 5 years old.
In order to measure vaccine coverage, each individual record of 
12 birth cohorts was studied, in all health centres. Data collection was 
the responsibility of local staff at the health centre level. Each district 
was responsible for checking and aggregating local data. At the March 
meeting only district and regional aggregates were analysed.
We compared the total number of individual vaccination records 
checked and studied with the number of live newborns from resident 
mothers in NHR, discounting infant deaths.
Vaccines assessed were [1]:
• BCG: (Bacille Calmette-Guérin): recommended to newborns.
• DTP: diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (whole cell) vaccine; 3 doses 
recommended at 2, 4, 6 months of age and booster doses at 18 months 
and 5-6 years; since 2002, a combined DTPwHib vaccine has been given 
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in the first year of life; previously, Hib had been given separately.
• Td: combined vaccine against tetanus and diphtheria, with 
reduced amount of diphtheria toxoid; recommended at 10-13 years 
of age and every 10 years for the rest of life.
• OPV: oral polio vaccine; 3 doses recommended at 2,4,6 months 
of age and a booster at 5-6 years.
• MMR: combined vaccine against measles, mumps and rubella, 
recommended at 15 months of age (introduced in 1987); since 1990, 
a second dose has been recommended at 10-13 years of age; in 2000 
the second dose of MMR was given earlier, at the age of 5-6 years, 
but cohorts born before 1993 will continue to receive the 2nd dose at 
10-13 y.
• HBV: hepatitis B vaccine; since 2000, recommended in the 
first year of life with the schedule 0, 2, 6 months; older cohorts will 
maintain the previously recommended schedule of 3 doses at age 
10-13 (schedule 0, 1, 6 months).
Results
The proportion of individual vaccination records studied 
(compared with live births minus infant deaths) varied between 
94.0% and 101.8% [TABLE 2] in the studied cohorts.
T A B L E  2
Comparison between the number of vaccination records 
studied and live births, by year of birth, North of Portugal, 
1987-2002
Year of birth
A
No. of records 
checked
B
No. of live 
births*
%
(A/B) x 100
1987 40 856 43 442 94.0
1988 41 362 43 070 96.0
1989 40 594 41 473 97.9
1990 39 650 40 462 98.0
1995 35 387 36 698 96.4
1996 37 639 37 878 99.4
1997 39 207 38 650 101.4
1998 38 520 38 311 100.5
1999 36 969 38 392 96.3
2000 38 096 38 997 97.7
2001 37 035 36 382 101.8
2002 35 921 36 680 97.9
* Discounting infant deaths.
Vaccine coverage values in the final assessments did not show 
important differences between districts and thus data is presented for 
the whole Northern Health Region.. Coverage data by vaccine (and 
number of doses) and birth cohort can be observed in Tables 3, 4 and 
5. Vaccine coverage was higher in younger cohorts (those born 1999 
to 2002). There is a moderate tendency to the improved coverage over 
time with any vaccine considered [Table 1], [TABLES 3-5], except BCG 
[TABLE 3]. Intermediate evaluations detected coverage values below 
those observed in final assessments, in which coverage for specific 
vaccines/doses ranged from 91.6% [TABLE 5] to 99.5% [TABLE 3]. 
For the cohort born in 1989, a more detailed analysis was performed, 
concerning MMR vaccination independently of the age at vaccination: 
94.2% had received two doses of MMR, 5.0% were vaccinated only 
once and 0.8% received no dose of MMR; this means that 99.2% had 
received at least one dose.
Tables 6 and 7 summarise some international comparisons on 
vaccine coverage. Vaccine coverage data from the Northern Health 
Region of Portugal, described in Tables 3 and 5 should be compared 
respectively with data from tables 6 and 7.
T A B L E  3
Vaccine coverage (%) by vaccine and year of birth among 
children over 2 years of age, Northern Health Region of 
Portugal
Vaccine / 
Dose No.
Year of Birth
1999 2000 2001 2002
BCG n.a. 99.0 99.5 98.2
DTP 3 98.4 98.7 99.2 98.9
OPV 3 98.3 98.7 99.2 99.1
HBV 3 93.3 98.7 99.1 99.1
MMR 97.6 97.4 97.7 98.4
n.a. = not assessed.
T A B L E  4
Vaccine coverage (%) by vaccine and year of birth among 
children over 6 years of age, Northern Health Region of 
Portugal
Vaccine / 
Dose No.
Year of birth
1995 1996 1997 1998
DTP * 94.6 94.1 95.5 96.4
OPV * 94.7 94.1 95.9 98.2
MMR ** 94.6 93.3 94.6 95.0
*  Booster doses at 5-6 years of age; previous vaccination history was checked but 
not recorded.
**  MMR given at 5-6 years of age; MMR given in the 2nd year of life was not checked.
T A B L E  5
Vaccine coverage (%) by vaccine and year of birth among 
young adults over 14 years of age, Northern Health Region of 
Portugal
Vaccine / 
Dose No.
Year of birth
1987 1988 1989 1990
Td 95.5 96.4 96.7 96.7
HBV 3 92.5 91.6 92.6 95.6
MMR 2 * 93.4 94.5 94.2 96.0
* Second dose of MMR.
Discussion
Among cohorts born between 1999 and 2002, vaccine coverage for 
all the vaccines [TABLE 3] was higher in the North Health Region 
than in Portugal as a whole [5,10], the United States [11] and Canada 
[12]. Vaccine coverage with BCG [TABLE 3]. was similar to that 
estimated for Finland and higher than in several other European 
Union (EU) countries [5,10] [TABLE 6], but comparability is affected 
by different international policies on primary immunisation [13,14]; 
BCG coverage was higher than that estimated for any of the WHO 
regions [14]. Coverage with 3 doses of vaccine against diphtheria, 
tetanus, pertussis and poliomyelitis was similar with that observed in 
Finland and Sweden, and higher than in the remaining EU countries 
[5,10], while coverage with the first dose of MMR [TABLE 3] was 
very similar with that observed in Finland [5] and Canada [12] and 
higher than in the remaining EU countries [10]. Coverage values 
with three doses of HBV of cohorts born 1999-2002 in the Northern 
Health Region of Portugal were higher than those in cohorts born in 
1991-1992, in the Lazio Region of Italy [15] and higher than in the 
remaining EU countries in 2000 [10] [TABLE 6]. HBV coverage in 
the Northern Health Region was also above values reported for most 
countries in the world where there is universal infant vaccination in 
1999 [16].
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T A B L E  6
Vaccine coverage (%) by vaccine at 2 years of age. 
International comparisons
Country/Year [ref]
Vaccine/doses
BCG DTP 3 OPV/
IPV 3
HBV 3 MMR
Portugal 1995 [5] 94 93 95 n.a. 94
Portugal 2000 [10] 82 96 96 58 96
Portugal 2003 * 83.0 96.8 97.0 96.6 95.6
Finland 1995 [5] 100 100 100 n.a. 98
Finland 2000 [10] 99 98 95 n.a. 96
Sweden 1995 [5] n.a. 99 99 n.a. 96
Sweden 2000 [10] n.a. 99 99 n.a. 94
USA 2002 ** [11] n.a. 94.9 90.2 89.9 91.6
Canada 1994 [12] n.a. 92.8 89.0 0.9 97.2
*  Unpublished data provided by the General Directorate of Health [Direcção-Geral 
da Saúde].
** Children aged 19-35 months, born between February 1999 – June 2001
n.a. = not available.
The proportion of children receiving DTP, OPV and MMR by 
6 years [TABLE 4] was very high; previous vaccination history (before 
the age of seven) was checked but not recorded, making comparisons 
with other studies difficult. Nevertheless some international 
comparisons are possible in the case of vaccination against measles: 
coverage in the Northern Health Region [TABLE 5] was higher than 
that observed in a study among Greek schoolchildren (82.7%) [17] 
and in a French study at 6 years of age (90%) [18]. Routine statistics 
from the Portuguese Ministry of Health had shown high vaccine 
coverage values (90-95%) with the first dose of MMR, in the first 
two years of life [6], among these cohorts; since it is very likely that 
most of the 93.3-94.6% of children vaccinated at 5-6 years (in the 
north of Portugal) have then received the second dose of MMR, it 
is likely that the 5-9 age group in the Northern Health Region is 
below the seronegativity threshold (10%) proposed by the WHO 
to reach the objective of measles elimination [18]; we are expecting 
the results of the National Seroepidemiological Survey (NSS) to test 
this hypothesis.
Among teenagers, vaccine uptake was very high for all three 
vaccines and cohorts studied [TABLE 5]. For these cohorts as well, 
such a high proportion of individuals had received two doses of MMR 
(and at least one), that this is likely to have a very positive impact on 
the levels of immunity needed to measles elimination [18]. Coverage 
with two doses of MMR is above that observed in European [18] and 
American studies [19] [TABLE 7]. In our study, the proportion of 
teenagers (cohorts born in 1987-1989) receiving three doses of HBV 
[TABLE 5] was above that observed in most studies, all over the world 
[15,16,17,19] and similar to the coverage observed in a small rural 
community in Spain [20] [TABLE 7].
T A B L E  7
Vaccine coverage (%) by vaccine among teenagers. 
International comparisons
Country/Year [ref]
Vaccine/doses
MMR 2 HBV 3
Italy 1996 [15] n.a. 50.2
Greece 1998 [17] 58.7 19.6
France 2002 [18] 50 * n.a.
USA 1998 [19] 70.0 15.8
USA 1999 [19] 92.6 68.5
Picassent (Valencia, Spain) 2002 [20] 89.6-96.3 90-98
* At 7 years of age. Above 7 years it has been impossible to distinguish between 
1st and 2nd doses.
n.a. = not available.
Vaccine coverage values observed in northern Portugal are 
excellent. For several reasons, we believe that no serious biases have 
affected the validity of vaccine coverage data in Tables 3-5:
•   The number of individual records studied is very close to the 
number of newborns (less infant deaths) in all cohorts assessed 
[TABLE 2]. The gap between the number of records studied and 
the number expected by vital statistics, though always small, 
increases in older cohorts; as time elapses, it is more likely that 
potential errors occur, especially those depending on people’s 
mobility.
•   Vaccination by the private sector and/or financial (or other) 
incentives have been pointed out as potential factors affecting 
validity of vaccine coverage data [20]; this is not the case in 
Portugal.
•   We had previously conducted a small survey, studying individual 
vaccination records from a non-representative sample of health 
centres [8] to assess vaccine coverage in the 1999 birth cohort: 
the results were not significantly different from those reported 
in Table 3.
•   We believe that checking directly all available vaccination records 
leads to more reliable vaccine coverage estimates than using 
statistics based on the number of doses given per year [22] and 
demographic statistics.
•   We do not know how much the use of computerised data recently 
implemented has affected the validity of our estimates, but it has 
been argued that, as new vaccines are added to the immunisation 
programmes, the use of the traditional written records becomes 
obsolete and that computerised databases will minimise errors 
and produce more reliable data [20].
In any case, an important check of validity of our vaccine coverage 
data is likely to come from the pending results of the NSS.
The precise age at vaccination was not recorded in our study, so we 
could not estimate the proportion of vaccinations performed later than 
the recommended age, probably induced by the assessment method 
itself. Nevertheless, taking into account the age group considered and 
the epidemiological situation in Portugal, this should not be critical 
for control issues and possible elimination of target diseases.
Coverage levels in the intermediate assessment have always 
been some points lower than in the final percentages; that can be 
explained by the age at consultation of the files, in the case of MMR, 
but the most likely explanation for the other vaccines is that catch-
up activities were undertaken to improve coverage values. In one of 
the annual meetings we presented a method to tackle the issue of 
detecting delays in the vaccination schedule: first, people should be 
contacted by post and if this was not successful, by telephone; as a 
final resort, the family should be visited at home (vaccines are not 
given at home). This was based in the experience of an urban health 
centre, but district and local coordinators were given freedom to 
choose the best strategy for each community. On the other hand, the 
discussion among professionals, comparing coverage data between 
health centres and/or districts might also have been relevant as a 
motivational strategy. The approach we used is still underway [TABLE 
1], and after some years, birth cohorts will begin to be assessed a 
second time, increasing the probability that good coverage values 
will be reached, supported by more reliable data. This strategy leads 
to an additional workload for the professionals at local level and we 
wondered about the sustainability of the approach. Nevertheless, the 
process of building computerised vaccination databases may play a 
positive role [20] in the future, making work easier, more reliable 
and efficient.
Given that our vaccine coverage data is valid, we should ask 
ourselves if it is comparable with data from other countries. The issue 
of validity and comparability of vaccine coverage data, depending on 
the diversity of methodologies used, has been assessed in the context 
of developed [21,22] and developing[21] countries. This is very 
important, but we have no answer but to recommend caution when 
making comparisons. Meanwhile, there seems to be an agreement 
on some issues: careful assessments of validity of data derived from 
various sources should be done [21], methods to produce valid 
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vaccination coverage data on birth cohorts should be developed [22] 
and robust surveillance of vaccine coverage is indispensable [23].
To quote Szilagyi [24]: ‘coupled with exciting data about declining 
rates of vaccine-preventable diseases, the rising national vaccination 
rates represent one of the great healthcare achievements of our time’. 
This fits the situation in Portugal very well.
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Q U A L I T Y  A S S U R A N C E  F O R  T H E  D I A G N O S T I C S  O F  V I R A L  
D I S E A S E S  T O  E N H A N C E  T H E  E M E R G E N C Y  P R E P A R E D N E S S  
I N  E U R O P E
O Donoso Mantke 1, H Schmitz 2*, H Zeller 3*, P Heyman 4*, A Papa 5*, M Niedrig 1*
The threat posed by emerging and re-emerging communicable 
diseases and, more recently, by the intentional release of infectious 
agents in a susceptible population, has been receiving considerable 
attention at the national and international levels. Public health 
efforts to strengthen disease detection, surveillance and control 
have been intensified. However, clinicians and clinical microbiology 
laboratories play an important role in the early detection of disease, 
the identification of the putative agent, and notification of the 
appropriate authorities. To be effective in this role, laboratories must 
be specially prepared to handle viral agents safely, and need, among 
other things, the appropriate rapid and sensitive diagnostic tests. 
In 1998 the European Network for Diagnostics of “Imported” Viral 
Diseases (ENIVD) was established. ENIVD presently comprises, as 
permanent members, 44 expert laboratories in 21 European Union 
(EU) member states and 4 non-EU countries and is one of the 
networks on infectious diseases funded by the European Commission. 
ENIVD fulfils many of the important tasks required for the surveillance 
and control of imported, rare and emerging viral infections such as 
the exchange of expertise and the organisation of external quality 
assurance (EQA) programmes, both of which are needed to improve 
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diagnostics. Here, we summarise the data generated by recent EQA 
activities focussed on the diagnostics of infections with hantavirus, 
dengue virus, filovirus, Lassa virus, orthopox virus and the SARS-
coronavirus (SARS-CoV). These were carried out between 1999 
and 2004 and involved 93 laboratories from 41 countries, including 
laboratories from additional countries outside of Europe. Particularly 
the EU-candidate countries and Eastern neighbouring countries will 
be invited to join the network in the near future. A public website is 
available at http://www.enivd.de.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(6): 102-6 Published online June 2005
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Introduction
In addition to lifestyle changes, migration and other factors, travel 
is one of the most potent reasons for the emergence of infections, 
and the current volume (e.g., 1600 million air travellers per year), 
speed and distance of travel are unprecedented [1]. Numerous 
viral outbreaks in recent years, such as Ebola haemorrhagic fever in 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1995), Uganda (2000) and Gabon 
and Republic of Congo (2001-2003), West Nile fever in the United 
States (US) in 1999 and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 
China in 2002 [2-6], serve as reminders that severe infections can be 
imported into Europe by travellers coming from regions with a high 
incidence and then spread quickly. There have been several reports 
in the last ten years from various European countries regarding the 
import of suspected or confirmed cases of viral haemorrhagic fever 
(VHF) and SARS which support these concerns [TABLE 1].
T A B L E  1
Examples for reports regarding the import of suspected or confirmed cases of VHF and SARS into Europe
Period of time Imported from Imported to Viral agent Number of cases/deaths Type of traveller Reference
Nov 1994 Ivory Coast Switzerland Ebola virus 1/0 Repatriation [7]
Apr 1996 Brazil Switzerland Yellow fever virus 1/1 Tourist [8]
Sep 1997 Ghana Germany Suspected VHF1 1/1 Refugee [9]
Nov 1998 The Gambia Belgium Suspected VHF2 1/1 Tourist [10]
Aug 1999 Ivory Coast Germany Yellow fever virus 1/1 Business [11]
Jan 2000 i.a. Ivory Coast Germany Lassa virus 1/1 Tourist [12]
Feb 2000 Sierra Leone UK Lassa virus 1/1 Repatriation [13]
Mar 2000 Nigeria Germany Lassa virus 1/1 Medical transport [14]
Jul 2000 Sierra Leone The Netherlands Lassa virus 1/1 Business [15]
Dec 2000 Kenya Germany Suspected VHF3 1/1 Tourist [16]
Mar 2001 Sierra Leone Germany Suspected VHF2 1/0 Repatriation [17]
Mar 2001 i.a. Chile France Hantavirus 1/0 Tourist [18]
Aug 2001 Bulgaria Germany CCHF virus 1/0 Tourist Pers. comm. a)
Sep 2001 Chad France RVF virus 2/0 Business [19]
Nov 2001 The Gambia Belgium Yellow fever virus 1/1 Tourist [20]
Sep 2002 Nepal Spain Suspected VHF1 1/0 Tourist Pers. comm. b)
Oct 2002 Cameroon Rep. of Ireland Suspected VHF2 1/0 Business Pers. comm. c)
Feb 2003 Sierra Leone UK Lassa virus 1/0 Business [21]
Feb 2003 i.a. China different countries SARS-CoV 33/1 Tourist/Business [6]
Mar 2003 USA France West Nile virus 1/0 Tourist Pers. comm. d)
 Aug 2003 USA Germany West Nile virus 2/0 Tourist [22]
Jun 2004 USA France Hantavirus 1/1 Tourist Pers. comm. d)
Sep 2004 USA Germany West Nile virus 1/0 Tourist [22]
Oct 2004 USA France West Nile virus 3/0 Tourist Pers. comm. d)
Oct 2004 Tunisia France West Nile virus 1/0 Tourist Pers. comm. d)
Nov 2004 Senegal France CCHF virus 1/0 Repatriation Pers. comm. d)
VHF: viral haemorrhagic fever; CCHF: Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever; RVF: Rift Valley fever; SARS-CoV: SARS-coronavirus. 
1. No fi nal diagnosis; 2. Final diagnosis: Malaria; 3. Final diagnosis: generalised HSV-1 infection.
Pers. comm. (Personal communication): a) H. Schmitz, BNI, Hamburg, Germany; b) A. Tenorio, ISCIII, Madrid, Spain; c) W. Hall, UCD, Rep. of Ireland; d) H. Zeller, Institut Pasteur, 
Lyon, France. 
Without appropriate diagnostic tests, there is a risk that such 
infections will be diagnosed incorrectly because clinicians are often 
unfamiliar with the symptoms. Furthermore, examination of the 
patient’s close personal contacts (including hospital staff) will 
often be unsuccessful and will carry the additional risk of disease 
transmission.
Since the anthrax incidents in the US in 2001 and the worldwide 
terror attacks in recent years we have all become aware of the need in 
every country (including those of Europe) to be prepared for dealing 
with people who have been exposed to or infected with agents of 
bioterrorism (BT). This includes the rapid detection and surveillance 
of putative agents and prompt response and communication [23-
27]. The viral agents that are more likely to be used for bioterrorist 
attack are not commonly encountered in the majority of clinical 
microbiology laboratories [TABLE 2], and with the exception of 
smallpox virus most of these agents are occasionally isolated from 
patients who have been naturally infected.
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T A B L E  2
Categories of potential viral agents and diseases in a 
bioterrorism event
Category Agent(s) Disease
A Variola major virus Smallpox
Filoviruses (Ebola and Marburg viruses) VHF
Arenaviruses (Lassa and related viruses) VHF
B Alphaviruses (VEEV, EEEV and WEEV) Encephalomyelitis
C Bunyaviruses (Hantavirus and Crimean-
Congo virus)
Haemorrhagic fever
Flaviviruses (Yellow fever and Dengue 
viruses)
Yellow fever and 
DHF
Nipah virus Encephalomyelitis
Tickborne viruses Haemorrhagic fever 
or encephalitis
Adapted from http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/agentlist.asp
Category A: Agents can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to per-
son; result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health 
impact; might cause public panic and social disruption and require 
special action for public health preparedness.
Category B: Agents are moderately easy to disseminate and have moderate morbid-
ity and low mortality but require specifi c enhancement of diagnostic capacity and 
enhanced disease surveillance.
Category C: Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be 
engineered for mass dissemination in the future. 
VEEV: Venezuelan encephalomyelitis virus; EEEV/WEEV: Eastern/Western equine 
encephalomyelitis virus; VHF: viral haemorrhagic fever; DHF: Dengue 
haemorrhagic fever.
The early recognition of a bioterrorist event therefore depends 
on trained medical and laboratory personnel (especially at the 
community healthcare level), on specific and sensitive laboratory 
techniques allowing the early identification of potential bioterrorist 
agents and on a closer cooperation between global organisations, 
such as the World Health Organization (WHO), and entities such as 
the European Union (EU) and individual countries. It is impossible 
to know in advance which newly emergent pathogens might be 
used by terrorists, and it is therefore imperative that efforts for BT 
preparedness be coordinated with disease surveillance and outbreak 
response activities.
Having appropriate detection strategies in support of surveillance 
and control of imported, rare and emerging viral infections are 
dependent upon having established specific and sensitive laboratory 
diagnostic tests. The European Network for Diagnostics of 
“Imported” Viral Diseases (ENIVD), established in 1998 in response 
to decision no. 2119/98/EC [28], fulfils important tasks in this field 
of research [29]. These tasks include (1) providing mutual help by 
the exchange of diagnostic samples, reagents, methodologies and 
expertise; (2) improving the performance of diagnostic tests by 
running external quality assurance (EQA) programmes; and (3) 
organising and coordinating international cooperations with the 
European ‘Surveillance network group’, and other national and 
international organisations such as the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) in the US, the WHO and the Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO). Presently, the network comprises 
44 expert laboratories spanning 21 EU member states and 4 non-EU 
countries as permanent members. Here, we present the results and 
conclusions of our EQA activities carried out in the last five years 
in which several expert laboratories, from both inside and outside 
Europe, were invited to participate with the aim of evaluating and 
improving their laboratory techniques.
Methods
Between 1999 and 2004 several EQA programmes have been 
established to assess the quality of serological and/or molecular 
diagnostics of hantavirus, dengue virus, filovirus, Lassa virus, 
orthopox virus and SARS-CoV infection [TABLE 3]. A total of 
93 invited expert laboratories from 41 European and non-European 
countries participated at least in one of these studies. The selection 
of invitees was based on the register of ENIVD members as well as 
on their literature contributions relevant to each of the topics (for 
the detailed lists of participants see references in table 3). In the case 
of the SARS-relevant EQA studies, invitees were members of the 
international WHO SARS Reference and Verification Laboratory 
Network or of national and regional SARS reference laboratories. 
Each of the studies was announced as an EQA study of diagnostic 
proficiency, which included the certification and publishing of the 
results in a comparative and anonymous manner.
T A B L E  3
EQA studies performed by the ENIVD between 1999 and 2004
Period of time Viral agent Type of methods No. of laboratory participants2
No. of countries 
represented 
No. of samples 
positive/negative
No. of labs with 
good overall 
proficiency 
Reference
1999/20001 Hantavirus Serology 13 (13) 10 3/1 11 (85%) [30]
2001/2002 Hantavirus Serology 18 (16) 14 14/6 13 (72%) [30]
19991 Dengue virus Serology 13 (13) 10 2/2 11 (85%) [31]
2002 Dengue virus Serology 18 (16) 16 18/2 15 (83%) [31]
2002/2003 Dengue virus PCR 13 (11) 12 7/3 5 (38%) [32]
2002/2003 Filovirus PCR 14 (12) 13 7/53 7 (50%) [33]
2002/2003 Lassa virus PCR 14 (12) 13 8/53 8 (57%) [33]
2002/2003 Orthopox virus PCR 23 (21) 15 13/53 10 (43%) [33]
2004 SARS-CoV PCR 62 (34) 37 7/3 54 (87%) [34]
2004 SARS-CoV Serology 30 (14) 19 5/6 13 (43%) [35]
2004/2005 Orthopox virus PCR 32 (25) 18 11/8 27 (84%) p.i.p.
1. Pre-evaluation panel tested before running the respective EQA to optimise sample preparation and shipping procedures. 2. In brackets, portion of laboratories from 
European countries. 3. The same negative samples were included in the three test panels for diagnostic of Filo-, Lassa- or Orthopox virus. p.i.p.: publication in 
preparation.
For the EQA of serological diagnostics each participant received a 
coded panel of 15 or 20 freeze-dried human sera that also included 
negative controls. The positive samples, used to evaluate test sensitivity 
and specificity, consisted of sera with various titres of IgM and 
IgG. Samples of low volume but high titre were pre-diluted with 
human plasma known to be negative for the respective virus specific 
antibodies and viruses (including HIV, hepatitis B virus and hepatitis 
C virus). Before shipping, the serum panels were tested in duplicate by 
immunofluorescence assay (IFA), enzyme immunoassay (EIA) and/or 
immunoblotting (IB). The participating laboratories were advised 
to dissolve the samples in 100 µl distilled water and to centrifuge for 
5 minutes to remove any aggregates before testing. For the EQA of 
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molecular diagnostics each participant received a coded panel of 10 or 
33 lyophilised human plasma samples known to be positive or negative 
for the viral agent in question. The positive samples had been spiked 
with cell-culture derived and sequence-confirmed strains of virus and 
contained a range of concentrations between 102 and 107 viral copies 
per ml. The virus stocks used had been heat inactivated for 1 hour 
at 56 °C and gamma irradiated with 30 kGy and had been shown 
to be non-infectious in cell culture. Before shipping, the expected 
DNA/RNA concentrations in solubilised samples were confirmed 
by quantitative real-time PCR and, in the case of orthopox viruses 
(monkeypox strain) and SARS-CoV, virion integrity was assessed by 
electron microscopy.
The participants in each of the EQA studies were asked to analyze 
the material provided using the procedures routinely used by them 
in suspected cases of human infection. They were asked to provide 
details about the tests, such as the type of the methods used for 
serological diagnostics (e.g., IFA, EIA, IB or neutralization assay), 
the protocols and references of the oligonucleotide primers used for 
PCR, the method used to extract RNA or DNA, and the suppliers and 
types of commercial kits, if used.
The following two criteria were chosen as the minimum 
requirements for good overall proficiency: (1) correct identification 
of the majority of positive samples and (2) no false positive results for 
the negative samples. In the case of serological analysis, indeterminate 
results in positive or negative samples were identified as such and 
were not used in the evaluation. For molecular detection assays, 
indeterminate results in positive samples were treated as negative 
and those in negative samples were treated as positive. This is because 
tests based on the amplification of nucleic acid do not usually involve 
indeterminate endpoints and laboratories should be able to resolve 
unclear results by retesting the sample with a different amplification 
assay.
Results
The data from the EQA studies conducted through the ENIVD 
provided a good overview of the diagnostics of those imported, 
rare and emerging viral infections that have recently become of 
interest (and a challenge) to expert laboratories involved in public 
health surveillance both within and outside of Europe. Applying 
the proficiency criteria, the number of participating laboratories 
who passed the minimum requirements for successful participation 
is briefly presented besides other details in table 3. These EQA 
studies for serological and molecular diagnostics revealed many 
points that require attention and improvement in the participating 
laboratories.
Serology
The EQA studies for serological diagnostics revealed that the 
specificity of the test systems used for the detection of hantavirus
-and dengue virus-specific antibodies by the participating laboratories 
was acceptable (≥ 97% and ≥ 93% of correctly reported negative 
results, respectively) [30,31]. However, with only 88% of the negative 
samples being correctly reported, a lack of specificity for the detection 
of anti-SARS-CoV antibodies was evident [35]. Generally, for each 
study, the majority of the participating laboratories achieved good 
test scores for samples with high antibody concentration but showed 
poor sensitivity for samples with lower IgM or IgG titres. In particular, 
the difficulties in diagnosing samples with low IgM titres indicate 
that there is a considerable risk of overlooking acute infections in 
patients with low IgM titres. The scores for the correct identification 
of positive samples by IgM-testing were only 53% for hantavirus, 
58% for dengue virus and 64% for SARS-CoV. The in-house and 
commercial serological tests used in these studies for the detection 
of antibodies to hantavirus and dengue virus performed with almost 
equal proficiency and the type of assays used (IFA, EIA or IB) seemed 
to have little influence on the result. There were, however, clear 
differences when applied to the serological detection of SARS-CoV, 
with those laboratories using EIA and/or IB having major problems 
with regard to sensitivity and specificity. Furthermore, commercial 
assays performed significantly better than the in-house assays.
Molecular testing
The EQA studies revealed that, with the exception for SARS-
CoV, molecular diagnostics showed a poor overall test proficiency 
than the serological diagnostics. Almost twice as many participating 
laboratories successfully completed the study for SARS-CoV molecular 
detection [34] compared to those for dengue virus [32] and viral 
agents of bioterrorism (filoviruses, Lassa virus and orthopox viruses) 
[33] (38% for Dengue vs. 45.8% for BT viral agents vs. 87% for SARS-
CoV). Although failure was mainly due to a lack of sensitivity, false 
positive results were also a problem for some laboratories. Such results 
are particularly troublesome because of the serious public health 
concerns they can cause in a diagnostic situation. The EQA studies 
for molecular diagnostics only addressed paramount issues such as 
sensitivity and the control of contamination while validation of other 
aspects (e.g. cross-reactivity of primers or control of PCR inhibition) 
remained the responsibility of each diagnostic laboratory. The use of 
real-time PCR versus conventional PCR, but not the use of in-house 
versus commercial PCR, was shown to have a significant impact on 
a laboratory’s overall sensitivity, especially for detection of dengue 
virus, filovirus, Lassa virus and orthopox virus. The use of real-time 
PCR has a positive effect on the diagnostic performance. This may be 
because real-time PCR is still a relatively new technology normally 
performed in expert laboratories with a high level of PCR expertise. 
However, commercial RT-PCR test kits made a significant difference 
with regard to total sensitivity for SARS-CoV detection. This was 
clearly the method of choice for good diagnostics, possibly because 
SARS-CoV is a pathogen with which relatively few participating 
laboratories have had experience.
Discussion
The results of the EQA studies suggest that there is a need 
to improve many of the assays in order to improve laboratory 
diagnostic capabilities. Comparative testing of well-characterised 
samples provides all participating laboratories with the opportunity 
to examine their weaknesses and improve methodologies. Several 
proficiency panels for the EQA of viral diagnostics have been produced 
for viral pathogens of high prevalence such as HIV, herpes simplex 
virus, cytomegalovirus and enteroviruses. These panels are offered 
throughout Europe by commercial organisations such as the UK 
NEQAS (http://www.ukneqas.org.uk) and INSTAND e.V. (http://
www.instand-ev.de), or at the initiative of scientific societies such as 
the European Union Quality Control Concerted Action formed by the 
ESCV (http://www.qcmd.org). However, there are still a number of 
rare (and often not commercially viable) but nevertheless dangerous 
viral agents that are not addressed by efforts to improve the reliability 
and quality of the diagnostic output. The ENIVD has begun, for the 
first time, to generate reference materials for rare viruses that are 
of public health interest (e.g. for molecular detection of filoviruses, 
Lassa virus, orthopox viruses and SARS-CoV). Samples are available 
through the ENIVD for the development and validation of diagnostic 
tests, and the results generated by the participants in the EQA studies 
presented here will be a valuable resource for others wishing to 
establish or improve their own tests. Furthermore, laboratories that 
require help to improve their diagnostic assays can be supplied with 
additional diagnostic material or be advised by a competent expert 
laboratory from the network. It turned out that the diagnostic even 
of BSL-4 (biosafety level 4) pathogens like filovrius and and Lassa 
virus or poxviruses can be performed under normal laboratory 
conditions after an appropriate inactivation is applied. Nevertheless, 
for a suspected case the ENIVD recommend also to contact one of 
the BSL-4 expert laboratories for isolation and characterization of 
the highly infectious pathogen. Given the demand for biological 
preparedness, regular participation in the EQA programmes will 
become increasingly important for laboratories worldwide.
A number of EQA programmes in other fields of viral diagnostics 
have shown that results rapidly improve in subsequent studies [36]. 
Presently, the ENIVD is conducting a second EQA run for the molecular 
diagnostics of orthopox viruses, this time taking into consideration 
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how laboratories prevent PCR inhibition by various inhibitory factors 
that might cause quality deterioration in serum or tissue samples 
from clinical cases or in samples from environmental sources [37]. 
This second run shows preliminary a significant improvement of the 
diagnostic performance for the participating laboratories as compared 
to the first EQA run (unpublished data).
In May 2005 the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) became fully operational, and this represents a new 
milestone in measures to defend against and prevent threats to public 
health – both natural or deliberate – in the European Community 
[38]. The scientific expertise and information made available through 
various disease specific EU networks like the ENIVD can be brought 
together by the ECDC to fulfil its important tasks. Furthermore, the 
existing network structures can be used to expand the international 
role played by the EU in tackling diseases, particularly in neighbouring 
countries, and its role in the global action to control and respond to 
serious outbreaks or threats. The benefits of such close cooperations 
with existing networks could be shown for the immediate development 
and provision of reliable diagnostic tools in response to SARS, where 
the Global Outbreak and Response Network of the WHO (GOARN) 
and the ENIVD worked together to enable laboratories to perform 
the appropriate diagnostics. The ENIVD is planning to expand its 
network structure by inviting additional laboratories from EU-
candidate countries and neighbouring Eastern countries to participate 
as permanent members.
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The 2003-2004 influenza season in Europe was dominated by the 
spread of the new drift variant A/Fujian/411/2002 (H3N2)-like virus 
which was not perfectly matched with the A(H3N2) component of 
the influenza vaccine. Sporadic cases of this virus were detected 
in Europe at the end of the 2002-2003 season and influenza 
activity associated with this virus began relatively early during the 
2003-2004 season. Generally, influenza activity first occurred in 
the west of Europe (Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Iberian 
Peninsula) in October/November and gradually moved east across 
Europe, affecting Latvia, Lithuania and Poland during the months 
of January and February 2004. In general, the intensity of clinical 
activity was higher than during the 2002-2003 season (in 13 out 
of 20 networks) and, in countries reporting age specific data, the 
highest consultation incidences were observed among children aged 
0-14. However, despite the emergence of the A(H3N2) drift variant, 
clinical incidences were not especially high compared with historical 
data. The composition of the 2004-2005 influenza vaccine has been 
modified compared with the 2003-2004 season and includes an 
A/Fujian/411/2002 (H3N2)-like virus strain and a new B virus strain 
(a B/Shanghai/361/2002-like virus).
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Introduction
Influenza has an important public health impact each winter in 
Europe. It is associated with higher general practice consultation 
rates [1], increased hospital admissions [2] and excess deaths [2,3]. 
In England and Wales, the average number of excess deaths during 
influenza epidemic periods (1989-1998) was estimated to be 12 554 
per season (range 0-27 587) [2]. Extrapolating these figures to the 
European Union (25 countries), the average number of excess deaths 
during influenza epidemic periods between 1989 and 1998 was about 
107 000 per winter, with the total number in each country ranging 
from roughly 100 in Luxembourg and Malta to 19 500 in Germany. 
In recent winters, influenza activity in Europe has generally not been 
as intense as during the 1989-1998 period [4,5] and the average 
number of excess deaths has probably therefore been lower.
The European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS) is a 
collaborative project [6-8] that aims to contribute to a reduction 
in morbidity and mortality due to influenza in Europe. During 
the 2003-2004 season, 25 surveillance networks from 22 European 
countries were active members of EISS. The scheme aims to include 
all member states of the European Union [9] and networks must 
meet the following criteria for full membership: 1) the surveillance 
network (consisting of sentinel physicians providing clinical data 
and national reference laboratories providing virological data) 
is nationally or regionally representative; 2) the authority of the 
network is recognised by the national or regional health authority
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in the country or region; 3) the clinical surveillance and virological 
surveillance are integrated in the same population (community); 4) 
the network has functioned successfully for at least two years; and 
5) the network can deliver data on a weekly basis.
Sixteen networks were full members of EISS during the 2003-
2004 season and nine were associate members (Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Lithuania, Malta, Northern Ireland, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic and Sweden). Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and 
Sweden were associate members, as they did not combine clinical 
and virological data in the same population. Luxembourg, Malta, 
Northern Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania had this status as they did 
not fulfil the EISS criteria of two years of successful functioning 
prior to the 2003-2004 season, or were recent members of EISS. 
Including all members, the EISS project comprised 30 national 
influenza reference laboratories, at least 11 000 sentinel physicians, 
and presented surveillance data for a total population of 445 million 
inhabitants.
Methods
EISS members actively monitored influenza activity from week 
40/2003 (29/9/2003 – 5/10/2003) to week 20/2004 (10/5/2004 – 
16/5/2004) during the 2003-2004 season. In each of the countries, 
one or several networks of sentinel physicians collected weekly 
(consultation) incidences of cases of influenza-like illness (ILI) and/or 
acute respiratory infection (ARI). Sentinel physicians also obtained 
nasal, pharyngeal, or nasopharyngeal specimens from a subset of 
patients and these were sent to the national reference laborator(y)(ies) 
for virological analysis. Combining clinical and virological data in the 
same population allows the validation of clinical reports made by the 
sentinel physicians and provides virological data in a clearly defined 
population (the general population that visits their physician with an 
ILI or ARI) [10]. In addition to specimens obtained from physicians 
in the sentinel surveillance systems, the laboratories also collected 
and reported results on specimens obtained from other sources 
(e.g. from hospitals or non-sentinel physicians). These data are 
called ‘non-sentinel’ in this paper and are collected to validate 
the virological data obtained from the sentinel physicians and to have 
a second measure of influenza activity.
The virological data included results mainly from typing and 
subtyping of viruses isolated using cell culture and additionally from 
rapid diagnostic enzyme-immunological or immunofluorescence 
tests identifying the virus type only. Many laboratories also used 
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) routinely 
for detection and (sub)typing [11]. About 55% of the laboratories 
also reported antigenic characterisation data and about 30% of 
the laboratories reported genetic characterisation data of the virus 
isolates [12].
During the influenza season, the weekly clinical and virological data 
are processed and analysed by the national centres and then entered 
into the EISS database the following week via the internet (www.
eiss.org) [13]. The indicators of influenza activity are established 
on a weekly basis by the national coordinators: the intensity of 
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clinical activity (compared with historical data), the geographical 
spread of influenza (a World Health Organization indicator) and the 
dominant type/subtype circulating in the population. This allows 
members to view data in neighbouring countries and is the basis for 
the publication of a Weekly Electronic Bulletin that appears on the 
EISS website each Friday.
This paper presents epidemiological and virological data collected 
between week 40/2003 (29/9/2003 – 5/10/2003) and week 16/2004 
(12/4/2004 – 18/4/2004). Week 16/2004 was chosen as some networks 
stopped collecting clinical data at the end of the season and data was 
therefore incomplete for weeks 17-20/2004.
Results
The influenza activity started in the west of Europe (Ireland, 
the United Kingdom (UK) and the Iberian Peninsula) in October/
November and gradually moved east, affecting Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Latvia, Poland, Italy and Germany during the months of January/
February 2004 [Table]. The peak weekly level of intensity and 
geographical spread of influenza activity varied between the member 
countries during the 2003-2004 season [Table]. The peak intensity of 
clinical influenza activity (compared with historical data) ranged from 
low in Germany, Luxembourg and Wales, to high in nine networks. 
Most networks reported widespread influenza activity during the 
2003-2004 season (16 out of 25). The peak levels of weekly ILI/ARI 
incidences in Europe were reached between week 46/2003 and 6/2004 
[Table], with the majority of networks reporting peak levels before 
the end of the year (16 out of 24). A more detailed breakdown of 
the epidemiological data by country is available on the EISS website 
(http://www.eiss.org/documents/eurosurveillance_supplement_2003-
2004_season.pdf). In countries reporting age specific data, the highest 
consultation incidences were observed among children aged 0-14 
(data not shown).
T A B L E
Overview of influenza activity in the EISS networks during the 2003-2004 season
Country
Network
Week of peak clinical 
incidence 
Intensity
(peak weekly level)1
Week of peak virus 
detections2
Dominant virus 
type/subtype3
Geographical spread 
(peak weekly level)4
Influenza-like illness
 England 46 Medium 47 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Ireland 46 Medium 45-47 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Northern Ireland 46 Medium 46 A(H3) Local
 Scotland 46 Medium 48 A Widespread
 Portugal 47 High 47 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Spain 47 Medium 47 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Wales 48 Low 46 n.a. Local
 Malta 49 High n.a. n.a. Widespread
 Norway 50 High 49 A(H3N2) & A(H1N2) Widespread
 Belgium 51 Medium 49 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Denmark 51 High 51 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Luxembourg 51 Low 51 A Local
 Netherlands 51 Medium 51 A(H3) Widespread
 Switzerland 1 High 51 A(H3) Widespread
 Slovak Republic 4 Medium 6 A(H3) Widespread
 Lithuania 5 Medium 2 n.a. Local
 Slovenia 5 High 3-4 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Latvia 5 High 4 A(H3N2) Regional
 Poland 6 High 9 A Regional
 Italy 6 Medium 6 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Sweden n.a. Medium n.a. n.a. Regional
Acute respiratory infections
 France 49 Medium 51 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Romania 51 High 51 A(H3N2) Widespread
 Czech Republic 51 Medium 51 A(H3) Regional
 Germany 6 Low 11 A(H3N2) Regional
n.a: not applicable as no data is available or insuffi cient data is available.
1.  The intensity of clinical activity compares the weekly clinical morbidity rate with historical data: Low = no infl uenza activity or infl uenza activity at baseline level; 
Medium = usual levels of infl uenza activity; High = higher than usual levels of infl uenza activity; Very high = particularly severe levels of infl uenza activity (less than 
once every 10 years).
2.  Assessment based on sentinel and non-sentinel data.
3.  Assessment based on: 1) sentinel and non-sentinel data (primary assessment sentinel data); 2) minimum number of sentinel/non-sentinel positive isolates: 10 for the sea-
son and these must represent at least 10% of total positive isolates reported during the season; 3) possibility to have two dominant virus types/subtypes (limits: 45%:55% 
and 55%:45%).
4.  The geographical spread is a WHO indicator that has the following levels: No activity = no evidence of infl uenza virus activity (clinical activity remains at baseline 
levels); Sporadic = isolated cases of laboratory confi rmed infl uenza infection; Local outbreak = increased infl uenza activity in local areas (e.g. a city) within a region, 
or outbreaks in two or more institutions (e.g. schools) within a region. Laboratory confi rmed; Regional activity = infl uenza activity above baseline levels in one or more 
regions with a population comprising less than 50% of the country’s total population. Laboratory confi rmed; Widespread = infl uenza activity above baseline levels in one 
or more regions with a population comprising 50% or more of the country’s population. Laboratory confi rmed.
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The figure presents the total number of specimens positive for 
influenza viruses by week during the 2003-2004 season. The largest 
number of positive specimens was detected before the new year, 
between week 48/2003 and 51/2003. Detections continued during the 
first three months of 2004, but at a lower level. The peak weekly level 
of influenza virus detections varied among the member countries, 
and coincided roughly with the week of peak clinical morbidity 
[TABLE].
F I G U R E
Total number of sentinel and non-sentinel specimens positive 
for influenza viruses by week during the 2003-2004 season, 
EISS, Europe
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A total of 13 652 sentinel and non-sentinel specimens were 
positive for influenza virus during the 2003-2004 influenza season. 
The largest number of positive specimens were reported by France 
(3607), England (1704), Belgium (1260), Scotland (1139) and Norway 
(1000). Less than one per cent of the specimens (0.86%) were positive 
for the influenza B virus. The predominant viruses by country are 
shown in the table. A more detailed breakdown of the virological 
data by country is available as a Supplement on the EISS website. 
Influenza A virus was predominant in all countries that reported 
virological data (> 91% of all influenza virus isolates per country; total 
N=13 535). In most countries, the haemagglutinin of the influenza 
A isolates was subtyped (range: 0% – 100% of total influenza A 
isolates, average 50%, median 44% per country; total N=5841), and 
the predominant subtype was H3 (excluding the one country that 
reported no subtyping, > 90% of H-subtyped isolates per country; 
total N=5781). Among the 5841 subtyped influenza A virus isolates, 
only 60 (1.0%) were A(H1) and of the 36 neuraminidase subtyped 
A(H1) isolates, 22 had the N1 and 14 had the N2 subtype. EISS 
received no reports of influenza A(H5N1), A(H7N2) or A(H7N3) 
viruses that caused outbreaks among poultry in Asia, Canada and the 
United States (US), and also infected humans [14-17].
Of a total of 3457 virus isolates, the haemagglutinin was antigenically 
characterised. The largest number of characterisations was reported 
by Latvia (796), Germany (491), France (392), the Netherlands (390), 
and England (348). Over 97% of the characterised isolates had an 
A/Fujian/411/02 A(H3N2)-like H3 haemagglutinin. There were 
46 isolates with an H3 haemagglutinin similar to the vaccine strain 
A/Moscow/10/99 (H3N2), 34 with an H1 haemagglutinin similar to 
the vaccine strain A/New Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1) and seven with a 
haemagglutinin similar to the vaccine strain B/Hong Kong/330/2001. 
There were 11 non-vaccine strain reports of influenza B isolates: seven 
with a haemagglutinin similar to the B/Sichuan/379/99-like virus (in 
the Netherlands (3), Switzerland (2), France and Germany) and four 
with a haemagglutinin similar to the B/Shanghai/361/2002-like virus 
(in England (2), Italy and Norway). Of the antigenically characterised 
isolates, 166 were also genetically characterised and all haemagglutinins 
were antigenically and genetically similar to the same vaccine strain. 
In addition, 138 isolates were characterised genetically only, which 
added 132 more viruses with an A/Fujian/411/2002 (H3N2)-like 
haemagglutinin, four more with an A/New Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1)-
like haemagglutinin and two more with a B/Shanghai/361/2002-like 
haemagglutinin (from Norway). The B/Shanghai/361/2002-like 
viruses were detected at the end of the 2003-2004 season.
Discussion
The 2003-2004 influenza season in Europe was dominated by the 
emergence and spread of the new drift variant A/Fujian/411/2002 
(H3N2)-like virus. Sporadic cases of this virus were detected at the 
end of the 2002-2003 season in Switzerland and Norway [6] and 
activity related to this virus started relatively early during the 2003-
2004 winter compared with previous seasons. The intensity of clinical 
activity was higher than during the 2002-2003 season in 13 out of 20 
networks [6], but did not reach particularly high levels compared 
with historical data [4,5,18].
The general west-east spread of influenza activity across Europe 
during the 2003-2004 season has also been observed during previous 
winter seasons. Plotting the peak weeks of clinical sentinel activity 
against the longitude and latitude of each network in EISS during five 
winter seasons (1999-2000 to 2003-2004) indicated that there was a 
west-east spread of influenza activity in three of five seasons (2003-
2004, 2002-2003 and 2001-2002) and that in one of the seasons (2001-
2002), there was also a south-north spread [19]. Another finding of 
this analysis was that influenza activity during the 2003-2004 season, 
for Europe as a whole, was longer (18 to 22 weeks) than in recent 
winters (e.g. 14 to 18 weeks during the 2001-2002 season) [19].
The identification of circulating viruses within the population and 
the recognition of virological changes are important tasks for EISS. 
There is a particular need to detect and monitor the emergence or 
re-emergence of viruses with pandemic potential and viruses that 
have a ‘mismatch’ with the vaccine strain components. The virological 
database was therefore upgraded at the beginning of the 2003-2004 
season so that more detailed information could be collected (e.g. 
separate recording of H and N subtyping and antigenic and genetic 
strain characterisation results) and the database could be quickly 
and easily modified to collect information on emerging influenza 
viruses (e.g. a new avian influenza virus). These developments proved 
particularly relevant in the light of the emergence of avian influenza 
outbreaks and transmission to humans in South East Asia (H5N1), 
Canada (H7N3) and the US (H7N2) in 2004 [14-17].
Objective determination of the predominant virus by type and H-
and N-subtype in a country was difficult as in many countries only a 
minority of influenza A virus isolates was haemagglutinin subtyped 
and the neuraminidase even to a lesser extent. More importantly, 
determining the H-and N-subtype of influenza A viruses is necessary 
to detect the emergence of new (avian) subtypes or reassortant viruses, 
illustrated by the emergence of the A(H1N2) reassortant virus in 2001 
[20]. EISS is aiming at H-and N-subtyping of at least a representative 
sample of isolates throughout the season in each country in order to 
fulfil its early warning function [12].
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The predominant virus circulating in Europe during the 2003-
2004 season was the new drift variant A/Fujian/411/2002 (H3N2)-like 
virus. The A(H3N2) Fujian-like virus is antigenically different from 
the influenza A/Moscow/10/99 (H3N2) virus strain included in the 
2003-2004 vaccine and there were concerns about the effectiveness 
of the vaccine in preventing influenza illness [6]. Studies have shown 
that estimates of influenza vaccine effectiveness ranged from 25% 
to 49% in children and 38% to 52% in adults in preventing illness 
during the 2003-2004 influenza season in the US [21]. Although 
estimated protection rates are higher when the match between the 
vaccine and circulating virus is good (70-90% in adults <65 years) 
[21], our epidemiological data for the 2003-2004 season indicate that 
the season was not particularly intense compared with historical data 
[18]. At the beginning of the 2003-2004 season, there were reports 
of deaths in children in the UK [22] which received considerable 
media attention and initially seemed to confirm the concerns about 
the escape of the A(H3N2) Fujian-like virus from pre-existing or 
vaccine induced anti-A(H3N2) immunity. Although we observed 
the highest clinical incidences among children aged 0-14 in countries 
reporting age specific data, these were not especially high compared 
with historical data (data not shown). From these observations, we 
may conclude that, despite the A(H3N2) Fujian-like virus being 
antigenically different from the previously circulating A(H3N2) 
virus and the A(H3N2) virus used in the vaccine, illness was not 
particularly severe.
The composition of the influenza vaccine for the 2004-2005 
season (northern hemisphere winter) was announced by the World 
Health Organization in March 2004 [23]. Based on the analysis of 
influenza viruses from all over the world till February 2004, the A/
Moscow/10/99 (H3N2)-like and B/Hong Kong/330/2001-like vaccine 
strains in the influenza vaccine of 2003-2204 have been exchanged for 
more current viruses. The European influenza vaccine [24] for the 
2004-2005 season contains:
•  A/NewCaledonia/20/99(H1N1)-like virus (the currently used 
vaccine virus is reassortant virus IVR-116 which is derived from 
A/NewCaledonia/20/99).
•  A/Fuijan/411/2002 (H3N2)-like virus (the currently used 
vaccine virus is reassortant virus X-147 which is derived from 
A/Wyoming/3/2003).
•  B/Shanghai/361/2002-like virus (the currently used vaccine virus 
is B/Jiangsu/10/2003).
The spread of virus strains in Europe during the 2004-2005 season 
will be carefully monitored by the virological, epidemiological and 
clinical experts within EISS. Assessments of the influenza activity will 
be made in collaboration with the WHO Collaborating Centre in 
London and will be reported on the EISS website on a weekly basis.
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H E P A T I T I S  A  O U T B R E A K  A M O N G  M S M  L I N K E D  T O  C A S U A L  
S E X  A N D  G A Y  S A U N A S  I N  C O P E N H A G E N ,  D E N M A R K
A Mazick 1,2, M Howitz 2, S Rex 3, IP Jensen 4, N Weis 5, TL Katzenstein 6, J Haff 3, K Molbak 2
During an outbreak of hepatitis A predominantly among men who have sex 
with men (MSM) in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2004, we did a case-control 
study to determine risk factors for infection. A case was an MSM > 17 years, 
living in Copenhagen, with IgM positive hepatitis A infection diagnosed between 
June and August 2004, and without a household contact with a hepatitis A 
case before onset of illness. Controls were selected at the Copenhagen Pride 
Festival. The study included 18 cases and 64 controls. Sixteen of 18 cases 
and 36/63 controls had sex with casual partners (OR
MH
 5.6, 95% CI 1.2-26.9). 
Eleven of 18 cases and 14/62 controls had sex in gay saunas (OR
MH
 4.2, 95% 
CI 1.5-11.5). Sex at private homes appeared to be protective (OR
MH
 0.2, 95% 
CI 0.1-0.7). Casual sex including sex in gay saunas was an important risk 
factor for the spread of HAV among MSM in Copenhagen. The results are in 
accordance with findings in other European outbreaks. As the general immu-
nity to hepatitis A decreases and the outbreak potential increases, we recom-
mend health education and hepatitis A vaccination to all MSM not living in 
monogamous relationships, especially if they visit gay saunas or other places 
with frequent partner change. To stop spread of hepatitis A among MSM in 
Europe, a European consensus on prevention and control measures may be 
required.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(5): 111-4 Published online May 2005
Key words: Case-control study, hepatitis A, homosexuality, male; 
sexual behaviour
Introduction
In Denmark, anti-HAV IgM positive hepatitis A virus (HAV) 
infection is notifiable by clinicians. HAV is not regarded as endemic in 
Denmark and susceptibility in the population is high. The majority of 
infections are imported by children of foreign origin returning from 
visits to friends and relatives in endemic countries [1]. Subsequent 
secondary spread in childcare institutions is a common cause of small 
outbreaks. Outbreaks of hepatitis A among men who have sex with 
men (MSM) have been reported from several cities in Europe and 
worldwide. In Copenhagen, outbreaks among MSM occurred in 
1977 [2] and in 1991 [3]; with 21 and 17 reported cases of hepatitis 
A respectively. Studies have shown that hepatitis A is a sexually 
transmitted infection (STI) in MSM. The main risk factors identified 
are oral-anal sex (rimming) or digital-anal sex [4,5], visiting certain 
bars or saunas [6,7,8], having sex with anonymous partners or group 
sex [4,5]. Social contact of a non-sexual nature and contaminated 
food [7] also contribute to infection.
From January 2004 an outbreak of hepatitis A affecting 
predominantly MSM occurred in Copenhagen [9]. In April, active 
case finding in collaboration with laboratories was set up. Awareness 
of hepatitis A diagnosis and the need for reporting was raised among 
clinicians. Apart from ordinary precautions in a hepatitis A outbreak, 
such as increased hygiene and immunoglobulin for close contacts, 
vaccination was recommended for MSM not living in monogamous 
relationships. Further information for MSM was provided by a 
national STI campaign carried out by the Danish gay organisation 
STOP AIDS and the Danish National Association for Gays and 
Lesbians. The outbreak continued, and in August 2004, the Statens 
Serum Institut (SSI) and STOP AIDS carried out a case-control study 
to determine risk factors for hepatitis A infection in this outbreak in 
order to inform targeted preventive measures.
1. European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (EPIET).
2. Department of Epidemiology, Statens Serum Institut, Denmark.
3. STOP AIDS, Denmark.
4. Department of Virology, Statens Serum Institut, Denmark.
5. Department of Infectious Diseases, H:S Hvidovre Hospital, Copenhagen, Denmark.
6. Department of Infectious Diseases, Rigshospitalet, Copenhagen, Denmark.
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Methods
A case was defined as an MSM > 17 years, living in Copenhagen, in 
whom hepatitis A infection with positive anti-HAV IgM was diagnosed 
between 1 June and 14 August 2004, and who did not have contact 
to a hepatitis A case in his household in the six weeks before onset of 
illness. Cases were selected from the notifications received.
Controls, frequency matched to the cases date of onset of illness, 
were selected at the annual Copenhagen Gay Pride Festival on 
14 August 2004 from MSM resident in Copenhagen. Based on the 
result of a saliva antibody test (Methods: see [10]) only persons 
susceptible to hepatitis A were included as controls. Data on exposure 
was collected for a six week period before illness onset and for the same 
period in controls using piloted self-administered questionnaires. 
To protect privacy, patients were contacted by their physician who 
obtained informed consent before posting a questionnaire to them. 
Information collected included: eating in restaurants/cafes/bars, 
shellfish consumption, whirlpool use, travel abroad, contact with 
hepatitis A cases, number of regular and casual sexual partners, venues 
for sexual contact, sexual contacts abroad or arranged via internet, 
oral-anal and digital-anal sex practices, history of STIs. Additionally, 
controls were asked about their attitude towards vaccination.
Data analysis was performed in STATA 8.0. Matched odds ratios 
and 95% confidence intervals were calculated for each exposure 
factor. Adjusted odds ratios were calculated using conditional 
logistic regression analysis. Exposure factors with P values < 0.20 
and confounding variables such as age were included. The final model 
was build by backward elimination of variables above the threshold 
of P = 0.10.
Results
In 2004, 163 cases of hepatitis A in men > 17 years were notified 
to the Department of Epidemiology, SSI. In the past five years the 
median number of annually reported cases of hepatitis A among 
men of this age group was 13 (range 7-25). Of the 163 cases, 107 were 
from Copenhagen, 56 from the rest of Denmark. The incidence rate in 
Copenhagen was 23 per 100 000 and declined with increasing distance 
from the capital [FIGURE 1].
The following results are restricted to cases in Copenhagen. Of 
the 107 patients, 68 (64%) were reported to be MSM and five to be 
heterosexuals. For 34 patients, the sexual orientation was not known 
[FIGURE 2].
Patient ages ranged between 19 and 73 years with a median of 
41. Ninety seven (91%) patients were residents in Denmark. Thirty 
seven (35%) patients were admitted to hospital.. Forty nine (46%) 
cases were reported by general practitioners and 58 from hospital 
in-or outpatient departments.
F I G U R E  1
Incidence rate (per 105) of reported cases of hepatitis A 
among men > 17 years by county in Denmark, 2004
Case-control study
The case-control study conducted among MSM included 18 cases 
and 64 controls. Physicians of 36 notified cases were asked to recruit 
their patients for the study; 30 patients agreed to participate and 
24 of these (80%) returned questionnaires. Six patients did not fulfil 
the case definition (four self-identified as heterosexual, one was 
infected by a household contact and one did not live in Denmark 
during the exposure period). Saliva samples were taken from 105 MSM 
visiting the Copenhagen Pride Festival: 86 (82%) had no detectable 
antibodies against HAV; 15 (14%) were IgG positive, two of these were 
also IgM positive; four samples were inconclusive. Of the 86 without 
detectable antibodies, 17 reported having been vaccinated against 
hepatitis A, three were not in Copenhagen during the period required 
and two refused to participate. Therefore, 64 (61%) of the participants 
were included as controls.
Case patients and controls were similar with regards to residence 
within Copenhagen, but patients were older than controls [TABLE 1].
The proportion of HIV-infected people was higher among patients 
than controls. Neither patients nor controls reported a previous 
syphilis infection.
F I G U R E  2
Reported cases of hepatitis A among men >17 years living in Copenhagen, (n=107), by week of onset of illness and sexual 
orientation, Denmark, 2004
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T A B L E 1
Characteristics of HAV infected study cases and controls, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, 2004
Characteristics Study cases(n=18)
Controls
(n=64) p-value
Age in years: median (range) 41.5 (19-73) 33 (18-66) 0.04*
Residence: Copenhagen 
Commune 10/18 40/63
Frederiksberg 2/18 9/63 0.62
Copenhagen County 6/18 14/63
HIV-positive 4/14 2/42 0.02
History of STI 2/18 3/61 0.34
History of syphilis 0 0
History of 
gonorrhoea 1 1
No of sexual partners, 
median (range) 3 (0-10) 2 (0-50) 0.18*
No of casual partners, 
median, (range) 2 (0-10) 1 (0-48) 0.11*
Disclosed sexual preference to GP 38/61 (62%)
* Kruskal-Wallis test.
Matched univariate analysis of exposure factors [TABLE 2] suggests 
that HAV infection was not associated with consumption of seafood 
or eating outside home. There was no evidence of a cluster of cases 
linked specific food outlets or restaurants. Travelling abroad was 
less frequent for case patients than controls. Patients had a median 
of three sexual partners in the six weeks before illness and controls, 
a median of two.
Patients were more likely to have had sex with casual partners 
than controls. One third of both patients and controls had sex with 
partners they met via the internet. HAV infection was associated with 
sex in gay saunas. This association was very strong in May and June, 
when 9 of 10 patients were exposed (OR
MH
 129.2, 95% CI 7.6-2197.5), 
but not in the later part of the study. No single sauna was implicated. 
Sex at cruising grounds and toilets was not associated with infection. 
Sex at private homes appeared protective. Participation in group sex 
was reported by 17% of the patients and 5% of controls. High risk 
practices such as oral-anal and digital-anal sex were common among 
both cases and controls, and were not associated with increased risk 
of HAV infection.
T A B L E  2
Selected exposure factors of HAV infection among MSM cases and controls, in 6 weeks before illness onset in cases, 
Copenhagen, Denmark 2004
Factor
Number exposed among
cases 
(%)
controls
(%) ORMH* 95% CI P
Eaten out (restaurants, etc) 14/17 (82) 55/59 (93) 0.4 0.1-2.4 0.35
Eaten seafood 9/16 (56) 28/60 (47) 2.0 0.6-6.6 0.25
Travel abroad 3/18 (17) 21/63 (33) 0.4 0.1-1.6 0.19
Contact with hepatitis A case** 5/18 (28) 7/61 (11) 2.8 0.8-10.2 0.09
Sex in gay saunas 11/18 (61) 14/62 (23) 4.2 1.5-11.5 0.003
Sex in private homes 8/18 (44) 50/62 (81) 0.2 0.1-0.7 0.004
Sex at cruising ground & public toilets 0/18 8/62 (13) 0
Sex with casual partners 16/18 (89) 36/63 (57) 5.6 1.2-26.9 0.02
Sex with >1 partner 12/15 (80) 31/61 (51) 3.6 0.9-14.2 0.06
Sex with partner met on the internet 6/17 (35) 22/63 (35) 1.1 0.3-3.5 0.91
Digital-anal sex (finger-sex) 14/17 (82) 43/61 (70) 1.8 0.5-6.8 0.33
Oral-anal sex (rimming) 9/16 (56) 28/62 (45) 1.7 0.5-5.5 0.36
Group sex 3/18 (17) 3/64 (5) 5.6 0.9-36.6 0.06
* Mantel-Haenszel odds ratio (matching variable: onset of illness in cases).
**  Defi ned as contact with hepatitis A case since January 2004 and is thus a proxy measure for contact with a community where hepatitis A is prevalent, not an indica-
tor for person-to-person transmission.
After adjusting for confounding, sex with casual partners (adjusted 
odds ratio(aOR) 8.7; 95% CI 1.6-48.9) and sex in private homes (aOR 
0.1; 95% CI 0.0-0.5) seem to respectively increase and decrease the risk 
of infection. Because of the time dependency, sex in gay saunas did not 
prevail as an independent risk factor in the multivariate analysis.
Two thirds of controls disclosed their sexual orientation to their 
general practitioner. Of 36 controls, who had had casual sex, 11 had 
been recommended hepatitis A vaccination (gay campaigns (5), 
an STI clinic (4), and general practitioners (2)). Among controls, 
53 (83%) were willing to be vaccinated against hepatitis A. However, 
of these, only 14 (26%) were willing to pay for the vaccination.
Discussion
The study suggests that sexual activity was the major mode of 
transmission in this hepatitis A outbreak among MSM. Sex with 
casual partners and sex in gay saunas contributed to the spread of 
hepatitis A among MSM.
However, as the study period encompassed only part of the outbreak, 
we must be cautious about extrapolating results to the whole period 
of the outbreak. The study may be further limited by a small sample 
size. Controls selected at the festival may not be representative of the 
total MSM population in Copenhagen. However, since it is impossible 
to select controls directly from the study population, we consider 
our approach the best possible way to represent a broad spectrum of 
MSM. Protecting privacy was considered to be extremely important 
in this outbreak investigation, and therefore access to information on 
the cases was limited due to the sensitive nature of the subject.
This was the largest recorded outbreak of hepatitis among MSM 
in Denmark and the first one in more than a decade. In Europe, cases 
of hepatitis A among MSM are reported with increasing frequency: 
since 1995 there have been outbreaks in major European cities on an 
almost annual basis. Venues for casual sex, such as gay saunas and 
darkrooms are frequently implicated [7,8,11,12]. The increased risk 
of infection is presumably related to the possibility of having several 
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partners within a short period of time. In Copenhagen, gay saunas are 
popular places for both Danes and visitors from abroad to have casual 
sex. There are at least seven saunas, they operate all year round and 
the largest sauna typically attracts approximately 700 to 1000 visitors 
per week. With increasing tourist traffic between European cities 
and increasing susceptibility to HAV in the population, gay saunas 
offer a perfect venue for endemic and epidemic spread of hepatitis A 
among MSM in Europe. The Copenhagen outbreak caused hepatitis 
A in at least 13 Swedish men [13]. Most of these men were from 
southern parts of Sweden, which is situated close to Copenhagen, 
and in some of them, infection could be directly linked to sex at gay 
saunas. The outbreak in Copenhagen is most likely also responsible for 
an outbreak among MSM in Norway. There, the same outbreak virus 
strain circulated among infected MSM that caused the Copenhagen 
and Swedish cases [14].
Hepatitis A is a relatively mild disease with a low case fatality. 
No death was recorded in Copenhagen. However, one third of cases 
were admitted to hospital. Costs associated with hospital admission 
and days off work could be avoided by vaccination. In HIV-infected 
individuals, HAV infection has been associated with prolonged HAV 
viraemia, which might lead to longer infectivity and increased risk 
of spread in this population [15]. Inactivated HAV vaccine is safe in 
HIV-infected individuals [16].
The prevalence of anti-HAV antibodies among MSM tested at 
the Copenhagen Pride Festival was 14%. This is low compared with 
a serological study in two gay saunas in Copenhagen conducted in 
1984, where 36% of sauna attendees were immune to HAV – a figure 
three times higher than in the general Danish population at that 
time [17]. It is uncertain whether this reflects an overall decline of 
hepatitis A infections among MSM over the last 20 years, because 
sauna attendees may not be representative of the population of MSM 
attending the festival. However, it suggests that the population of MSM 
in Copenhagen is susceptible to hepatitis A infection and therefore 
need to be alerted of the risks of infection and how to prevent it.
Based on the results of the investigation we suggest recommending 
hepatitis A vaccination to all MSM who are not in a monogamous 
relationship, especially if they visit gay saunas or other places with 
frequent partner change.
Opportunities for vaccination could be visits to general 
practitioners (although not all MSM disclose their sexual orientation 
to their doctor), sexual health clinics or outreach campaigns at saunas 
or mobile clinics. Willingness to be vaccinated was high among MSM, 
but a considerable number were reluctant to pay for the vaccination. 
This attitude may be influenced by information about the importance 
of vaccination. As free hepatitis B vaccination is available for MSM in 
Copenhagen, exchanging the monovalent vaccine for the combined 
hepatitis A and B vaccine would make protection against hepatitis A 
available at little extra costs.
We further suggest that adequate hygiene should be ensured in 
saunas. An information campaign on risks and prevention of hepatitis 
A transmission should be targeted at sauna visitors (both Danish and 
international guests). To stop spread of hepatitis A among MSM in 
Europe, a European consensus on prevention and control measures 
may be required.
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L Gambotti 1 and the acute hepatitis C collaborating group*
In mid-2004, three Parisian hospital wards informed the Institut de veille 
sanitaire of recent acute hepatitis C in HIV-infected (HIV+) men who had sex 
with men (MSM). These cases for whom none of the usual bloodborne routes 
for hepatitis C (HCV) transmission was found, reported having had unprotected 
sex. In October 2004, we conducted a retrospective investigation in Parisian 
hospital wards to explore HCV modes of transmission in recent acute hepatitis 
C in HIV+ MSM. Patient demographics, clinical and biological status of HIV 
infection, reasons for HCV testing, sexual behaviour and risk factors for HCV 
transmission within the 6 months before hepatitis onset were collected from 
medical records. An anonymous self-administered questionnaire on sexual 
behaviour within the six months before hepatitis onset was also offered to all 
cases. We identified 29 cases of acute hepatitis C in HIV+ MSM with onset 
from April 2001 to October 2004. HIV infection was asymptomatic for 76%. 
Median age at hepatitis C onset was 40 (28-54) years. In all records, were 
noted unprotected anal sex, fisting in 21% and a concomitant sexually trans-
mitted infection (STI) in 41%. Median time between HIV diagnosis and HCV 
infection was 6.5 years (0-22). From the 11 self-administered questionnaires 
completed, 10 reported an STI, 8 “hard” sexual practices, 6 bleeding during 
sex and 5 fisting. HCV transmission probably occurred through bleeding during 
unprotected traumatic anal sex among HIV+ MSM and may be facilitated by 
STI mucosal lesions. This report stresses the continuous need to strongly 
advocate safer sex to MSM.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(5): 115-7 Published online May 2005
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Introduction
In mid-2004, two major hospital wards in Paris informed the 
national public health institute (InVS) of several cases of acute 
hepatitis C that had occurred in HIV positive (HIV+) men who 
had sex with men (MSM). These reporting clinicians indicated the 
unusual occurrence of these cases and that none of the usual routes 
for hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission, such as injecting drug 
use (IDU), professional or nosocomial exposure, was reported for 
these cases. A third Parisian hospital ward had recently described five 
acute HCV infections in HIV+ MSM [1], who were concomicantly 
diagnosed with primary or secondary syphilis.
In order to ascertain the number of cases, to describe patients’ 
characteristics and to suggest risk factors for HCV transmission among 
HIV+ MSM, between September and October 2004 we conducted a 
retrospective investigation of all acute hepatitis C in HIV+ MSM in 
the three hospital wards.
Method
We defined a case as a HIV+ MSM with acute hepatitis C occurring 
since 1 January 2001. Acute hepatitis C was defined as a documented 
HCV seroconversion within 6 months, or a positive HCV-RNA by 
polymerase chain reaction assay (PCR) following a negative assay 
within 6 months previously, or a positive HCV-RNA PCR and 
10 fold the normal limits of serum alanine aminotransferase level 
(ALT) with documented normal levels during the preceding year.
The three Parisian hospitals wards (two infectious disease wards 
and one hepatology ward) initially involved were asked to find all cases 
of acute hepatitis C that fitted the case definition. We reviewed the 
medical records of all identified cases to assess possible risk factors 
for HCV infection during the 6 months prior to acute hepatitis 
C, including patient demographics, HIV infection characteristics 
(date of diagnosis, group of transmission, clinical stage, CD4 count 
and viral load level, antiretroviral therapy), hepatitis C infection 
description (date of diagnosis, reasons for HCV screening, viral 
genotype, treatment, progression), sexual behaviour and risk factors 
for HCV transmission (IDU, professional or nosocomial exposure). 
An anonymous self-administered questionnaire on sexual behaviour 
was offered to cases at the next follow-up visit: it listed sexual practices 
including hardcore gay practices (e.g., fisting), number of sexual 
partners, attending gay venues and drug use, in the 6 months prior 
to acute hepatitis C onset. The study questionnaires were notified to, 
and approved by, the national commission for data protection.
Results
We found 29 acute hepatitis C cases that occurred between March 
2001 and October 2004: two cases in 2001, 10 in 2002, nine in 2003 
and eight in 2004 [FIGURE]. The median age at hepatitis C onset was 
40 years (range: 28-54). The reasons identified for HCV testing were 
an ALT level increase (24), acute jaundice (3) or an STI (1). HCV 
seroconversion within 6 months was documented for 16 patients. 
A positive HCV RNA-PCR and ≥10-fold normal limits of ALT with 
normal levels for the preceding year were documented for 13 patients 
with a median time of HCV seroconversion of 19 months [range: 7 – 65]. 
Genotype 4 was detected in 15 (52%) patients, genotype 3 in seven (24%) 
and genotype 1 in six (22%); for one case, no genotype was available.
F I G U R E  
Number of HIV+ MSM with acute hepatitis C in three 
hospital wards, Paris (France), by month and year of 
diagnosis (N=29 patients), 2001-2004
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None of the common risk factors for HCV transmission (IDU, 
professional or nosocomial exposure) were found. All patients had 
had unprotected anal sex and six reported ‘hard’ sexual practices, with 
two resulting anal perforations. A STI co-infection was recorded for 
12 (41%) patients and specified for nine: syphilis (7), gonorrhoea (1) 
and genital herpes (1).
The median time between HIV and hepatitis C diagnosis was 
6.5 years (interquartile range: 4-14 years). Two patients had HIV 
primary infection within 3 months prior to hepatitis C onset. Median 
age at HIV diagnosis was 29 years (range: 20-50). At the time of acute 
hepatitis C, 22 (76%) patients were clinically asymptomatic for HIV 
infection, and four (14%) had AIDS (HIV clinical stage unspecified for 
three). Most of the patients (86%) were taking antiretroviral therapy 
and four were untreated. All patients had more than 200/mm3 CD4 
and 16 (55%) more than 500/mm3. HIV viral load was undetectable 
for 19 (65%) patients, detectable but 104 copies/ml for six (21%) 
and > 104 copies/ml for four (14%).
The 11 anonymous self-administered questionnaires respondents 
had had unprotected anal sex with casual partners within the 
six months prior to hepatitis C onset, nine had 10 partners and six 
had unprotected anal sex one or more times per week. All respondents 
met their casual sex partners at commercial gay venues (sex-on-site) or 
via the internet. A STI was reported by all but one, including syphilis 
(6), gonorrhoea (3), genital herpes (3), Chlamydia (3) and warts 
(anal or genital) infections (3). Eight patients reported “hard” sexual 
practices, including fisting for five. Bleeding during sex was reported 
by six patients. All patients inhaled poppers (nitrite inhalants) during 
sex, none used intravenous drugs and five reported consuming 
psychoactive drugs (ecstasy, cocaine, gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), 
ketamine or LSD). Tattoos or piercings within the six months prior 
to hepatitis C onset were reported by three patients.
Discussion
We retrospectively identified 29 cases of acute hepatitis C occurred 
between March 2001 and October 2004 in HIV+ MSM from the 
medical records of three major infectious diseases or hepatology wards. 
A STI was simultaneously present in 41% of the cases. All patients 
had high-risk sexual behaviour for transmitting HIV (unprotected 
sex with multiple casual partners). Nearly a third reported having had 
“hard” sexual practices with their casual partners. Most patients were 
being treated for a long-time HIV infection that was immunologically 
and virologically well-controlled.
The report of these acute hepatitis C cases could be linked to an 
increase in routine HCV testing in HIV+ patients as recommended 
in 2002 [2] in the national management guidelines for HIV infection. 
This is unlikely, however, since most of the patients had been tested for 
HCV because of an increase in ALT levels. Furthermore, an increase 
in the incidence of HCV seroconversion in HIV+ MSM has also been 
reported since 2000 in Switzerland [3] and the United Kingdom [4].
HCV sexual transmission is extremely rare among monogamous 
heterosexual couples, and the incidence is low (0.37‰ person-years 
in an Italian study [5]). HCV prevalence in genitourinary medicine 
clinic attendees is low in those who do not report IDU (0.65%; 95% 
CI: 0.51-0.78 [6]). Furthermore, the low estimated incidence of 
hepatitis C in cohort studies of MSM [7,8] suggests that hepatitis 
C is not readily spread by sex between men. However, this route of 
transmission may be facilitated by HIV infection [9,10], which may 
promote viral receptivity in individuals sexually exposed to HCV and 
enhance HCV infectivity in genital secretions.
High risk sexual behaviour for STI transmission (multiple sexual 
partners), sexual practices (unprotected anal sex, rimming, fisting) 
and STI have been discussed [10,11] and are still debated as factors 
that may facilitate HCV sexual transmission [10,12]. In our study, 
unprotected anal sex was recorded for all patients, and fisting for 21%. 
Bleeding (visible or not) during sex, which was mentioned in half of 
the self-administered questionnaires, may be a likely route for HCV 
transmission in these cases. Furthermore, a co-infection with an STI, 
which has been described as potential co-factor for HCV transmission 
[10-12], may have facilitated HCV infection: co-infection with an 
STI and hepatitis C was documented in 41% of the medical records 
and most of the respondents to the questionnaire reported a STI 
within 6 months prior to HCV infection. These observations are 
consistent with the recent upsurge in recent syphilis infections [13], 
the lymphogranuloma venereum outbreaks in MSM [12,14] and the 
increase of high-risk sexual behaviours described among French MSM 
in 2000 and 2002 [15,16].
We documented no intravenous drug use (IDU) in any of the 
cases, but this risk factor could have been under-reported. However, 
the respondents to the self-administered questionnaire mentioned 
neither IDU nor heroin use, but did mention use of other drugs or 
psychoactive substances. Our study suggests that HIV+ MSM who 
acquired HCV may belong to a specific group of men who are engaged 
in sensation seeking and sexual experiments including, “hard” sex [17] 
with high-risk sexual practices (multiple partners, no condom for anal 
sex, fisting without protective gloves.) which result in multiple STIs. 
In this group, psychoactive substance use may be used to facilitate 
“hard” sexual practices by lowering inhibitions [18] and therefore 
could favour bleeding.
The proportion of genotype 4 (52%) among this group is much 
greater than usually observed in France (nearly 11% [19]). This 
finding may indicate that the emergence of acute hepatitis in HIV+ 
MSM living in the Paris area could be related to a transmission of 
selected strains in a social network of people with specific behaviours. 
Phylogenetic studies are necessary and are underway [20] to further 
document this hypothesis.
Because our study was limited to three of the 12 hospital wards 
that provide care to HIV+ patients in the Paris area, the number of 
acute HCV infections in HIV+ MSM is likely to be underestimated. 
Although these hospital wards give treat a large number of HIV+ 
MSM, we cannot extrapolate our findings to all cases that occurred 
during the same time period. Furthermore, the sexual behavioural 
self-administered questionnaires were completed by only 38% of 
the cases, and so we cannot use our findings to make generalisations 
about all HIV+ MSM with acute HCV infection. A case-control study 
would have been useful to better document risk factors for acquiring 
HCV infection among HIV+ MSM. However, we chose to do an 
exploratory descriptive study first, to document the phenomenon and 
propose hypotheses in a timely fashion that may be evaluated further 
by analytical epidemiological or qualitative studies. This descriptive 
study also allows the timely informing of all clinicians involved in 
HIV patient care and gay advocacy groups.
We conclude that HCV transmission can occur through bleeding 
during traumatic unprotected anal intercourse and “hard” practices 
which may be facilitated by mucosal lesions linked to STIs. In the 
context of the recent resurgence of STIs and the drop in infection 
prevention practices by MSM, this report stresses the urgent need 
for continuing strong advocacy of safer sex among MSM. There is 
also a need for social and behavioural studies on sexual practices that 
enhance HCV transmission in gay men.
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I N  S O U T H E R N  F R A N C E  A F T E R  C O N S U M P T I O N  O F  F R O Z E N  
W I L D  B O A R  M E A T
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Six patients were infected with Trichinella britovi in southern France following 
consumption of frozen wild boar meat, which had been frozen at -35°C 
for 7 days. Microscopic examination of a sample of frozen wild boar muscle 
revealed the presence of rare encapsulated Trichinella larvae, identified as 
T. britovi.
People eating wild boar must follow individual prophylactic rules such 
as efficient cooking of meat (at least 65°C at the core for 1 minute) as 
recommended by the International Commission on Trichinellosis, or freezing 
exceeding four weeks at -20°C.
Euro Surveill 2005; 10(6): 117-8 Published online June 2005
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Introduction
Trichinellosis is a zoonotic disease caused by a nematode of the 
genus Trichinella. Numerous mammal species as well as birds and 
crocodiles [1,2] can harbour the parasite worldwide, but the sylvatic 
cycle is mainly maintained by wild carnivores. Human represents 
only a possible host and the parasite is exclusively transmitted 
through consumption of raw or rare meat. In Europe, pork, wild 
boar meat and horse meat are the main sources for human infection. 
Eight trichinella species have been identified so far: Trichinella 
spiralis, T. nativa, T. britovi, T. murrelli, T. nelsoni, T. pseudospiralis, 
T. papuae, and T. zimbabwensis. All species (besides T. zimbabwensis) 
have been involved in human cases [1].
This article describe an outbreak of trichinellosis associated with 
eating frozen wild boar meat. Although trichinellosis epidemics have 
been repeatedly observed in France [3], infection due to frozen wild 
boar meat has not been reported until now.
Material and methods
We report here six cases of human trichinellosis [4]. Patients were 
infected during a communal meal on 12 October 2003 that included 
wild boar meat. The animal had been killed 8 days previously at 
Villeneuve d’Entraunes (Alpes-Maritimes, south of France), a small 
village located at 950 m above sea level. After dressing, the meat was 
frozen at -35°C for 7 days, without veterinary control. Within 5 to 
24 days after consumption, 6 of the diners who had eaten their meat 
cooked medium rare presented with the classical clinical symptoms 
of the disease: fever, myalgia, facial oedema, asthenia and cutaneous 
rash. All six were started on a course of albendazole (15mg/kg/day for 
10 days) and of prednisone (1mg/kg/day for 4 days). Two days after 
the start of therapy, clinical symptoms increased, but then rapidly 
decreased, and three months after the end of treatment, the patients 
had recovered fully.
Results
Typical but not specific modifications of biological parameters 
were observed, including hypereosinophilia above 1350/mm3 and 
elevated aldolases, creatine kinases and lactate dehydrogenases.
Serum obtained from all patients tested positive belatedly for 
Trichinella antibodies, within 15 to 59 days following infection. 
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Antibodies were firstly detected by western blotting (WB) (LD Bio, 
Lyon, France) and few days later were detected by enzyme linked 
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) (Biotrin International, Lyon, France). 
A seventh person who shared the meal with the 6 patients but who ate 
the meat cooked well done, did not develop any clinical or biological 
symptoms. This person’s serology was negative.
Microscopic examination of a sample of frozen wild boar muscle 
revealed the presence of rare encapsulated Trichinella larvae in the 
striated muscle tissue. Muscle peptic digestion yielded 3 larvae per 
gram of muscle. These larvae were identified as T. britovi by polymerase 
chain reaction analysis (PCR) carried out at the International 
Trichinella Reference Centre (Rome, Italy).
Discussion
T. britovi, already identified in a previous outbreak in France 
[4] and elsewhere in Europe and Asia [5,6,7,8] is a species mainly 
found in wild animals such as foxes and wild boars, in biotopes at 
500 m above sea level [1,6]. However, an outbreak in Caceres (Spain) 
following the consumption of insufficiently cooked meat from a 
domestic pig [8], suggests a possible change in the epidemiology of 
trichinellosi Nowadays, because of the mandatory veterinary controls 
in slaughterhouses, large trichinellosis outbreaks due to horse meat 
consumption are rare in France, but cases in hunters and their families 
after raw or rare wild boar meat consumption are regularly reported, 
with over one hundred cases since 1975 [9].
These cases confirm the occurrence of T. britovi in wild boar 
in southern France and its relative resistance to freezing, already 
described by Pozio et al. [10]. Indeed, they observed that larvae from 
naturally infected wild boar meat frozen for three weeks at -20°C 
remained infectious, whereas they were not viable after four weeks. 
To prevent trichinellosis, an official European directive [11] 
recommends the freezing of meat at -25°C for at least 10 days for pieces 
of less of 25 cm thickness. Our patients froze their wild boar steaks at 
-35°C for seven days, but this freezing time appears insufficient to kill 
larvae, since T. britovi is a species relatively resistant to freezing [1]. 
Consequently, we recommend complete heating of wild boar meat at 
80°C for 10 minutes in our area. (South of France). According to the 
International Commission on Trichinellosis, meat should be heated 
at 65°C at the core for at least 1 minute to kill Trichinella larvae; 
larvae die when the colour of the meat at the core changes from pink 
to brown [12].
It seems difficult, however, to bring to an end the tradition 
among some hunters of consuming wild boar steaks immediately 
after shooting and dressing the meat. Therefore, despite all the 
recommendations, the risk of trichinellosis is likely to continue.
Wild boar consumers should be urged to follow individual strict 
prophylactic rules such as freezing at -25°C for at least 10 days (or 
-20°C during four weeks according to Pozio et al. [10]) or sufficient 
heating.
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An outbreak of gastroenteritis caused by Campylobacter infection was 
identified in May 2003 in a school in Madrid, Spain. Eighty one cases were 
identified in a total of 253 people studied. A retrospective cohort study showed 
that a custard made with ultra high temperature (UHT) milk was associated with 
illness (RR: 3.15; 95% CI: 1.25-7.93). The custard was probably contaminated 
with Campylobacter jejuni from a raw chicken prepared a day previously in the 
same kitchen. Our recommendations were to periodically remind the school’s 
authorities how to act if an outbreak should be suspected, to include the 
monitoring of a food handler’s working day in each environmental investigation 
in order to detect any risk behaviour; to implement microbiological analysis 
from the surfaces and utensils of the collective kitchens and improve the 
sanitary education of food handlers.
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Introduction
Campylobacter organisms are the second most common cause 
of bacterial foodborne disease notified to public health authorities 
in Spain (unpublished data, Microbiological Information System). 
Despite this, outbreaks of Campylobacter illness are rare in Spain, and 
from 1996 to 2001 an average of 6 Campylobacter outbreaks (range: 
2-12 outbreaks) were reported each year to the Centro Nacional de 
Epidemiología (unpublished data, Outbreak Surveillance System).
Campylobacter may be transmitted by food, particularly poultry 
[1], unpasteurised milk [2,3] and contaminated water [4,5]. The lack 
of standardised molecular subtyping methods for Campylobacter has 
made it difficult to recognise outbreaks and identify their sources [6].
On 22 May 2003 the Public Health Authority of Madrid was 
informed that Campylobacter jejuni had been isolated from three 
stool specimens of children who attended the same school. The school 
had 293 pupils aged between 3 and 12 years (distributed between 
13 classrooms) and 26 adults. Preliminary investigations identified 
an increased request for diet menus in the same week. Case finding 
conducted among paediatricians and microbiologists did not detect 
any increase in gastroenteritis or isolation of Campylobacter jejuni in 
the previous 30 days.
On the 23 May the Programa de Epidemiología Aplicada de Campo 
(Field Epidemiology Training Programme) started an investigation 
to assess the extent of the outbreak, identify the mode and vehicle 
of transmission, and initiate appropriate control measures in the 
school.
Methods
Case finding
Names and telephone numbers of all students, and the menus for 
meals served in the school were supplied by the principal.
A case was defined as a person (student or staff) who attended 
school between 12 and 14 May, and developed diarrhoea (loose stools, 
at least 3 times in 24 hours) or stomach pain and fever during the 
10 days after 14 May.
The suspected period of exposure was delimited 12, 13 and 14 May, 
because the school was closed during the remainder of that week.
Analytical study
A retrospective cohort study was conducted. A questionnaire was 
designed to obtain demographic details, symptoms of gastrointestinal 
illness during the ten days after 14 May, the time of onset and the 
duration of the symptoms, contact with other ill persons in their 
homes, whether the family doctor was contacted because of the illness, 
food and water consumed from 12 to 14 May in the school, and 
contact with animals.
A personal interview was conducted with children older than 7 years 
and adults. In children younger than six years, food information was 
collected through a routine daily report filled in by the teachers and 
the clinical information was collected from the parents by phone. 
Children aged six years were not interviewed because they could not 
remember the food they had consumed.
The data were analysed using Epi Info software, version 2002. 
Variables were examined for association with illness in single variable 
analysis, and variables for which 95% confidence interval did not 
include the null value were put into a logistic regression model. 
A trend analysis in proportions was also done to asses a possible 
dose-response relation.
Environmental investigation
The kitchen and dining hall of the school were inspected by the 
local environmental health officers on 26 and 27 May, and food and 
water samples were taken and submitted for culture. Water and food 
samples from the suspected menus were not available when the 
inspection started. The investigations examined transport, storage 
and preparation processes for the food served at the school.
The cook was interviewed to determine any recent illness and for 
food handling practices.
Information on brands of the raw materials was collected.
Results
The school had 293 children (aged between 3 and 12 years, 
distributed between 13 classrooms) and 26 adults. From 253 valid 
interviews obtained we identified 81 persons who met the case 
definition (overall attack rate in the school = 32%). No differences 
were found between the attack rates (AR) by sex (31.7% in males 
versus 32.5% in females). The median AR by classroom was 30% 
(range: 12.5% - 60%).
All cases ate in the school and all of them were children. Children 
aged 12 years showed the highest AR (50%) and children aged 9 years 
showed the lowest (24%). The commonest symptoms were diarrhoea 
(93.6%), abdominal cramps (89.6%), fever (61.5%), nausea (29.7%) 
and vomiting (28%). The mean duration of the illness was 5.2 days. 
Of 81 cases interviewed, 31 (38.3%) consulted a physician. We are 
aware that 5 cases had a stool culture prescribed and 3 of these were 
confirmed as Campylobacter infection.
Date of onset of symptoms ranged from 14 to 19 May [FIGURE]. 
The rapid increase and decline in the number of cases and the single 
peak in the epidemic curve and the fact that all the cases ate in the 
school (children who usually ate in the dinning hall of the school 
had a risk of illness 22.55 times higher than children who did not) 
suggested a foodborne point source outbreak among the students. 
Regarding minimum and maximum incubation periods of 1 and 
7 days respectively [7] and the onset dates of the first and last cases, 
we estimated that the exposure day was 13 May. The median of the 
incubation period was 73 hours.
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Therefore, we limited additional analyses to a cohort of 199 people 
who ate in the school on 12, 13 and 14 May (although the most likely 
exposure day was 13 May, 12 and 14 were included because of the 
variability of the incubation period of Campylobacter infection).
After univariate analysis of food consumed, two food items, custard 
and milk, showed statistically significant relative risk estimates. Forty 
five percent of those who ate custard developed illness compared 
with 14% of those who did not, and children who drank milk had a 
1.79 times higher risk [TABLE 1].
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T A B L E  1  
Food specific attack rates for Campylobacter infection among students of a school, Madrid, Spain, May 2003
Food eaten Food not eaten
Food items Cases Total AR % Cases Total AR % RR 95 % C.I.
Monday 75 186 40.31 6 13 46.15 0.87 0.47-1.61
Paella with 
chicken
72 179 40.22 7 16 35.29 1.07 0.56-2.07
Fish 67 173 38.72 11 21 52.38 0.74 0.47-1.16
Salad 68 172 39.53 12 25 48.00 0.82 0.53-1.29
Fruit 71 173 41.04 7 23 30.43 1.35 0.71-2.57
Tuesday 81 192 42.18 0 7 00.00 3.80 0.60-24.30
Macaroni 79 187 42.24 1 10 10.00 4.22 0.65-27.33
Pork 75 181 41.44 4 16 25.00 1.66 0.70-3.94
Custard 77 171 45.02 4 28 14.28 3.15 1.25-7.93
Wednesday 76 187 40.64 5 12 41.66 0.97 0.49-1.95
Soup 73 181 40.33 6 16 37.50 1.07 0.56-2.07
Chicken 72 183 39.34 8 15 55.33 0.73 0.44-1.22
Fruit 72 171 42.10 7 26 26.92 1.56 0.81-3.00
Milk 61 129 47.28 18 68 26.47 1.79 1.15-2.76
In the multivariate analysis, only eating custard remained 
significantly associated with illness (p=0.03).
T A B L E  2  
Multivariate analysis. Outbreak of Campylobacter infection 
in a school, Madrid, Spain, May 2003
Food items OR C.I 95% p-value
Custard 34 451 1.08-10.98 0.036
Milk 18 583 0.93-3.68 0.076
Also an analysis for trend in proportions was used for dose-
response relation. This analysis showed an increase of risk of disease 
if the amount of custard consumed increased.
T A B L E  3  
Attack rates of Campylobacter infection by amount of custard 
consumed by students of a school of Madrid, Spain, May 2003
Custard Total Cases RR
No exposure 28 4 1.00
Half a plateful 6 2 2.33
Whole plateful 162 73 3.15
Two platefuls 3 2 4.67
2: 10.34; P <0.005.
A private company supplied the staff of the kitchen and the raw 
materials for cooking the daily menus. Raw chicken was prepared for 
cooking the paella served on Monday.
Inspection of the kitchen indicated that food preparation areas 
for uncooked meats and ready-to-eat foods were not separated. The 
custard was made with ultra high temperature (UHT) milk and 
powder (without eggs) and kept at room temperature.
Campylobacter species were not isolated from the food samples 
from the kitchen or from water samples and there was no evidence 
of coliform contamination.
No faecal samples from children or food handlers were taken 
because of the delay in the start of the investigation.
Discussion
The epidemiological data from this investigation indicate 
that the contaminated custard was the most likely vehicle of 
Campylobacter infection in this outbreak However, we believe that 
cross-contamination in the kitchen was a more likely cause of this 
outbreak than the purchase of contaminated custard because (1) 
custard was made with pasteurised milk and powder, both of which 
products were widely available in Madrid, (2) no outbreak caused by 
these products and Campylobacter jejuni was reported to the Regional 
Health Authorities of Madrid during 2003 and (3) on 12 May a paella 
was made with chicken which is a common food associated with 
Campylobacter infection. Similar outbreaks of Campylobacter have 
occurred in United States and Australia after cooked food became 
cross-contaminated by uncooked meat and poultry during preparation 
[8,9]. Campylobacter jejuni cannot long withstand drying or freezing 
temperatures, which are characteristics that limit its transmission. 
However, C. jejuni survives in milk, other foods, or water kept at 4ºC 
for several weeks [7]. Also, the infectious dose of Campylobacter is low; 
ingestion of only 500 organisms, easily present in one drop of raw 
chicken juice, can result in human illness. Therefore, contamination 
of foods by raw chicken is an efficient mechanism for transmission 
of this organism [10].
This investigation was subject to a number of limitations. The delay 
between onset of illness and the cohort study was over two weeks for 
some cases, and this may have affected the accuracy of recall for food 
and water consumed. This was, to some extent, mitigated by the use 
of food lists when the questionnaire was administered. The fact that 
neither water nor food samples from the suspected days were available 
in order to detect Campylobacter species was also problematic. Also, 
the food handlers could not be ruled out as the source of infection 
because no faecal samples were taken from them.
As the results of this investigation the following measures were 
recommended: 1) that the the school authorities be periodically 
reminded how to act if an outbreak shouldbe suspected; 2) that the 
working day of a food handler be included in each environmental 
investigation to detect any risk behaviour; 3) that microbiological 
analysis from the surfaces and utensils of the collective kitchens be 
implemented; and 4) that the sanitary education of food handlers be 
improved. For example, food handlers should be aware that pathogens 
can be present on raw poultry and meat and that foodborne disease 
can be prevented by adhering to the following measures: 1) raw poultry 
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and meat should be prepared on a separate counter or cutting board 
from other food items; 2) all utensils, cutting boards, and counters 
should be cleaned with hot water and soap after preparing other 
foods; 3) hands should be washed thoroughly with soap and running 
water after handling raw poultry or meat; and 4) poultry should be 
cooked thoroughly to an internal temperature of 82ºC or until the 
meat is no longer pink and juices run clear [8].
In summary, custard cross-contaminated by chicken served in a 
school appears to have been the source of infection in this outbreak 
of Campylobacter enteritis. Sanitary education of the food handlers 
continues to be the main control measure in foodborne outbreaks.
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O U T B R E A K S  C A U S E D  B Y  P A R V O V I R U S  B 1 9  
I N  T H R E E  P O R T U G U E S E  S C H O O L S
G Gonçalves 1, AM Correia 2, P Palminha 3, H Rebelo-Andrade 4, A Alves 4
This paper reports the study of outbreaks of an acute exanthematous 
disease among children of three schools in the municipality of Braga (Portugal). 
Laboratory tests were performed for five cases, showing that the disease was 
not due to infection by measles or rubella virus, and infection with parvovirus 
B19 was confirmed. There were 41 cases in children: 12 in the kindergarten, 
17 in the secondary school and 12 in the primary school. There was only one 
case in a staff member, who worked in the kindergarten. Eight cases were 
identified among household contacts; two of them were brothers, one from 
the kindergarten and another from the secondary school, where the outbreak 
occurred after the kindergarten outbreak. The estimated values of the basic 
reproduction number R
0
 were very low and it is very likely that asymptomatic 
infectious cases have occurred. The local health authority produced written 
documents and met with staff members and parents. Primary healthcare 
facilities and the obstetric department of the local hospital were also informed. 
As we are approaching the elimination of measles in Portugal and the rest of 
Europe, with very high vaccine coverage, it is very likely that a high proportion 
of infectious non-vesicular exanthemas will be due to B19 infections. This is 
to be taken into account in the design and conduct of surveillance activities, 
in the context of measles and rubella elimination programmes.
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Introduction
Erythema infectiosum (EI), or ‘slapped cheek’ disease, is the most 
common clinical manifestation of infection with parvovirus B19 
(B19) in children [1]. Several diseases, like measles, rubella, scarlet 
fever, erythema multiform and this ‘fifth disease’ can cause similar 
acute non-vesicular exanthematous rashes and differential diagnosis 
is often necessary, especially in the context of measles elimination 
programmes in Europe [2] and worldwide [3]. Parvovirus B19 
infections are usually benign and self-limiting [4] and commonly 
asymptomatic [1]; nevertheless, they can have important adverse 
effects among specific risk groups [1], namely pregnant women, 
immunocompromised individuals and patients suffering from chronic 
haemolytic anaemia. Thus, some authors have recommended the use 
of ELISA and PCR tests to confirm the aetiology of outbreaks [4].
In Portugal, EI and other B19 infections are not reportable to the 
local health authority (LHA), unlike measles and rubella. There are 
written recommendations on how to investigate suspected outbreaks 
(and isolated suspected cases) of measles [5]. We do not know of 
written reports of B19 outbreaks previously studied in Portugal 
but some serological data were published: in a blood transfusion 
department of a Portuguese hospital, 66.2% of health adults and 
83.3% of haemophiliacs were found to be positive for B19 IgG 
antibodies [6].
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The main purpose of investigating the reported cases of an acute 
exanthematous illness in three schools was to understand whether it 
was a dangerous public health situation and if appropriate control 
measures could be implemented. We were particularly concerned 
about the possibility of measles or rubella outbreaks. We report here 
the findings of the study of three outbreaks due to B19, in Braga, 
Portugal.
Alert
On 14 January 2004, the LHA of Braga (a municipality in the 
North of Portugal) was informed by the warden of a kindergarten 
that several cases of an acute exanthematous illness among children 
were occurring. Similar alert phone calls were made on 17 February 
(secondary school) and on 26 of April (primary school).
Preliminary assessment
Telephone interviews were conducted with the directors of the 
three schools and some general practitioners (GP) who had observed 
the children. Signs and symptoms were so suggestive that some 
physicians explicitly mentioned erythema infectiosum (EI), as the 
most likely diagnosis. No laboratory confirmation had been done. 
The first known case of erythema occurred on 31 December 2003.
Methods
Laboratory study
Blood samples were collected from five children with clinical 
manifestations suggestive of EI: two from the kindergarten and three 
from the secondary school. In the sera from those five children specific 
IgM and IgG antibodies against measles, and B19 were measured using 
ELISA techniques; a PCR technique was used to detect B19 DNA. 
Specific antibodies against rubella were only studied in sera from 
the three cases in the secondary school. Tests were performed in the 
laboratory of the hospital of Braga (2 cases from the kindergarten) 
and in the national institute of health (three cases from the secondary 
school).
Active case finding
A written questionnaire was given to all staff members and parents 
from the three schools inquiring about signs, symptoms, medical care 
and the existence of other cases in the household. Written vaccination 
records were checked among all children in the kindergarten and all 
cases in the other two schools.
Case definition
Probable case of EI: erythema on the face, extremities or trunk, 
between 30 December 2003 and 8 of May 2004, in members of the 
three schools community (children and staff) and their household 
contacts.
Confirmed case of EI: probable case with laboratory confirmation 
(either by ELISA or PCR) of acute infection with B19 or epidemiological 
link with a confirmed case.
Statistical methods
To compare attack rates [7] we used χ
2
 tests. The basic 
reproduction number R
0
 has been defined as ‘the average number 
of persons directly infected by an infectious case during the entire 
infectious period, when he enters a totally susceptible population’ [8]. 
In order to estimate the basic reproduction number R
0
 of infection 
by B19, we used a formula which had already been used during 
measles outbreaks [9]. This was performed for the kindergarten, 
the Class 5A of the secondary school and in Class 1 in the primary 
school. For the purpose of this estimate in these groups we assumed 
that there were only susceptible children before the outbreak and 
that transmission (after the primary cases) occurred inside these 
groups, with homogenous mixing. For the two class groups with 
10 symptomatic cases, we made the estimates for the whole range 
of possible numbers of asymptomatic infections, from zero to 
sixteen.
Results
Laboratory study
The five cases with clinical manifestations suggestive of EI were 
confirmed as being cases of infection with B19. Most cases were 
positive for both specific IgM and specific DNA [TABLE 1]; in most 
cases, the results were compatible with what was expected for the 
time when blood collection took place [1]. The three cases from 
the secondary school were negative for both measles and rubella 
IgM search. Four of them had serological markers (positive IgG) 
for immunity against measles. The one exception was a girl, born 
in 1993, who had received MMR at 9 months of age, during the 
last 1993/1994 measles epidemic observed in Portugal; following 
the standard procedure, she had been revaccinated at 15 months of 
age and failed to show protective measles antibodies at 11 years of 
age (last case in Table 1). We do not know the cause of this finding 
but it could be related to previously expressed concerns about the 
consequences of vaccinating too early against measles [10].
T A B L E  1
Laboratory results of the study of five children with clinical manifestations of erythema infectiosum. Braga, Portugal
Case Measles Rubella Parvovirus B19 Parvovirus B19
Age / Sex / School Serology Serology Serology PCR (DNA)
4 / M / kindergarten
IgM negative
IgG positive
Not tested
IgM negative
IgG positive
Positive
5 / M / kindergarten
IgM negative
IgG positive
Not tested
IgM negative
IgG positive
Positive
11 / F / secondary
IgM negative
IgG positive
IgM negative
IgG positive
IgM positive
IgG positive
Positive
10 / M / secondary
IgM negative
IgG positive
IgM negative
IgG positive
IgM positive
IgG positive
Positive
11 / F / secondary
IgM negative
IgG negative1
IgM negative
IgG borderline
IgM borderline
IgG positive
Positive
1.  This child, born in 1993, had received MMR at 9 months of age during the 1993/1994 measles epidemic observed in Portugal. Following the standard procedure, he was 
revaccinated at age 15 months.
Description of the outbreaks
From the laboratory results and questionnaire data, we identified 
35 confirmed cases (in the kindergarten and secondary school) and 
12 probable cases (in the primary school). We had no questionnaire 
data from 2 of the 12 cases in the primary school. The most frequent 
reported clinical manifestations were facial erythema (93.3%), rash on 
the arms (79.1%), rash on the legs (77.4%), itching (12.2%) and fever 
(11.1%); only one case reported arthralgia and the facial rash recurred in 
two cases, 4 and 26 days after the first day of onset. The three epidemic 
curves, shown in Figure 1, spanned over a period of 19 weeks.
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F I G U R E  1
Epidemic curves of three outbreaks of erythema infectiosum 
in Braga, Portugal, December 2003-May 2004
Kindergarten: One case not represented because date of onset was unkown
Secondary School
Primary School: Two cases not represented because date of onset was unkown
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The 50 children in the kindergarten were divided in two groups 
(4 years and 5/6 years), with most activities in separate rooms and 
meals in a common room. The 12 cases among children occurred 
between 31 December 2003 and 2 February 2004. There was only 
one case among the 6 staff members [TABLE 2]: the woman directly 
in charge of the 4 year old group. The attack rate in the 5/6 year 
old group (AR=9/25=36%) was significantly higher (P=0.047) than 
among children in the 4 year old group (AR=1/25=12%). Two cases 
were reported in household contacts: the mother of the child with 
onset of disease on 5 January became ill on 27 January; the brother 
of the child with onset of disease on 17 January became ill on 11 
February and was a student of Clasee 5B in the secondary school; 
these two children had a cousin in Class 5A in the secondary school 
who was the first case from that school (19 January). All children in 
the kindergarten had been vaccinated with MMR.
T A B L E  2
Cases of infection with B19 in the three schools in Braga, 
Portugal
School
Children Staff
Household 
members1No. of 
cases
No. at 
risk (%)
No. of 
cases
No. at 
risk (%)
Kindergarten 12/50 24 1/6 16.7 12
Secondary 17/735 2.3 0 0 42
Primary 12/364 3.3 0 0 0
1.  Data on the number of persons by household is not precise or complete 
enough to estimate attack rates.
2.  Household members that were not part of the school communities studied 
here. In addition to these, a child in the 5-6 years age group at the kinder-
garten fell ill on 17 January. This child had a cousin in the class 5B who fell 
ill on 19 January, and a brother in class 5A who fell ill on 11 February.
The 735 children in the secondary school were aged between 10 and 
15 years; they were distributed into 28 classes (6, 7, 5, 5, and 5 classes 
respectively in Classes 5 to 9). The 17 cases in children occurred 
between 19 January and 5 March 2004; they were aged 10 to 14 years. 
The attack rate in children at the secondary school was much lower 
than in the kindergarten [TABLE 2], but big differences were observed 
between classes within the school. Cases were only observed in four 
classes, with significantly different (P=0.0015) ARs between them. 
Observed ARs were 38.5% in Class 5A, 19.2% in Class 5B, and 3.8% in 
the Class 6F. There was only one case in Class 8C (the brother of one 
of the cases from Class 5B). No cases were observed in Classes 7 and 
9 or in the remaining groups in Class 8. No cases were reported in 
staff members. Among household contacts, six cases were identified, 
each from the family of a different case: a father, a mother and four 
brothers who attended different schools (the kindergarten, another 
class of the same secondary school, and two other secondary schools 
not studied in this investigation). All 17 cases had been vaccinated 
with MMR.
The 364 children in the primary school were aged between 6 and 
10 years; they were distributed into 16 classes (4 in each class from 
Class 1 to Class 4). Ten cases among children from one of the classes 
in Class 1 (AR of 38.5%), occurred between 2 April and 8 May. 
Two more cases were observed among children from a single class in 
Class 3 but we do not have the precise date of onset. No cases were 
reported among staff members or household contacts. All cases had 
been vaccinated with MMR.
Estimates of the basic reproduction number R
0
The basic reproduction number R
0
 estimated for the kindergarten 
was 1.108 (95% CI 0.220-1.996) while for Class 5A of the secondary 
school and Class 1 of the primary school it was 1.184 (95% CI 0.141-
2.227). These estimates assume that no asymptomatic infections had 
occurred, which is not likely to be true. The real R
0
 value depends 
on the number of asymptomatic infections that have occurred 
[FIGURE 2]; point estimates for R
0
 varied from 1.184 to 3.706 for 
asymptomatic infections varying from zero to sixteen.
F I G U R E  2
Estimates of the basic reproduction number R
0
 of B19 
infection in Class 1 of a primary school, and Class 5 of a 
secondary school, by number of infections1
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1.  Values were calculated using the formulae published in [9]; the possible 
number of infections in each group, ranges from 10 (no asymptomatic infections) 
to 26 children; the actual number of asymptomatic infections is not known.
Control and prevention measures
Though evidence for effective preventive measures may still be 
insufficient [7], some actions can be taken [8], to avoid exposure 
or minimise the consequences of the infection among pregnant 
women and other high risk groups [1,7]. Procedures were initiated 
even before laboratory confirmation. Aware of the importance 
of communication and reassurance [7], the LHA produced and 
distributed written information to school staff members and parents; 
written information on the situation and the disease, with a reminder 
about the risk groups, was also sent to general practitioners, in the 
municipality, and to the obstetric department of the local (District) 
Hospital. Except for cases with fever, exclusion from school was not 
performed because communicability is greatest before the onset 
of rash and probably not communicable after that [9]. Besides the 
written information, the LHA met with the staff members of the 
kindergarten on 15 January, to inform them about the disease, 
potential consequences and measures to be taken. In the secondary 
school, with the same purpose, the LHA met staff members and 
students on 18 February, and parents on 25 February.
Discussion
After studying these three outbreaks, we had informal knowledge 
about similar outbreaks occurring in other schools of the same 
municipality and in a neighbouring one, but we have no information 
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on whether they were due to B19 infection or not. It was clearly 
confirmed that the three epidemics of exanthematous disease, studied 
in Braga, were not due to measles or rubella; they resulted from 
infection with B19. It is very likely that they were part of a general 
increase in the incidence of the disease in a wider geographical area 
in the northern Portugal. It is likely that some children from the 
kindergarten transmitted the infection to their older siblings who later 
introduced the infection in the secondary school, but we can not prove 
that because the alternative explanation that the sibling could just have 
been infected in his/her own school is possible. No epidemiological 
link was established between the outbreak in the primary school and 
the two previous ones, but it is likely that we have missed the detection 
and study of many isolated cases and institutional outbreaks.
The distribution in time of some cases among household contacts 
and within the schools suggests that there had been asymptomatic 
infections, links that were missed in the chain of transmission. This is 
also suggested by the small values of R
0
 estimated if no asymptomatic 
infections are assumed; furthermore, assuming heterogeneity in 
mixing generally would increase R
0
 estimates [9]. Other authors have 
reported the occurrence of asymptomatic infectious infections by 
B19 [1,11]. Better estimates can be obtained when immune status of 
people is studied before and after the outbreak [9], which would make 
it possible to know the precise number of asymptomatic cases.
The age distribution of cases in the primary and secondary schools 
(in younger age groups) and the lower ARs among staff members 
is compatible with the existence of immunity due to previous 
infections. Nevertheless, the higher attack rate in the older group of 
the kindergarten is not consistent with this explanation. Our data 
are consistent with seasonal variation observed elsewhere [1], with 
increased incidence in months of late winter and early spring. But the 
lack of a surveillance system prevents us to have precise data on the 
epidemiology of infections due to B19 in Portugal: for example, we 
do not know about cyclic variation of annual incidence [1,12].
As we are approaching the elimination of measles in Portugal 
(and Europe), with very high vaccine coverage with MMR and a two 
dose schedule, it is very likely that a high proportion of infectious 
non-vesicular exanthems (isolated and in outbreaks) will be due to 
B19 infections. This is to be taken into account in the design and 
conduct of surveillance activities [2,5], in the context of measles and 
rubella elimination programmes: study protocols should include data 
collection procedures and laboratory tests able to confirm or discard 
the diagnosis of B19 infections, among other causes of non-vesicular 
exanthems. High MMR vaccine coverage among children within the 
age groups in these schools is consistent with routine data from Braga 
district.
Fortunately, most B19 infections are benign. To minimise the 
consequences among the small number of people from risk groups 
[1] guidelines already exist [1,13] that should be consulted and 
publicised when outbreaks occur, while implementing evaluations 
of the effectiveness of such recommended procedures.
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CRYPTOSPORIDIUM OUTBREAK AFTER A VISIT TO A WILDLIFE 
CENTRE IN NORTHEAST SCOTLAND: 62 CONFIRMED CASES
C McGuigan
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Published online 28 April 2005
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By 25 April, 62 confirmed cases of Cryptosporidium parvum 
infection were reported from an outbreak linked to visits to a 
wildlife centre in Perthshire, Scotland since 25 March [1,2]. None of 
the patients are seriously ill, although six children were admitted to 
hospital and are now recovering.
Lambs, poultry, chicks, rabbits, cattle, ducks and other species 
were at the wildlife centre. A temporary ‘petting area’ had been set up, 
where adults and children could touch young animals. There were no 
handwashing facilities next to the petting area, although disinfectant 
hand cream dispensers were available. Animal petting has now ceased 
at the centre.
About 4000 people may have visited the centre between 25 March 
and 18 April when the outbreak was detected. At least one case was 
in a visitor from the south of England. It is possible that other non-
Scottish residents have been affected.
An outbreak control team is continuing detailed epidemiological, 
environmental, veterinary and microbiological investigations in an 
effort to identify the source of the infection. General practitioners and 
hospitals in the region have been alerted and encouraged to submit 
stool samples from possible cases and to report cases to the local public 
health authorities. In addition there has been widespread coverage in 
Scottish media (newspapers, radio and television). Members of the 
public have been encouraged to visit their general practitioner if 
affected, or to contact the NHS Scotland telephone helpline for more 
information.
The outbreak control team met for the fourth time on 25 April and 
reinforced its advice to the public, issued after their first meeting on 
19 April, to observe strict hygiene and to use thorough handwashing 
with soap and water to protect against infection after contact with 
animals, animal faeces or people with the infection.
Further cases of cryptosporidium infection that may be related to 
this outbreak should be reported to Christopher McGuigan at NHS 
Tayside (telephone +44 (0)1382 596987). A detailed questionnaire 
is available to capture the wildlife centre related exposure history in 
potential cases.
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OUTBREAK OF TUBERCULOSIS IN A CATALONIAN NURSERY SCHOOL 
AFFECTS 27 CHILDREN
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On 15 April 2005, a female assistant at a private school in a 
wealthy area of Barcelona province was diagnosed with pulmonary 
tuberculosis at the emergency department of a hospital. She had had 
a cough for one month before. A chest x-ray revealed cavitary lesions 
and the sputum smear was positive for Mycobacterium tuberculosis.
Tuberculosis contact investigation was initiated 24 hours after 
diagnosis of the index case. Of the 150 exposed people, 122 were 
asymptomatic children under 5 years of age (62% were under 2 yrs 
old and 90% under 3 yrs), 19 were assistants from the nursery school 
and 9 were close relatives of the index case.
Five days after the index case was diagnosed, an assessment of 
previous history of tuberculosis and immune suppression was done, 
as well as a tuberculin skin test (TST) and chest x-ray of all exposed 
people. The vast majority of children were not vaccinated with the 
Bacille Calmette Guerin (BCG) vaccine.
Among the 122 children, 36 (30%) had a positive TST (in 92% it 
was = than 10 mm). Of these 36 children, 12 (10%) had an abnormal 
chest x ray and were diagnosed as having primary tuberculosis disease. 
Many children who had a positive TST and an unclear or normal 
chest x-ray underwent a computerised tomography (CT) scan due 
to described difficulties associated in diagnosing tuberculosis among 
young children. The CT scan yielded abnormal findings suggestive of 
primary tuberculosis disease among 15 more children. Blood samples 
and an early morning gastric washing were collected from all children 
with tuberculosis. Testing for acid-fast bacilli in gastric aspirates has 
yielded negative results in all collected samples.
None of the 19 nursery assistants investigated had abnormal chest 
x-rays, but the 12 who were TST positive were considered infected 
and prescribed chemoprophylactic therapy, determined on individual 
basis. Of the nine close relatives investigated, five had a positive TST, 
but all had normal chest x-rays.
So far, 27 cases of pulmonary disease among children under 
5 years old have been notified to the Public Health Unit of the 
Health Department of Catalonia. All children with a negative TST 
are receiving prophylactic therapy and a TST will be repeated in 8 to 
10 weeks. Children with TB infection but not disease are also receiving 
prophylactic therapy for nine months, and those with pulmonary 
tuberculosis are receiving a standard treatment regimen, according 
to published guidelines [1].
M. tuberculosis has been cultured in sputum from the index case 
and drug susceptibility testing has shown the strain to be sensitive to 
the four first-line antituberculosis drugs.
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There are indications that the rubella outbreak that started in 
September 2004 among members of a religious community in the 
Netherlands, first reported in Eurosurveillance on 3 March 2005 
[1], has spread to Canada. This outbreak is specifically affecting 
some unvaccinated groups within the Gereformeerde Gemeente in 
Nederland (Netherlands Reformed Community in the Netherlands, 
a Christian community).
Up to 17 May, 214 laboratory confirmed cases of rubella have 
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been reported in southwest Ontario. Five of these cases have been 
in pregnant women. The Canadian Christian community where the 
cases occurred has historical and social links with the affected groups 
within the Gereformeerde Gemeente in Nederland, and individuals 
frequently travel between the two communities. A definitive source 
for the Canadian patient with the earliest date of onset reported 
(mid-February 2005) has not yet been identified. An isolate has 
been obtained from the outbreak in Canada and is currently being 
genotyped. Attempts are being made to isolate rubella virus in the 
Netherlands so as to genetically link the respective outbreaks. The 
World Health Organization has recently published a standardised 
rubella virus genotyping protocol [2].
In the Netherlands, up to 17 May 2005, 309 laboratory confirmed 
cases have been reported (from 1 September 2004); 23 of these are 
known to be in pregnant women (nine in their first trimester). 
The geographical spread of the outbreak in the Netherlands is 
documented on the Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu 
website (http://www.rivm.nl/vtv/object_class/atl_infparasit.html). 
The epidemiological curve (Figure) shows three separate peaks, each 
larger than the last. It is uncertain whether these peaks reflect the true 
incidence or are the result of a registration artefact.
F I G U R E
Reports of laboratory confirmed cases of rubella by week 
of onset, the Netherlands (cases reported between 
1 September 2004 – 17 May 2005). 
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In both the Netherlands and Canada, the outbreak occurred 
in a community with low measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) 
vaccination coverage and strong social adherence. The proportion of 
cases in a vaccinated individual is low (0.3% and 0.6%, respectively), 
indicating that the effectiveness of the rubella component of the MMR 
vaccine is very high.
Rubella infection acquired during early pregnancy can lead to 
miscarriage or severe birth defects known as congenital rubella 
syndrome (CRS). This syndrome occurs in up to 90% of infants born 
to mothers who are infected in the first trimester [3]. It is important to 
differentiate primary rubella infection from re-infection because the 
risk of CRS for re-infection during the first trimester of pregnancy is 
less than 5 to 10% [2]. Rubella IgG avidity serology has been shown 
to be a very useful laboratory test for differentiating primary rubella 
infections from re-infections/past infections in pregnant women 
where critical patient management/counselling decisions are required 
[4]. Rubella IgG avidity serology is being used for the investigation 
of rubella exposure or suspected rubella in pregnant women in the 
Canadian outbreak.
Rubella and CRS are preventable by immunisation, and both the 
Netherlands and Canada have a routine two-dose MMR vaccination 
schedule. During the outbreak, health authorities in Canada and 
the Netherlands have offered MMR free of charge to unvaccinated 
individuals (in the Netherlands this has only been offered to those 
under the age of 18). Public health laws in Ontario allow authorities 
to exclude unvaccinated children from attending school when there 
is an outbreak of a vaccine preventable disease. Local public health 
officials in Ontario have issued indefinite exclusion orders for students 
who are not immunised or cannot offer proof of immunity. Such a law 
does not exist in the Netherlands. In addition, the provincial Ministry 
of Health for Ontario (Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term 
Care) has given advice on isolation of cases, quarantining of contacts 
and travel restrictions. This also differs from the Netherlands, where 
the emphasis of public health advice is on advising pregnant women 
to avoid contact with rubella patients.
The effectiveness of both Canadian and Dutch public health advice 
in preventing spread of rubella and in preventing pregnant women 
from becoming infected is probably limited. This is firstly because 
members of the affected communities often decline vaccination, since 
it contradicts their religious beliefs. Comprehensive information on 
the uptake of MMR during this outbreak is not yet available in Canada 
or the Netherlands. Secondly, rubella is most infectious prior to the 
onset of rash (usual range one week prior to four days post rash 
onset). Finally, only a minority of cases are diagnosed since rubella 
virus infection can be asymptomatic in up to 50% of cases and, if 
symptomatic, usually has a mild course.
Further spread of the outbreak and risk of CRS depends on herd 
immunity (resulting from vaccination and natural infection) and 
level of contact with the affected community. In the Netherlands, 
historical seroprevalence and vaccine uptake data suggest that the 
level of protection in the general population is high [5]. Even in 
municipalities where a high proportion of the population declines 
vaccination, seroprevalence studies suggest that > 97% of women 
of childbearing age are immune (probably through circulation of 
rubella virus in the past) [5]. In addition to the groups within the 
Gereformeerde Gemeente in Nederland, Dutch groups with a relatively 
low seroprevalence may include some groups of immigrants and those 
supporting the anti-vaccination movement (including followers of 
homeopathy and anthroposophical teachings).
In Canada, populations with relatively low seroprevalence may 
include immigrants as well as other groups who resist immunisation 
for religious and philosophical reasons.
Although Reformed Christian communities exist outside the 
Netherlands and Canada, to our knowledge vaccine preventable 
diseases have only spread internationally from the Netherlands 
Gereformeerde Gemeente in Nederland to Canada [6,7,8]. Canada’s 
temperate climate, which has synchronic seasons to those of the 
Netherlands may be one explanation for this. However, onward spread 
from Canada has been documented in the past: the poliomyelitis 
outbreak in the Netherlands in 1978 spread to Canada and 
subsequently into the United States [9].
Public health efforts in the Netherlands and Canada are now 
focusing on raising awareness amongst the affected community and 
health professionals, documenting (molecular) epidemiological links, 
and improving surveillance of CRS.
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Norwegian health authorities are investigating an outbreak of 
legionnaires’ disease in the neighbouring cities of Sarpsborg and 
Fredrikstad in southeastern Norway, close to the border with Sweden. 
As of 26 May, 39 cases, including five deaths, have been reported 
in this outbreak. All cases have been confirmed by urinary antigen 
testing. Cultures of clinical specimens have not yet been completed. 
The mean age of patients is 67 years (range: 35-94). Twenty three 
cases (59%) are in men. All cases are in Norwegian nationals, and 
there is no information on any international events in the area in 
the period. Thirty five of the cases (90%) are in local residents, while 
the remaining 4 cases have been diagnosed in patients elsewhere 
in Norway who had visited the area during the probable exposure 
period.
The two cities are situated very close to each other with a total 
of 120 000 inhabitants. The area is heavily industrial and is not a 
particular tourist destination.
The source is still unknown. Because the outbreak is large with 
many cases including deaths, occurring over a wide geographical area 
within a short time period (Figure), cooling towers are the most likely 
source. All of the known 19 cooling towers in the area have been closed 
down, pending results of bacteriological testing and disinfection. 
Epidemiologists from Nasjonalt folkehelseinstitutt (Norwegian 
Institute of Public Health) are assisting local health authorities with 
the outbreak investigation. Other probable sources are also being 
investigated. Clinical and environmental samples are being genotyped 
to support other epidemiological data.
F I G U R E
Epidemic curve of the outbreak of legionnaires’ disease in Fredrikstad-Sarpsborg, Norway, May 2005
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The rate of case reporting has now diminished, and based on 
epidemiological data, it is probable that the source is now inactive. 
Local health authorities have not issued any specific restrictions 
regarding staying in or travel to the area.
The outbreak has stimulated public discussion about statutory 
regulations for cooling towers and similar installations. Following a 
similar outbreak in Stavanger in 2001 [1], all owners of cooling towers 
are now required to notify local health authorities of their installation 
and to have an adequate system of control and maintenance. Local 
authorities have a statutory responsibility.
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UPDATE: OUTBREAK OF LEGIONNAIRES’ DISEASE IN NORWAY 
TRACED TO AIR SCRUBBER
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As of 8 June 2005, 55 cases of legionnaires’ disease including ten 
deaths have been diagnosed associated with an outbreak in southeast 
Norway [1,2]. The mean age of patients is 69 years, the median 
66 years. All of the patients are Norwegian residents; 33 are men and 
22 are women. The last case was in a patient who fell ill on 25 May.
The outbreak investigation included:
1.  A population-based retrospective cohort study where the 
exposure was the location of the cases’ residence in relation to 
several potential sources, and the outcome was legionnaires’ 
disease.
2.  A comparison of patient and environmental samples by 
restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLP) and random 
amplification of polymorphic DNA (RAPD) methods.
Both approaches indicated the same source, an air scrubber in a 
lignin production plant. The scrubber cleans particles in the air used 
in the production process by exposing it to a strong counterflow of 
water. The water in the scrubber has a high organic content and is 
circulated by a pump. A continuous input of fresh water helps to keep 
the dry-matter level constant and replace water lost as aerosol. The 
scrubber operates at 40°C and expels more than 4 cubic metres of 
water/hour as aerosol, with an airflow of 60 000 cubic metres/hour 
and velocity of about 20 metres/second. The tank of the scrubber 
was routinely cleaned with high-pressure hot water every 3-4 weeks, 
but no disinfection was used. The pump and pipes had not been 
manually cleaned.
The scrubber has been closed and there are no risks to tourists 
visiting the area or to other parts of Norway.
A risk assessment of air scrubbers regarding conditions facilitating 
legionella growth (such as temperature and biofilm formation) must 
be done when investigating outbreaks of legionellosis.
*  The outbreak investigation collaborators include: Fredrikstad and 
Sarpsborg municipalities, Nasjonalt folkehelseinstitutt, Sykehuset 
Østfold Fredrikstad, Telelab, Norsk Matanalyse, Universitetssykehuset 
Nord-Norge, Norsk institutt for luftforskning, and Geodata AS.
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TICKBORNE ENCEPHALITIS OUTBREAK IN ESTONIA LINKED TO RAW 
GOAT MILK, MAY-JUNE 2005
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In May and June 2005, 27 cases of tickborne encephalitis (TBE) 
were reported to the Estonia’s Tervisekaitseinspektsioon (Health 
Protection Inspectorate). All the cases occurred in two administrative 
territories: Tallinn city and Harju county. Of the 27 patients was 15 
were female and 12 were male, and their ages ranged between four 
and 69 years. 
The dates of symptom onset ranged from 9 May to 1 June. Fifteen 
patients had influenza-like symptoms (fever and/or headache); four 
patients reported vomiting and eight patients were admitted to 
hospital with neurological symptoms. 
A total of 24 patients were admitted to hospital. All clinical cases 
were laboratory confirmed, and no deaths have been reported. None 
of the patients had been vaccinated against TBE, and none of them 
reported being bitten by ticks before symptom onset.
Based on the results of the descriptive epidemiological investigation 
all cases were associated with consumption of raw (unpasteurised) 
goat milk that had been offered to customers to taste at a supermarket 
in Tallinn on 7 and 8 May 2005 as part of promotion. 
Serum specimens of 5 goats from the private breeding farm that 
supplied the milk were investigated for TBE virus neutralisation by the 
virology department of Smittskyddsinstitutet (the Swedish Institute 
for Infectious Disease Control) in Stockholm, Sweden. The results 
showed that one goat was clearly positive for TBE infection, and one 
goat showed borderline neutralisation.
Figure
Epidemic curve of the tickborne encephalitis outbreak linked to 
raw goat milk, Estonia, May – June 2005.
Discussion
Information about the outbreak was disseminated to ministries of 
health and public health institutes throughout Europe via the Early 
Warning and Response System (EWRS), in order to seek information 
on TBE cases in tourists who may have visited a supermarket in Tallinn 
and tasted raw goat milk. No additional cases in other countries have 
yet been identified. 
Other recent outbreaks of tickborne encephalitis associated 
with the consumption of raw goat and cow milk notified in Estonia 
include:
• 1990: household outbreak involving 3 family members.
• 1992: outbreak involving 10 military recruits.
• 2004:  household outbreak involving 3 family members and one 
guest. 
The milkborne route of transmission for TBE infection has been 
recognised since at least the 1950s [1-4].
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TWO OUTBREAKS OF NOROVIRUS INFECTIONS ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTED FROZEN RASPBERRIES, 
DENMARK, MAY-JUNE 2005
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On the weekend of 21-22 May, it was reported that 101 patients 
and 76 employees at the two Aalborg Hospitals, South and North, 
in Nothern Jutland, were ill with vomiting and diarrhoea. In the 
following four days, a further 43 patients and 52 employees, as well as 
4 relatives, were reported to be ill. Because of simultaneous outbreaks 
in the two physically separated hospitals, a foodborne source of 
infection was suspected. Cohort isolation of the sick patients was 
implemented, and some admissions, as well as a total of 43 operations, 
were cancelled. Sick employees were requested not to turn up for work 
until they had been well for at least 24 hours (48 hours for kitchen 
staff). In order to reduce the risk of infection, kitchen areas were 
disinfected and cleaning staff were instructed in disinfection of toilet 
areas. Infection control nurses and the Regional Food Inspectorate 
provided disinfection guidelines, for which a disinfectant that is active 
against norovirus was used.
Case-control studies were conducted among a total of 
120 employees and inpatients at the hospitals. The studies showed that 
the sick employees had all been at work on Thursday (odds ratio (OR) 
15; 95% confidence interval (CI) 3.4 to 71) and that the consumption 
of a ‘fromage blanc’ (fresh cheese) dessert containing frozen pieces of 
raspberries in the canteen that day was associated with an increased 
risk of disease (OR infinite, lower CI 3.4). Consumption of the same 
dessert with raspberries was also associated with illness in patients 
(OR 6.2; 95% CI 1.6 to 26). The suspicion of a norovirus infection was 
confirmed by the results of investigation of faecal specimens.
Outbreak on Sjaelland
From 3 June, several cases of gastrointestinal infection were also 
registered among the elderly in several areas in Sjaelland, and in the 
Greater Copenhagen area. The patients had received food from one 
particular food caterer supplying 12 municipalities with a ‘meals on 
wheels’ service as part of a home nursing scheme. On the basis of 
the experience from Aalborg, the possibility that this was another 
norovirus outbreak was thought to be likely, and the most likely 
source of infection a raspberry dessert that had been served to around 
1100 people between Wednesday 1 June and Friday 3 June. The frozen 
raspberries used were bought from the same importer that supplied 
the raspberries implicated in the outbreak in the Aalborg Hospitals.
As of 23 June, there appear to be at least 289 cases associated with 
this second outbreak. Several stool specimens collected from patients 
at Sjaelland were found positive for norovirus.
Discussion
This is a preliminary report of large foodborne outbreaks of 
norovirus infections associated with consumption of desserts made 
from frozen raspberries. The overall extent of these outbreaks, 
including secondary transmission, will be elucidated in ongoing 
investigations. Microbiological analyses of the raspberries as well 
as further analyses of stool specimens, including genotyping of 
norovirus, are also in progress. Preliminary results suggest that there 
may be more than one genotype involved.
It is important to note that the source of infection was recognised 
rapidly due to the swift response from the Medical Officer of Health, 
the Regional Food Inspectorate and the infection control department at 
Aalborg Hospital. Unfortunately, immediate withdrawal of the frozen 
raspberries from the market was not immediately implemented, and 
this delay resulted in another outbreak in Sjaelland that has afflicted 
at least 289 people in a very vulnerable age group. This outbreak could 
have been prevented by a more efficient recall.
After the cases at Sjaelland, the Danish Veterinary and Food 
Administration reinforced the recall, and the Danish importer has 
now withdrawn all similarly sourced raspberries from the market. 
The raspberries were imported from Poland, and were not distributed 
to ordinary retail outlets. It is not known if the raspberries were 
distributed to other countries. Immediately after the recognition of 
the outbreak in Aalborg, the Food-borne viruses in Europe network 
(FBVE, http://www.eufoodborneviruses.co.uk) was informed, and 
international warnings were sent through both the European Early 
Warning and Response System (EWRS) and the Rapid Alert System 
for Food and Feed (RASFF, http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/
rapidalert/index_en.htm).
Raspberries have previously been associated with outbreaks of 
norovirus, most recently in March, when a French school was affected 
[1]. However, the same producer was not involved as in the Danish 
outbreaks, and the strain in the outbreak in France (genogroup I 
genotype 5; Musgrove strain) has not been found so far in the recent 
Danish outbreaks.
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Tuberculosis (TB) is still a major global disease threat. Each 
year, there are over 8 million estimated cases and over 2 million 
deaths. In the World Health Organization European Region in 2003, 
416 085 TB cases were reported. There were different trends in three 
distinct areas of the Region (Figure 1). In most countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States of the former Soviet Union 
(CIS), notification rates continued to increase and exceeded 100 cases 
per 100 000 population in 2003. In the centre (Albania, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, 
Romania, Turkey), the overall rate was stable at around 50 cases per 
100 000, with the notable exception of Romania (142 per 100 000 in 
2003). In the European Union plus Andorra, Iceland, Israel, Monaco, 
Norway, San Marino and Switzerland (EU & West), there has been 
an overall decrease in annual cases from 18.1 per 100 000 in 1995 to 
13.6 in 2003, but numbers have been stable in recent years in several 
countries. The proportion of cases of foreign origin is increasing 
steadily (31% in 2003).
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This year, the theme of the World Stop TB Day (24 March) is 
focused on the role of care providers in the fight against TB. Prompt 
diagnosis and adequate treatment of active cases are the main ways 
of controlling TB. The long duration of standard anti-TB treatments 
(at least 6 months) makes good case management essential to 
improve adherence and ensure successful completion. WHO has 
set a treatment programme completion performance target of 85% 
for new pulmonary sputum smear positive TB cases. Monitoring 
treatment outcomes is essential for assessing the effectiveness of TB 
control and case management and international guidelines have been 
issued for this [1,2].
Treatment outcomes across Europe
Many European countries have started to monitor treatment 
outcome in recent years. Outcome information is usually collected 
for all definite pulmonary TB cases notified within a given period 
of time (cohort). The first outcome observed within 12 months of 
starting treatment or diagnosis is reported by clinicians and linked 
to case notification data. Aggregate data or, since 2002, anonymous 
individual TB case report data are reported to EuroTB.
Current outcome categories are treatment success, death, failure, 
default, transfer, continued treatment at 12 months and unknown. 
Outcomes are categorised differently in different countries, so 
international comparison is still difficult.
Preliminary treatment outcome data for definite TB cases notified 
in 2002 were available from 42 of the 52 countries in the WHO 
European Region, of which 21 provided individual data. Thirty-one 
countries provided data on complete cohorts, which included more 
than 99% of the confirmed cases notified nationwide (n=61 319).
The mean success rate among new cases (n=45 707) was 76% 
(median: 78%; country range: 59-100%). There were no real regional 
differences (Figure 2). Only six countries reached the 85% success 
target. In the EU & West (23 countries) and in the centre (4 countries), 
success among new cases was 80% or higher in 12 of the 16 countries 
where less than 2% cases had unknown outcomes. Exceptions were 
the three Baltic states (68-79%), where 7-10% cases, most of them 
with initial multidrug resistance, failed or continued treatment; 
and Hungary (59%) where 26% failed or continued treatment. In 
the countries where over 2% of outcomes were unknown, success 
rates ranged from 65% to 79%. In the four countries of the CIS, 
lower success rates were associated with frequent treatment failures 
(3-11%) and with high proportions of default, transferred or unknown 
outcomes in two countries. Death was less frequently reported in the 
CIS and in the centre (4%) than in the EU & West (7%), where the 
proportion of elderly cases, with higher mortality, is large.
F I G U R E  2
Cohort size and treatment outcome, new definite cases 
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The outcome of re-treated cases (n=13 864, not shown) was less 
favourable, with an overall success rate of 55% (median 68%; range 
36-100%), and higher proportions of deaths (9%), failures (11%), 
defaulters (13%) and continued treatments (5%).
Treatment outcome data are available from an increasing number 
of countries in Europe. In spite of remaining differences in category 
definitions, these data are informative and enable the description of 
some outcome determinants such as age or drug resistance.
In the EU & West, incomplete information, high mortality among 
the elderly and prolonged treatments appear to cause low success 
rates. Decentralised TB care implies active follow-up of clinicians to 
obtain complete outcome data and makes this monitoring labour-
intensive. Being vigilant for TB in high risk groups and improving 
patient management and completeness of data collection should 
enable most EU countries to reach the 85% treatment completion 
target.
In the Baltic States, the relatively high prevalence of primary 
multidrug resistance [3] definitely contributes to lower success 
rates, and most patients failing or continuing treatment have initial 
multidrug resistant TB.
In the countries of the CIS, high proportions of failures among 
new cases are also probably contributed to by primary drug resistance, 
although available data do not enable description of other factors. In 
this area, TB programmes should urgently address diagnosis and care 
of multidrug resistant TB and strengthen case management.
It is expected that ongoing efforts in standardising methods of 
treatment outcome monitoring, including the active involvement of 
TB care providers, will further improve inter-country comparisons 
and assist the progress towards TB control targets in Europe.
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At the beginning of 2005, a new and completely revised communicable 
disease notification was launched nationwide in Turkey.
The communicable diseases situation in Turkey varies greatly by 
region, and depends on the level of development and healthcare services 
provided there. These differences were taken into account when devising 
the new communicable disease surveillance system.
As in other countries, the total number of infections notified in 
Turkey is underrepresentative of the true burden of disease, and case 
definitions also vary.
Recent changes in disease epidemiology and developments 
in diagnostic capability meant that the notifiable diseases and 
the surveillance methods in the Turkish communicable disease 
notification system needed to be overhauled. In 2001, a committee of 
almost 60 academics and representatives from the Ministry of Health 
began a review of the national communicable disease notification 
system with a view to launching a new system. The committee will 
continue to meet every two years to revise the system.
The following factors were considered when making the list of 
notifiable diseases:
•  Is the disease a significant public health problem in Turkey, or 
could it be one in the future?
• Does the diagnostic capability exist?
•  Are special surveillance or prevention programmes already being 
carried out?
During the first stage of the review, standard case definitions for 
important communicable diseases were devised. During the second 
stage, the need for disease surveillance was considered. At the third 
stage, the diagnostic capacity for different diseases was reviewed. 
At the fourth stage, the notification system and the forms used for 
notification were examined and re-drafted.
To summarise, the new system consists of:
1.  An updated list of mandatorily notifiable diseases.
2.  Standard case definitions of mandatorily notifiable diseases.
3.  A new system of disease surveillance systems.
4.   Systems for immediate and standard notification for each 
notifiable disease.
The new list of mandatorily notifiable diseases consists of 
51 diseases, divided into four groups.
Group A mandatorily notifiable diseases
Data must be notified to the regional health authorities by all 
healthcare institutions, including primary healthcare. Most patients 
with these infections initially present to primary healthcare, and 
the physician diagnoses and notifies the infection according to the 
standard case definition. If diagnostic capacity is limited, the patient is 
referred or refers themselves to a state hospital. The state hospital must 
then notify the case to the regional health authorities, so that necessary 
contact tracing can be undertaken, and the source of the infection 
investigated, with the support of the provincial health directorate.
The diseases in group A are:
• Acute bloody diarrhoea
• Acute viral hepatitis
• AIDS
• Anthrax
• Brucellosis
• Cholera
• Cutaneous leishmaniasis
• Diphtheria
• Gonorrhoea
• HIV
• Malaria
• Measles
• Meningococcal meningitis
• Mumps
• Neonatal tetanus
• Pertussis
• Poliomyelitis
• Rabies and suspected rabies exposure
• Rubella
• Syphilis
• Tetanus
• Tuberculosis
• Typhoid fever
Group B mandatorily notifiable diseases
Diseases in group B have either never been seen in Turkey or 
not been present for a long time. However, they are still present in 
some regions of the world, have high transmission potential and 
mortality, and three of the diseases, smallpox, yellow fever and plague, 
are required to be reported according to the International Health 
Regulations. Any healthcare institution that encounters a possible case 
must directly notify the Turkish Ministry of Health immediately.
The Ministry of Health is then responsible for reporting these at 
an international level as well as implementing control measures.
The diseases in Group B are:
• Epidemic typhus
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• Plague
• Smallpox
• Yellow fever
Group C mandatorily notifiable diseases
Most of the diseases in group C are new additions to the notification 
system. With the exception of trachoma, they are only under sentinel 
surveillance. This is because:
•  Some of these diseases can only been diagnosed by state hospitals 
or other specialist institutions or laboratories. The notification 
done by these institutions is accepted as adequate.
•  For diseases such as influenza, notification of each single case 
is not necessary, but identification of outbreaks and typing 
of infections is Surveillance of group C diseases is a new and 
important application in Turkey’s healthcare system. Provincial 
health directorates are responsible for acting on the information 
generated.
The diseases in Group C are:
• Acute haemorrhagic fever syndromes
• Congenital rubella syndrome
• Echinococcus
• Haemophilus influenzae type B meningitis
• Influenza
• Legionnaires’ disease
• Leprosy
• Leptospirosis
• New variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)
• Schistomiasis
• Sub-acute sclerozive panancephalitis (SSPE)
• Toxoplasmosis
• Trachoma
• Tularaemia
• Visceral leishmaniasis
Group D mandatory notifiable infectious agents
Group D involves the notification of an infectious agent. This is 
an important innovation that involves the direct participation of 
laboratories in the notification system. The aim is to get data on the 
source of communicable diseases that remain a public health problem, 
and to study the epidemiology of these diseases when necessary. Only 
laboratories using acceptable diagnostic techniques will be able notify 
cases. Group D data are notified to the provincial health directorates 
who implement actions. Group D surveillance type, with the role 
of the laboratories at the notification of the A, B, C group diseases, 
will obtain a working comprehension with quality assurance and 
standardisation.
The infectious agents in Group D are:
• Campylobacter jejuni
• Chlamydia trachomatis (as a sexually transmitted infection)
• Cryptosporidium 
• Entamoeba histolytica
• Enterohemorraghic E. coli (EHEC)
• Giardia intestinalis
• Listeria monocytogenes
• Salmonella (Non-typhoidal Salmonellosis)
• Shigella
The information obtained from Group D surveillance, with the role 
of the laboratories at the notification of the A, B, C group diseases, will 
be quality assured and standardised.
The former communicable disease surveillance system has been 
completely replaced by the new system. Healthcare staff throughout 
Turkey are being trained in the new notification system. A national 
training meeting and several meetings at provincial level were held, and 
training materials have included 33 000 manuals, 50 000 CD-ROMS, 
and 100 000 posters.
Turkey has a Bilateral Cooperation Agreement (BCA) with the World 
Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, and it is hoped that 
this will be a source of funding for the new system.
COMMUNITY-ACQUIRED PVL+ MRSA IN IRELAND: 
A PRELIMINARY REPORT
A Rossney, P Morgan, B O’Connell
National MRSA Reference Laboratory, Dublin, Ireland
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Cases of community-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (CA-MRSA) infection were recently detected for the first time 
in Ireland [1]. CA-MRSA infections have been reported in recent years 
from many countries around the world. In a study comparing 117 CA-
MRSA isolates from three continents, it was shown that in all cases, 
methicillin resistance was encoded by the SCCmec IV genetic complex. 
In addition, all the isolates contained the Panton-Valentine leukocidin 
(PVL) genes lukS-PV and lukF-PV. These encode the synergistic PVL 
proteins LukS and LukF, which damage host cell membranes.
In a preliminary study of blood culture isolates of MRSA submitted 
to the Irish National MRSA Reference Laboratory during the second 
quarter of 2003, from Irish hospitals participating in the European 
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System, two of 112 isolates 
carried the PVL genes. Six isolates (from skin or nose) from six 
patients in whom CA-MRSA infection was suspected in 2004 also 
tested positive for PVL genes. All of these isolates have not yet been 
tested for mecA by PCR but were methicillin resistant by disk diffusion. 
Four of the 2004 isolates were obtained from one family: a child with 
a soft tissue infection and three asymptomatic family members. The 
other two patients had skin infections and an epidemiological link 
was suspected but not proven.
Seven of the eight patients with PVL+ MRSA did not have risk 
factors for hospital acquisition of MRSA. Specifically, they had 
not been admitted to hospital for at least two years, they had not 
used antimicrobials within the last year or had close contact with 
a healthcare worker or relative who had recently been in hospital. 
The isolate from the eighth patient was probably acquired in the 
community abroad.
All eight isolates were susceptible to ciprofloxacin; seven isolates 
were susceptible to erythromycin; and the four isolates from the one 
family were resistant to fusidic acid. Studies to further characterise 
these isolates and to determine the prevalence of PVL among other 
patient populations in Ireland are on-going but the results of this 
preliminary investigation suggest that CA-MRSA may already be a 
problem in Ireland.
MRSA is a major cause of hospital-acquired (HA) infection but 
in recent years it is being reported with increasing frequency in the 
community worldwide [2-4]. In the past, investigation of apparent 
CA-MRSA usually revealed some underlying healthcare-associated 
(HCA) risk factor such as recent hospitalisation, close contact with 
a patient who had been in hospital recently or previous antibiotic 
therapy. While hospital acquired-MRSA (HA-MRSA) may contribute 
to the burden of MRSA in the community, MRSA in patients without 
healthcare-associated risk factors is an emerging problem.
CA-MRSA has been reported worldwide in schools, prisons, 
sports teams, day-care centres, homeless shelters and military bases. 
Risk factors among these groups were minor skin trauma and risky 
practices including sharing of personal items such as towels. CA-MRSA 
from different geographical areas share a number of characteristics. 
Unlike HA-MRSA which are frequently multi-antibiotic resistant, 
CA-MRSA tend not to be multi-antibiotic resistant, tend to exhibit 
lower oxacillin minimum inhibitory concentrations and have shorter 
doubling times [2-5].
Clinically CA-MRSA appears to be more virulent than methicillin 
susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) (PVL is found in only 
2% to 3% of MSSA strains) [4,6]. In addition to PVL, one strain of 
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CA-MRSA has been shown to carry many additional virulence genes 
[2,4,7].
The National MRSA Reference Laboratory is inviting microbiology 
laboratories throughout Ireland to submit suspect isolates for 
testing.
Adapted from reference 1 by the Eurosurveillance editorial team.
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Between January and March 2005, 45 trichinellosis cases were 
notified to the Public Health Agency (PHA) of Latvia. This represents 
a 246% increase on the same period in 2004, and involved 42 patients 
in three outbreaks, and three sporadic cases.
The largest of these outbreaks affected 27 patients and occurred 
between 28 February and 14 March. Cases occurred in three 
administrative territories (Riga, the capital of Latvia, the district 
around Riga, and the Madona district). Epidemiological analysis 
linked the infection to eating salted streaky bacon bought at Riga 
central market. Of the 27 patients, 18 were female and 9 were male. 
The average age of the patients was 41 (range: 13 – 60).
The main symptoms were weakness, nausea, facial oedema (more 
then half of the cases) and fever – in more than in half the cases, 
the body temperature exceeded 38°C. All the patients were admitted 
to hospital. The incubation period ranged between two and four 
weeks.
F I G U R E  1
Patients in the 2005 Riga outbreak of trichinellosis, by onset 
of illness and place of residence 
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The Latvian Food and Veterinary Service (FVS) collected 37 meat 
samples from retail outlets identified in the investigation, and all 
tested negative for trichinella larvae. One retail outlet was found 
to be selling pork of unknown origin which came with falsified 
delivery notes,so the pork had not been tested for Trichinella spiralis 
in government-supervised inspections. The descriptive epidemiology 
of those who were ill strongly implicated this streaky bacon as the 
vehicle for infection. A case-control study was not carried out. It was 
not possible to confirm that the trichinellosis outbreak was caused 
by the bacon, as none was available for testing.
Trichinellosis situation in humans
Trichinellosis in both humans and animals is a mandatorily 
notifiable disease in Latvia, and sporadic cases must be registered 
and reported. All outbreaks are required to be reported. Since 2002, 
there has been a European case definition for reporting trichinellosis 
[1]. The laboratory diagnosis is by testing blood serum for antibodies 
to Trichinella spiralis.
Epidemiologists from the Public Health Agency investigate each 
case notified by a physician. The PHA, in collaboration with the Food 
and Veterinary Service (FVS), check the producers of implicated foods 
if there is reasonable suspicion that a business may be connected 
with the case. In cases of human trichinellosis due to consumption 
of animal products or when the T. spiralis parasite is found in animal 
products and there is a potential risk of human infection, the PHA 
and FVS cooperate in exchanging information.
In the past seven years (1998-2004), 247 cases have been reported 
in Latvia. Annual case numbers peaked in 2000 with 91 cases, which 
included four outbreaks involving a total of 77 cases. 
In the period 2001-2004, the number of cases reported annually 
has remained steady (range: 20 – 24), with an incidence of between 
0.7 and 1 case per 100 000 inhabitants.In the last five years, cases 
of trichinellosis have been identified in all the age groups above 
1 year old.
F I G U R E  2
Human trichinellosis cases in Latvia, 1998-2004
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F I G U R E  3
Incidence of trichinellosis per 100 000 population, by age 
group, 2000-2004
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In the past four years (2001-2004), between one and three out-
breaks have been identified each year, involving between 2 and 20 
people. In each outbreak, the epidemiological investigation has 
shown that the infections were due to eating infected pork.
T A B L E  1
Outbreaks of trichinellosis in Latvia, 2000-2004
Year Total number of cases Outbreaks
Total number of patients 
in all outbreaks
2000 91 4 77
2001 20 1 2
2002 20 3 13
2003 22 2 20
2004 24 3 13
Trichinellosis situation in animals
The FVS is responsible for surveillance, reporting and control of 
zoonoses in the animal population and the food chain. It has produced 
guidelines for slaughter houses for the veterinary examination of 
cows, sheep, goats and horses.
Diagnosis in the FVS slaughter house laboratory is by:
• Trichinoscopy and compression or 
• Recovery of larvae after mechanical digestion of a sample.
All pig and horse carcasses are tested for trichinella larvae. If there 
are any positive results, the affected slaughterhouse is investigated and 
placed under restrictions while legally prescribed remedial measures 
are instituted. When animals are slaughtered at home, or hunted 
for personal consumption, the owner or hunter is responsible for 
ensuring the carcass is tested before it is consumed. (Table 2)
In the period 1999-2004, trichinellosis was identified in 3 pigs on 
one farm in 2000 and in 2 pigs on one farm in 2001. In each case the 
pigs were slaughtered at home without veterinary supervision. Every 
year, trichinellosis is found in large numbers of wild pigs.
To control trichinellosis outbreaks, the FVS organises unannounced 
checks on food producers that have been associated with trichinellosis 
outbreaks. In the first quarter of 2005, the FVS tested 58 samples from 
various retail grocery products (fresh pork, 17 samples; smoked pork 
and bacon, 33; salted bacon, 8) for Trichinella larvae. Trichinella larvae 
were not found in any of these samples.
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T A B L E  2
Epizootic situation of trichinellosis in Latvia, 1999-2004
Year
Pigs Wild pigs Lynx Beaver Foxes
Number 
of checked 
animals
Positive 
cases
Number 
of checked 
animals
Positive 
cases
Number 
of checked 
animals
Positive 
cases
Number 
of checked 
animals
Positive 
cases
Number 
of checked 
animals
Positive 
cases
1999 368 610 - 120 3 - - - - - -
2000 328 546 3 238 5 2 2 5 - - -
2001 322 723 2 567 7 - - 14 - - -
2002 446 408 - 583 9 - - 8 - 150 36
2003 429 171 - 313 13 2 2 8 - - -
2004 419 105 - 1022 12 - - 14 - - -
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The Europe-wide epidemic of lymphogranuloma venereum 
(LGV), caused by Chlamydia trachomatis serovar L2, is continuing. 
It is affecting men who have sex with men (MSM), many of whom are 
HIV positive. Outbreaks and various case reports have been described 
in several European countries and, more recently, in the United States 
and Canada. The outbreak is of public health importance, since LGV 
facilitates transmission of HIV and other blood-borne infections.
Overview of the LGV situation in Europe (March 2005)
In the Netherlands, 144 confirmed cases of LGV had been 
reported by March 2005, the majority in Amsterdam: 65 cases in 
2002/3 were identified retrospectively. In France, 142 cases of LGV 
have been confirmed, mainly in Paris and Bordeaux, of which 
21 in 2002/3 were identified retrospectively. In the United Kingdom 
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(UK), 34 confirmed cases have been reported since October 2004, 
the majority in London, with others reported in cities across the UK: 
8 were identified retrospectively. Concurrent incident infections with 
hepatitis C were diagnosed in the Netherlands and the UK. Only small 
clusters of cases have been reported from other European countries: 
8 cases in Belgium, 20 cases in Germany, three cases in Sweden and 
one in Spain.
Preliminary results of active surveillance systems in The 
Netherlands, France, the UK and the US, describe broadly similar 
trends and responses to the epidemics. The current outbreak 
of LGV is occurring in MSM only and is characterised by severe 
anorectal infections with long-lasting symptoms including rectal 
pain, tenesmus, rectal discharge and constipation. The majority 
of LGV patients are HIV positive. All reported a variety of sexual 
risk behaviours, including unprotected anal sex, with numerous 
anonymous partners. Epidemiological investigations of transmission 
risk factors are underway.
Recognition of cases
At first, rapid recognition of the outbreaks was hindered, because 
doctors and patients were not familiar with the signs and symptoms 
of the disease. There is a lack of licensed chlamydia polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) tests for rectal specimens and genotyping facilities. 
Reporting LGV is not mandatory in many countries and new cases 
have often not been reported in a timely way.
Notification through ESSTI ALERT (European Surveillance of 
Sexually Transmitted Infections early warning and alert system), 
informed epidemiologists in Europe of early LGV cases with 
international links, and prompted the investigation of possible LGV 
cases in the Netherlands and France. Active surveillance for LGV was 
implemented in the Netherlands in January 2004, in France in March 
2004 and in the UK in October 2004. Retrospective evaluation of 
possible cases in The Netherlands and France has confirmed that MSM 
with LGV were presenting to medical services as early as 2002.
Microbiological and clinical issues of LGV
The laboratory diagnosis of LGV ideally uses direct detection of 
Chlamydia trachomatis specific DNA in rectal specimens followed 
by amplification of the omp1 gene using nested PCR and restriction 
endonuclease digestion to identify LGV specific serovars (L1, L2 or 
L3). However, C. trachomatis nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs) 
are not licensed for use on rectal or pharyngeal specimens. Most 
commercial platforms perform well for rectal specimens but currently 
only reference laboratories and major centres with rectal specimen 
testing experience have validated these tests for use. Using unlicensed 
tests and the complexity of the confirmatory tests may have hindered 
the identification of LGV cases. Real-time PCR is needed that will 
identify L2 serovars directly from the specimen to allow timely and 
sensitive detection.
Preliminary results from ongoing clinical studies demonstrate that 
LGV-2 infections occur also in patients with no signs or symptoms. 
The first case of urethritis caused by LGV-2 in France was found 
in a male patient with no other genital or anorectal complaints. 
Wider screening of MSM is needed but this requires a validated 
real-time PCR. Such tests are currently being validated by a number 
of laboratories, including one in Amsterdam and the United States 
Centers for Disease Prevention and Control.
Serology has been widely used to diagnose LGV but this is not 
specific enough. However, direct detection may not always be possible 
and serology may have a role if the rectal specimen is negative, 
inhibitory, or it is not possible to amplify the omp1 gene. A high 
antibody titre in patients with proctitis is highly suspicious of LGV, 
whereas a low antibody titre with evidence of symptoms cannot 
confirm or exclude LGV.
Sequence diversity within the omp1 gene has been used to further 
identify strain variation. In the Amsterdam outbreak, a single strain 
known as AMSTLGVL2b was found, which has also been identified 
in France. Variants have been detected in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Confirmation of sequence variants is necessary to define 
the limits of the outbreaks in the future.
Information needs to disseminated on confirmation of LGV strains 
(by genotyping), evaluation of serology, international validation of the 
real-time PCR and confirmation of sequence variants. Information 
on reference laboratories should become available soon on the ESSTI 
website (http://www.essti.org/).
International information exchange and collaboration results in 
recommendations to diagnose and control outbreak.
ESSTI has facilitated international information exchange and 
collaboration since cases were first detected. In April 2005, a scientific 
conference was organised by ESSTI and RIVM, the Netherlands. 
The meeting provided the opportunity to formulate the following 
recommendations to improve LGV prevention and control efforts 
across Europe:
•  Clinical recognition still needs to be improved by increasing awareness 
of sexually transmitted infections among general physicians. 
•  Updated clinical information and guidance for investigation 
(including standardised questionnaires), diagnosis and management 
should be placed on the ESSTI website. 
•  International comparison of strains is required. More information 
sharing among European microbiologists would be beneficial. 
•  A Europe-wide accepted case definition and international 
recommendations for standard diagnostic methods are needed as 
quickly as possible. 
•  ESSTI should publish a list of reference laboratories competent at 
confirming LGV diagnosis. 
•  International internet-based anonymous reporting of LGV cases 
(real-time surveillance) should be considered. 
•  A multi-centre study on epidemic characteristics and clinical features 
of LGV proctitis among MSM should be considered. 
•  There is a continuing need for targeted interventions to improve the 
sexual health of MSM. 
Since European countries are not equally affected by the LGV 
epidemics, it was recommended that: 
•  In countries with no or few reported cases at present, more 
awareness of LGV is needed in the MSM community. Clinicians 
need information about the clinical features of LGV, diagnostics 
and methods of reporting. These countries should begin to identify 
laboratory diagnostic facilities and reference centres. 
•  In countries with a number of reported cases, active surveillance should 
be implemented and the transmission risk factors and clinical features 
need to be investigated thoroughly. International collaboration should 
increase the power of descriptive and analytic investigations. 
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In August and September 2004, a large outbreak of hepatitis A 
occurred involving tourists staying at a specific hotel (hotel X) in the 
Egyptian resort of Hurghada. A total of 351 cases associated with this 
outbreak were came to the attention of the Robert Koch-Institut (RKI): 
271 primary and 7 secondary infections reported in Germany, and 
60 primary and 13 secondary infections which were reported via the 
national public health institutes of eight other European countries.
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Descriptive epidemiology, Germany
In Germany, primary cases were defined as having been guests 
of the implicated hotel between June and August, with laboratory 
confirmation of recent HAV infection (n=8), clinical evidence of 
hepatitis A (n=5) or both (n=258). Patient ages ranged from 2 to 67 
years (median 34 years), and 54% were male. No deaths were reported, 
but some patients were very ill and needed prolonged convalescence. 
Two patients reported having been immunised against HAV before 
travel, one with two doses and the other with a full course (3 doses) 
of the hepatitis A and B combination vaccine in 2003.
Patients had stayed at the hotel in Egypt between 9 June and 
8 August, 2004 (Figure 1). Their length of stay varied from 6 to 21 days. 
The minimum period during which infections could have occurred 
was 24 June to 23 July. The infection source must have been present 
during this time, although possibly intermittently. No more than 52% 
of the infected guests stayed together at the hotel on any single day. 
Dates of symptom-onset were between 10 July and 8 September. The 
period from median day of hotel stay to onset of illness was between 
7 and 62 days (median: 30 days).
F I G U R E  1
Proportion of infected guests staying at hotel X on any respective 
date. The time period between the earliest patient’s last 
day and the latest patient’s first day in the hotel (minimum 
period during which infections occurred) is shown in blue.
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Other affected countries
The RKI informed other European countries in August about 
the outbreak via the European Union’s Early Warning and Response 
System (EWRS) and reports in Eurosurveillance Weekly [1,2]. The 
European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training 
(EPIET) was invited to join the investigation and provided a network 
of contacts to other potentially affected countries in this outbreak. 
The following European countries reported primary cases associated 
with this outbreak: Austria (18), Sweden (10), Denmark (9), the 
Netherlands (9), Belgium (6), the United Kingdom (5), Italy (2) and 
Switzerland (1). Secondary cases were noted only in Austria, where 
an outbreak with 13 cases occurred due to an infected tourist who 
returned to her job in commercial food preparation after staying at 
the hotel [3].
Case-control study of German patients
To identify the source(s) of infection in this outbreak, the Robert 
Koch Institute conducted a case-control study together with the state 
and local health authorities of Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and North 
Rhine-Westphalia. Based on the information provided by the hotel 
management, the following hypotheses regarding possible vehicles 
of infection were developed: consumption of ice cream, salads/raw 
vegetables and/or juices served mainly for breakfast. Information 
supplied by patients (18 years or older) who had stayed at the hotel 
during the minimum period of infection, was compared with that 
provided by healthy hotel guests (‘controls’, i.e. guests 18 years or older 
and not registered as cases, who had not been vaccinated against HAV 
and reported no previous infection). The information concerned 
foods and drinks consumed, as well as various holiday activities. Only 
one person per household was interviewed via telephone.
Sixty-nine cases and 36 controls were included in the statistical 
analysis, all of whom had stayed at least one day at hotel X between 24 
June and 23 July. Patients and controls did not differ significantly in age, 
sex, trips, bathing habits, in their consumption of ice cream or salads, 
or a number of other queried aspects. They did differ significantly 
with respect to whether they drank fruit juice served at the hotel 
breakfast buffet (82% of cases but only 64% of controls). Guests who 
developed hepatitis A disease after vacation were 2.6 times more likely 
to have drunk the juice than controls (95% CI: 1.1-6.6). Regarding 
the number of days on which cases and controls drank orange juice, a 
statistically significant dose-response relationship emerged (Figure 2). 
Consumption of grapefruit juice was also associated with an increased 
risk of disease: 32% of cases, but only 17% of controls remembered 
drinking it (difference not statistically significant).
F I G U R E  2
Days of orange juice consumption among cases and controls, 
odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses) 
comparing each category to the reference category
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Laboratory and environmental investigations
Genome sequences of hepatitis A virus isolated from 13 German 
cases were found to be identical (HAV genotype 1B). None of the 
hotel staff in Egypt were anti-HAV IgM-positive, making it unlikely 
that an infected employee was the source of infections. The Egyptian 
Ministry of Health and Population focused its investigation on the 
hotel’s suppliers. Independently of the case-control study results, the 
juice supplier came under suspicion. At the site of production, hygiene 
problems were identified and the juice was not heat-treated. None of 
the staff at the juice production company were IgM-positive, but staff 
members often changed.
Discussion and conclusions
The case-control study and Egyptian investigation results strongly 
implicate the juices served at the breakfast buffet as the vehicle of 
infection in this outbreak. Although fruit juices are well recognised 
vehicles of foodborne diseases,, citrus juices have only rarely been 
linked to hepatitis A outbreaks [4]. The fact that the juice was 
consumed by 60% of the healthy controls may be explained in part 
by fluctuating virus concentration within the juice over a 4-week 
period, resulting in varying degrees of exposure. This assumption 
is corroborated by the dose-response relationship regarding days of 
consumption. Furthermore, we can not exclude that some controls 
might not have been aware of a previous HAV infection or may have 
failed to mention previous HAV immunisation.
With 331 reported primary infections and several secondary 
infections in nine European countries, the outbreak associated 
with stay in hotel X was exceptionally large. A large proportion of 
German tourists in hotel X were not immunised against hepatitis 
A, although it is explicitly recommended for travellers to Egypt and 
other endemic areas by international as well as national guidelines. 
Some of the infected travellers reported that physicians, whom 
they had consulted for pre-travel advice, had considered hepatitis 
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A vaccination unnecessary for this type of travel and destination. 
This outbreak again emphasises the importance for tourists to seek 
adequate pre-travel advice, preferably in an institution specialised in 
travel medicine. Travel agencies should incorporate comprehensive 
pre-travel advice, including immunisations, into their catalogues or 
refer travellers to a competent institution for individual advice.
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A pilot project to screen 1000 woman aged between 18 and 30 years 
for genital chlamydia infection in the Nova Gorica region of Slovenia 
is underway.
In the first national survey of sexual lifestyles, attitude and health 
conducted in 1999-2001 in Slovenia, genital chlamydia prevalence 
was found to be 3.6% in the 25-34 age group and 4.1% in the 
18-24 age group for both men and women [1]. For the Nova Gorica 
screening project, we are targeting women aged between 18-30 to 
detect asymptomatic infections and to treat them and their partners. 
Although the evidence suggests that the prevalence in men is the 
same as women within the target age groups, there is no evidence 
that screening men influences the prevalence of genital chlamydia 
infection in women.
At this stage, and with limited available resources for the pilot, we 
decided to focus on women, who are more vulnerable to longer term 
sequelae of untreated infections. Screening and treatment is the most 
effective way to minimise the prevalence and transmission of genital 
chlamydia and pelvic inflammatory disease.
In Slovenia, genital chlamydia testing of women is mainly done 
by gynaecologists at primary healthcare facilities (gynaecological 
dispensaries). Some testing is also done at hospital gynaecology 
departments. Men are tested by dermatovenerologists in primary 
healthcare facilities, and some at a hospital dermatovenerological 
clinic. Genitourinary medicine is not accessible without referral from 
either gynaecologists or general practitioners.
Genital chlamydia infection is a notifiable disease by law, with all 
cases reported anonymously using soundex coding since 2001 [2].
Chlamydia epidemiology in the Nova Gorica region
In the Nova Gorica Health Region of Slovenia (103 000 inhabitants) 
between 2000 and 2004, 715 specimens, the majority of which were 
endocervical, were tested for Chlamydia trachomatis. There were 
132 positive tests (18.5%) (Figures 1 and 2).
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The screening project 
The project first analysed current chlamydia epidemiology in 
the Region. With the participation of regional primary care level 
gynaecologists, 1000 female patients aged 18-30 years are being 
screened.
Because all women must register to use gynaecology services, there 
is precise information on the number of women within certain age 
categories. There are 4700 registered women aged 18-24 years and 
4456 registered women aged 25-30 years. From this, we estimated that 
a sample of 1000 would be realistically achievable within the short 
time period that the project is running.
All women between the ages 18-30 years who consult gynaecologists 
in Nova Gorica region are being asked to participate in this project. 
If they agree, and give written informed consent, they are invited 
to provide a first void urine specimen for chlamydia testing. They 
are also asked to complete a short questionnaire on their social and 
demographic background and on their sexual behavioural [2].
On the basis of the FVU specimen test results, the prevalence of 
Chlamydia trachomatis urogenital infections in different age groups, 
and the sociodemographic and sexual behavioural risk factors for 
chlamydia urogenital infections can be estimated.
Diagnostic methods
Since 1986, direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) testing has been used 
to detect genital chlamydia infection in Nova Gorica. Project funding 
has obtained Mastercycler equipment which enables chlamydia 
detection by polymerase chain reaction (PCR); PCR is highly sensitive 
and is much more effective than DFA testing of individuals with 
asymptomatic infections.
Contribution to prevention work
Diagnosis, prevention and treatment of chlamydia require a 
multidisciplinary approach by health professionals. With the screening 
results, we aim to inform and promote screening of chlamydia 
infection among regional gynaecologists and affect public health 
policy on the issue.
Funding is provided through the Phare programme (http://
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/intro.htm), and one of 
the conditions of Phare funding is collaboration between European 
countries. This project is a collaboration with the Azienda per I Servizi 
Sanitari n. 2 “Isontina” Gorizia and Comune di Gorizia – Servizi 
Sociali in Italy, and leaflets giving information on genital chlamydia 
infection (symptoms, transmission, diagnosis, treatment, follow-up, 
prevention and safe sex) have been produced in both Slovene and 
Italian. These leaflets will be distributed in gynaecological dispensaries, 
schools, and to the media in Nova Gorica, Slovenia and the Gorizia 
region in Italy, with the intention of raising chlamydia awareness in 
young people.
The project started in October 2004 and is due to finish by 
October 2005. We hope that our results will provide support for the 
introduction of nationwide chlamydia screening in Slovenia.
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Foodborne disease outbreaks are a public health problem for 
certain population groups in Spain, because of their magnitude 
and severity [1]. The foods implicated in these outbreaks tend to 
be prepared with raw shell eggs, and Salmonella serotype Enteritidis 
tends to be the causative agent. In Spain, foodborne outbreaks due to 
consumption of eggs and egg products have not declined since 1998 
[2], despite the introduction of numerous prevention measures aimed 
at addressing this problem. Such measures include health education 
[3] and making it mandatory for food catering facilities that cook and/
or serve meals to replace raw shell eggs with pasteurised egg products 
when food is prepared without heat treatment and for immediate 
consumption [4].
There are a number of sources that provide information for 
surveillance of foodborne diseases and outbreaks in Spain. The 
Outbreak Reporting System (Sistema de Brotes) and the National 
Reference Laboratory of Spain are the most useful for outbreaks 
specifically linked to consumption of eggs or egg products. The 
Outbreak Reporting System collects epidemiological data from the 
regions of Spain [5]. The National Reference Laboratory shares data 
with other European countries via networks such as the International 
Surveillance Network for the Enteric Infections (Enter-net, http://
www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/inter/enter-net_menu.htm).
For this study, we analysed data on reported foodborne outbreaks 
in Spain associated with the consumption of eggs and egg products, 
for the period 2002 – 2003 (the most recent complete years available 
for both sources).
Results
Outbreak Reporting System
In Spain, a median of 951 (range: 882-989) foodborne outbreaks 
were reported in the 10 years preceding the study. In 2002 and 2003, 
the equivalent figures were 971 and 1227 outbreaks, respectively.
Outbreaks associated with consumption of eggs and egg 
products accounted for 41% of all foodborne disease outbreaks 
(895/2198), with a total of 6991 cases including 1059 hospital 
admissions and 6 deaths (Table 1). Although the number of 
foodborne disease outbreaks reported in 2003 rose overall, the 
percentage of these due to consumption of eggs and egg products 
was not notably different from that registered the previous year 
(40% in 2003 versus 42% in 2002).
T A B L E  3
Reported foodborne outbreaks and cases associated with consumption of eggs and egg products, Spain: 2002-2003
Year
Outbreak Reporting System (a) National Reference Laboratory (b)
No. of outbreaks 
(c)
No. of cases in 
outbreaks
No. of community 
outbreaks
No. of household 
outbreaks No. of outbreaks 
No. of cases in 
outbreaks
No. of community 
outbreaks
No. of household 
outbreaks
2002 403 3003 145 232 23 80 9 13
2003 492 3988 191 281 14 53 6 7
Total 895 6991 336 513 37 133 15 20
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The Outbreak Reporting System data for 2003 indicated an 
increase over 2002 in terms of both the number of community and 
household outbreaks, and the number of cases (Table 1). In 2003, 
57% of outbreaks were linked to the home, 38% were community 
outbreaks and, in 5% of outbreaks, the setting was not reported. 
Among the group of community outbreaks attention should be 
drawn to the food catering and handling sector, which accounted 
for 32% and 34% of all outbreaks, with a known setting in 2002 
and 2003, respectively (Figure 1). Of the 895 outbreaks linked to 
consumption of eggs and egg products, 85% (758 outbreaks) were 
due to salmonella. Salmonella Enteritidis, with 438 outbreaks, 
accounted for 58% of salmonellas in these outbreaks; moreover, 
it is thought that this percentage would be higher still if the serotype 
in the 310 outbreaks due to salmonella species were known.
F I G U R E  1
Foodborne disease outbreaks associated with eggs and egg 
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The foodstuff implicated (eggs and egg products) was 
laboratory confirmed in 1.7% (15 outbreaks), epidemiologically 
confirmed in 39% (353 outbreaks), and by both in 8% of instances 
(74 outbreaks). There was evidence of contributing factors in 
685 outbreaks (77%, 685/895), the most important being linked 
to unsafe food temperatures, consumption of raw foods, and 
preparation far in advance of consumption.
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Control measures are reported to have been implemented for 
70% of these outbreaks (629/895). Figure 3 shows that the most 
important control measure was health education, followed by 
inspection of premises and the monitoring of food handlers. 
In 11 outbreaks, intervention led to closure of the facility, and in 
4 outbreaks, to the imposition of penalties. 
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Over the study period (2002-2003), Spain’s National Salmonella 
and Shigella Reference Laboratory analysed 133 strains corresponding 
to cases in 37 outbreaks associated with consumption of eggs and egg 
products (23 outbreaks in 2002 and 14 in 2003).
Unlike the data from the Outbreak Reporting System, the data from 
the National Reference Laboratory indicated a marked decrease in the 
number of outbreaks across the two years studied (Table 1). A total 
of 54% (20/37) of these outbreaks took place in homes. The National 
Reference Laboratory of Spain obtained data on the suspected food 
in 34% of the outbreaks studied. The results yielded by this source 
pointed to eggs as being the suspected food in 12% of all salmonella 
outbreaks: nevertheless, if all outbreaks in which the suspected food 
was present were included, this percentage would rise to 62%. The 
Enteritidis serotype proved to be the causative agent in 89% (33/37) 
of outbreaks in which eggs were cited as the suspected food (Figure 4). 
Information was obtained on S. Enteritidis phage types in 32 egg-or 
egg-product-related outbreaks, with phage types 1 (13 outbreaks, 35% 
of the total) and 4 (6 outbreaks, 11% of the total) being identified 
most frequently. In the remaining 13 outbreaks, 7 different phage 
types were identified (21, 8, 6, 44, 4B, 1C and 7).
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Between December 2004 and March 2005, two cases of 
pertussis (whooping cough) in unvaccinated infants, both under 
two months of age, were reported to the same municipal health 
authority in the north of Portugal. These cases are part of a 
changing epidemiological pattern of infection due to Bordetella 
pertussis in Portugal.
The Portuguese national vaccination programme’s 
recommended schedule includes five doses of diphtheria-tetanus-
pertussis [1,2] whole cell (DTPw) pertussis vaccine. The first dose 
is recommended at two months of age and the fifth at 5-6 years of 
age [1]. Vaccine coverage in Portugal is high [3] and pertussis has 
been a statutorily reportable disease for many years. Reported cases 
of pertussis decreased since the 1960s and reached very low levels 
in the period 1993-2003 [4,5] (Table 1). In northern Portugal, 
fewer than 10 cases have been reported each year from 1993 to 2002 
to zero cases in 2003; there was a clear resurgence in 2004, when 
26 cases were reported (Table 1), with 2 deaths in children below 
2 months of age. No deaths were reported from 2000 to 2003. 
Both in the north, and in Portugal as a whole, most reported cases 
occurred in the first year of life. In the northern region, most of 
these cases in the first year of life were observed in infants under 
the age of six months, and no cases occurred in the eleventh and 
twelfth months of life (Figure 1).
In the north of Portugal, data on previous vaccination against 
pertussis was available for the 29 cases in the first year of life 
reported in the period 2000-2004: none of the 6 infants who were 
below the recommended age to receive the first dose of DTPw had 
been vaccinated before the onset of the disease; of the remaining 
23, only 7 had been vaccinated. Staff responsible for vaccination 
are carrying out detailed investigations of the pertussis cases that 
might have been prevented by vaccination.
 F I G U R E  4
Foodborne disease outbreaks associated with eggs and egg 
products, by serotype, Spain, 2002-2003
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Conclusions
No changes were observed in the pattern of presentation of 
foodborne disease outbreaks linked to consumption of eggs and egg 
products in 2002 and 2003 in relation to previous years [2]. Egg-or 
egg-product-related outbreaks accounted for 41% of all foodborne 
disease outbreaks reported to the Outbreak Reporting System in the 
study period. Salmonella was the causative agent in 85% of outbreaks 
associated with consumption of eggs, with Enteritidis being the most 
frequent serotype. The household setting is the predominant place of 
presentation of reported outbreaks in both the Outbreak Reporting 
System and the National Reference Laboratory. Outbreaks due to eggs 
and egg products tend to be more frequent in the months with the 
highest ambient temperatures, with the principal contributing factors 
being linked to inadequate food storage temperatures.
The rising trend in the number of outbreaks (both community and 
household) reported to the Outbreak Reporting System from 1999 
to 2003 leads us to believe that, notwithstanding the improvements 
in the surveillance system in some of the country’s Autonomous 
Regions, no changes have been achieved in the population’s habits 
with regard to basic egg-related salmonellosis prevention measures 
and, more seriously, that there is continuing non-compliance with the 
regulations designed to ensure prevention in the food catering sector. 
With the aim of reducing the incidence of these types of outbreaks, 
in 2003, the Ministry of Health & Consumer Affairs and the Ministry 
of Agriculture implemented a salmonella control programme in eggs 
and egg products [7] which lays down action proposals throughout 
the food chain.
In contrast to the Outbreak Reporting System, the results obtained 
by the National Reference Laboratory show a decrease in outbreaks 
across the study period of over 50% compared to previous years [2] 
and this substantial decline is again in evidence when the two study 
years are compared. This could be due to data processing changes 
implemented since 2002 and could reflect worse compliance in 
terms of the variables for ‘linked to outbreak’ and ‘food’. Another 
explanation could be that data from only a small proportion of 
outbreaks in Spain are collected by the National Reference Laboratory, 
and a relatively small change in the numbers may result in a large 
percentage change.
There are currently plans to integrate the data from the National 
Reference Laboratory and the Outbreak Reporting System, in order 
to improve knowledge of the risks associated with the appearance of 
new specific salmonella serotypes.
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T A B L E  1
Number of reported cases of pertussis in Portugal and 
in the northern region, in the period 1993-2004. All ages 
and in the first year of life
 Year
Portugal Northern region of Portugal
All ages < 1 year All ages < 1 year
1993 26 Not available 5 2
1994 19 Not available 4 4
1995 19 Not available 5 4
1996 16 14 7 7
1997 11 9 1 1
1998 9 6 6 3
1999 12 11 3 3
2000 22 13 4 3
2001 2 2 1 1
2002 2 2 1 1
2003 4 4 0 0
2004 Not available Not available 26 24
F I G U R E
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Case 1
This case was in a baby boy who died on 16 December 2004, 
following illness onset on 7 December and hospital admission on 
14 December. The syndrome was typical of pertussis and the case was 
confirmed after positive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing of a 
nasopharyngeal specimen. Blood samples from the three household 
contacts in March 2005 were tested for specific IgM and IgG using 
ELISA (Pertussis Toxin® – Genzyme Virotech GmbH). On the basis 
of reported cough in the mother during the week before onset of 
symptoms in her child and serological results (Table 2) it is very 
likely that the mother transmitted B. pertussis to the baby before the 
recommended age of vaccination with DTPw.
Case 2
This case was in a baby girl, whose cough began on 27 February 
2005 and became intense on 4 March, and who was admitted to 
hospital the next day. The case was confirmed after a positive PCR 
test (nasopharyngeal specimen). The baby was put into isolation, 
treated with erythromycin and cefotaxime, and recovered. The 
other children in the ward and the household contacts received 
azithromycin. Blood samples were collected from the five household 
contacts (10/05/2005) and tested for specific IgM and IgG using 
ELISA (Pertussis Toxin® – Genzyme Virotech GmbH). On the basis 
of reported cough in the mother during the week before onset of 
symptoms in her child and serological results (Table 3) it is very 
likely that the mother transmitted B. pertussis to the baby. The first 
dose of DTPw, given to the child after the first mild symptoms, did 
not prevent the occurrence of the typical pertussis syndrome.
T A B L E  2
Vaccination history and serology among household contacts of case 1
Household 
member Age Vaccination history
Date of onset/
admission to hospital IgG (*) (U/ml) IgM (*) (U/ml)
Infant 1 month BCG and hepatitis B vaccine October 2004 Symptom onset 7 Dec. 2004, admission to hospital 14 December 2004 Not available Not available
Mother 17 years 5 doses of DTPw in childhood (final dose in December 1996) Cough in the week before onset in the child Positive 42.1 Positive 12.3 
Father 25 years 3 doses of DTPw in the first year of life No recent respiratory signs or symptoms Positive 13.9 Borderline 10.1
Aunt 44 years No vaccines recorded before 1974. Other vacci-nes recorded after that No recent respiratory signs or symptoms Positive 11.6 Negative 8.3
(*) Specific B. pertussis antibodies; positive if U/ml> 11.0
T A B L E  3
Vaccination history and serology among household contacts of case 2
Household 
member Age Vaccination history Date of onset/admission to hospital IgG (*) (U/ml) IgM (*) (U/ml)
Infant 1 month
BCG and hepatitis B vaccine January 2005
DTPwHib and OPV on 3 March 2005 
Symptom onset 27 February 2005, admission 
to hospital 5 March 2005 Not available Not available
Mother 39 years DTPw: 3 doses in 1967); 1 dose in 1968 - Other vaccines
Persistent cough from 2 weeks before 
child’s date of onset Positive 30.2 Positive 12.8 
Father 45 years
Never vaccinated against pertussis
Other vaccines
No recent respiratory signs or symptoms Positive 13 Borderline 9 
Brother 12 years Five doses of DTPw (final dose March 2003) - Other vaccines No recent respiratory signs or symptoms Positive 24.4 Borderline 9.9 
Brother 9 years Five doses of DTPw (final dose February 2001) - Other vaccines No recent respiratory signs or symptoms Positive 12 Borderline 10.1 
Sister 6 years Five doses of DTPw (final dose February 2004) - Other vaccines No recent respiratory signs or symptoms Positive 17.6 Borderline 9.6
(*) Specific B. pertussis antibodies; positive if U/ml> 11.0
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Discussion
These findings are consistent with previously published 
observations: unvaccinated infants get classic pertussis symptoms 
[6] and infection results from exposure to B. pertussis transmitted by 
siblings or parents [6-8]. They are also consistent with the reported 
resurgence of pertussis in other countries with high vaccination 
coverage [9]. In common with surveillance scientists elsewhere, 
we are not sure whether the availability of PCR as a diagnostic tool 
has contributed to the increase of reported pertussis cases in the 
north of Portugal [10] Pertussis vaccination appears to have limited 
impact on interrupting transmission, as both natural infection and 
vaccination protect for a limited time only [11]. A well-documented 
gradual decrease in protection leads to a wide variation in severity 
of symptoms, posing a major challenge to diagnosis and reporting 
systems, and hampering surveillance [12]. The data reported here 
contribute to the evidence which suggests that childhood vaccination 
does not generate enough herd immunity to prevent infection in 
infants who are too young to be vaccinated.
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UK GUIDELINE FOR MANAGING MENINGOCOCCAL DISEASE 
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Practical guidelines on the management of meningococcal 
disease in universities have recently been published in the United 
Kingdom [1].
Universities in the UK are increasingly aware that cases of 
meningococcal disease cause great distress and disturbance on 
campuses. Living arrangements and student lifestyles pose particular 
problems in public health management: for example, many students 
in the UK study at universities far from their home towns, and live in 
one-person rooms within halls of residence that may accommodate 
several hundred students. Misinformation about incidents may spread 
quickly and panic can easily result. Students who have recently left 
home may feel vulnerable especially if they have not yet established 
good access to local primary care services.
A peak of incidence in meningococcal disease in late teenage 
years is well recognized, and this peak corresponds with the age at 
which most students start university and at which the prevalence of 
carriage is rising [2,3]. University students in the UK are at higher 
risk compared with non-students of the same age group [4]. The risk 
is highest among first year students [5]. Students starting university 
are likely to be exposed to a wide variety of meningococcal strains, 
many of which they may not have encountered previously, and in a 
setting where extensive social interaction occurs.
This publication provides advice on drawing up plans for 
universities and public health services with suggested action before 
and after cases occur. Preventive advice includes checking for 
immunisation with meningococcal conjugate C vaccine, recommended 
in the UK up to the age of 25 years. The guidelines propose that 
each university formulate a management protocol for dealing with 
cases and outbreaks. Prompt and accurate communication to raise 
awareness of symptoms in students and healthcare providers, and 
to provide reassurance to students, is essential. Effective systems are 
recommended for monitoring and supporting students during illness, 
and providing rapid medical assistance when necessary.
Although the UK guideline for students is a practical and complete 
document that addresses pathogenesis and transmission of Neisseria 
meningitidis and control strategies to limit mortality and morbidity of 
the disease among universities students in UK, this guideline has much 
less relevance in European countries such as France, because students 
tend to continue to live in the family home during their university 
education, or to share apartments with a handful of other students, 
and they tend to socialise in smaller groups. Therefore this group is 
not considered as a high risk group for meningococcal disease. In 
France, the rate of meningococcal disease in teenagers (15-19 years 
old) is higher than in older age groups [6] and is associated with social 
behaviour rather than any particular living conditions.
Although the pathogenicity of N. meningitidis is universal, large 
differences in incidence rates are observed in Europe, both between 
neighbouring countries and within the same country. This reflects 
differences in the epidemiology of the circulating clones, environmental 
factors such as living conditions, and perhaps also some genetic factors 
and the national control strategy policies. Vaccination programmes 
are the primary prevention tool for meningococcal disease, but rapid 
identification and medical care seeking to limit fatality and sequelae 
and to prevent secondary cases are very important, and countries 
that have already produced recommendations addressing these issues 
should share these with countries that do not have the benefit of 
expertise or capacity to establish national guidelines. Comparisons of 
guidelines, and of the impact of those guidelines, are crucial to better 
control the disease at national and European level [7].
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